THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY

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FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY


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Foundations of Sociology

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To My Honored Colleague

Professor George Elliott Howard

EQUALLY RENOWNED FOR
THE EMINENCE OF HIS SCHOLARSHIP
AND THE LOFTINESS OF HIS CHARACTER

This Book is Dedicated

PREFACE

To the student of society present themselves the questions, *What is? What has been? What tends to be? What may be?* The first calls for descriptive sociology; the second evokes historical sociology; the third summons into being theoretical sociology; the fourth is a demand for practical sociology. In a way, however, the first two are tributary to the third. Laws and generalizations are the coveted treasure of those who know, and therefore the inquiry which establishes *what tends to be* yields the sociology that ranks with such sciences as biology and psychology.

We seek truth not merely for the pleasure of knowing, but in order to have a lamp for our feet. We toil at building sound theory in order that we may know what to do and what to avoid. Hence all the labors of social investigators finally empty into practical sociology. This branch first frames a worthy and realizable ideal and then, availing itself of theoretical sociology, indicates what measures will so take advantage of the trend of things as to transmute the actual into the ideal. The goal set up may be a far-off social Utopia; but again it may be nothing more radical than the stamping out of alcoholism, the suppression of war, or the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men. Society is to be led toward the goal along routes intelligently laid out

with due regard to human nature and to the obscure tendencies that lurk in the social deeps.

Whether we like it or not men are becoming conscious of their social existence. It is no longer possible for them to take their institutions in the naïve, unconscious way of barbarians. Looking across frontiers and centuries they come to know too much about the practice of other times and peoples to preserve an unshaken confidence in an institution they cannot rationally justify. If to-day a people clings to its own type of family or school or criminal code when they are put to the question, it does so on assignable grounds; and if it gives them up, it will renounce them for explicit reasons. Now that every social arrangement, however venerable, is required to submit its credentials, the demand for a valid sociology must grow. The iconoclast who attacks an institution in the name of a certain theory of society is met by a conservative who withstands him in the name of another theory of society.

The solution of the larger social problems demands not only special data but also the light of general principles. The heaping together of all the pertinent facts does not equip us to deal successfully with the drink problem, the woman question, race friction or the factory labor of children. We need to know the sympathetic connections that bind the phenomena we are dealing with to other masses of social fact. We must have, moreover, some notion of what has been and what tends to be in this particular sphere of social life, lest we waste our strength in vainly

trying to dam a stream of tendency we might be able to guide. Not unpractical, then, are those who withdraw a little from the perplexities of the hour in order to work out a body of general social theory. They are like the irrigator who diverts the water farther up stream and loses a season in building a longer canal, in order at last to lead an ampler flow upon a wider tract.

It will be long before sociology becomes so exact that it can affirm of a policy "*This is scientific; consider no other!*" What we may reasonably hope for is that, as the laws of social phenomena come to light, many extreme proposals will be barred from consideration and the intelligent public will center its attention upon a smaller number of policies. Thus we already begin to see autocracy and anarchy eliminated as projects of government and sacrament and contract shut out as theories of the marriage relation. The growth of sociology is likely to confine within ever narrower limits and focus upon an ever smaller number of measures the discussions relating to family, property, association, education, crime, pauperism, colonization, migration, class relations, race relations, war, and government.

An authoritative body of social theory exists at present as aspiration rather than fact. In this volume the writer has ventured on little beyond the laying of foundations. The erection upon them of an enduring superstructure is a task for the future.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

Lincoln, Nebraska, April, 1905.

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FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY

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I

THE SCOPE AND TASK OF SOCIOLOGY[1]

We are told that the subject-matter of sociology is the social aggregate. But what is meant by the social aggregate? Where does it begin, where end? Is it humanity, the race, the nation, the community, the class, or the voluntary association? "Study the social organism," they bid us, but nowhere do we perceive a social body complete in itself, with head and members, periphery and viscera. We see extending everywhere a web of human beings, woven now close, now loose; binding men together sometimes with many threads, sometimes with few; uniting them at times directly, oftener indirectly, through other men, or through centers of attachment such as common interests, ideals, or institutions. Where in this continuous tissue shall we find a social cadaver to dissect?

In another quarter it is held that sociology is concerned only with the action of human groups on one another—social phenomena—and the influence of the group on its individual members—psycho-social

[1] *Vide The American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1903.

phenomena. According to Gumplowicz[1] and Bauer,[2] not social wholes, but the hundred interlacing groups into which men combine, are the proper subject of study. This, no doubt, is an enticing conception, for it excuses us from showing how groups form and how a group-type or a group-will arises out of the play of mind on mind. It is not clear, however, that the sociologist may ignore the genesis of the group any more than the biologist may ignore the genesis of the organism. Then, too, quite aside from the group, there are man-to-man relations, which are well worth studying. How the social mystery begins to clear when we have made out such typical relations as those between model and imitator, apostle and disciple, leader and follower, between two dissentients, two competitors, or two comrades! Yet such a couple is not a group any more than a molecule of two atoms is a body or a binary star is a solar system.

Most helpful is Simmel's notion[3] that the true matter of sociology is not the groups themselves, but the *modes* or *forms* of association into groups. In bodies the most diverse—a church or a guild, a trust or an art league—may be found identical modes of union. Despite their infinite variety of purpose, the groupings of men reduce to a few principles of association. Among such "forms" are equality, superiority and subordination, division of

[1] "Sociologie et politique," sec. 20.
[2] "Les classes sociales."
[3] "The Problem of Sociology," *Annals of the American Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science*, Nov., 1895.

labor, imitation and opposition, secrecy, and hierarchy. To work out the various relations in which associates may stand to one another, and to discover what happens to groups in consequence of the more or less of each relation, is the task of the sociologist.

Nevertheless, it is better to consider this attractive area, not the domain of sociology, but only one of its provinces, viz., that of *social morphology.* The partialness of a conception which focuses our gaze on the human interactions themselves is well brought out by comparing it with another conception which rivets attention on the results or products of these interactions. For Dr. Ward the subject-matter of sociology consists in *human achievement.* How do lauguages, sciences, and arts come into being? How does the coral reef of civilization rise? This is certainly one of the most fascinating and practical of studies, but, as Ward distinctly states, it does not cover all the ground. His superb *Pure Sociology* should be, perhaps, the second or third volume in a complete treatise on sociology. For how can you draw a firm line between those modes of human interaction which yield a permanent product, and those which leave behind them no lasting result? Mobs and panics, public opinion and social suggestion, are certainly worthy of study, albeit they contribute nothing to the sum of human achievement.

A widening circle of thinkers make sociology equivalent to *the science of association.* They would have it deal with the conditions, motives, modes, phases, and products of association, whether

animal or human. Here is, indeed, a virgin field to till, and to it we all prudently retire when our neighbors complain of us as poachers and claim-jumpers. But who contents himself with this territory? Professor Giddings so conceives sociology, yet he tells us a few pages farther on that it is concerned with "the constant elements in history." All sociologists are keen in their ambition to find out the springs of human progress, to lay bare the prime causes of social transformations, to trace the influence of environment on the character of population, and to correlate the various phenomena of social life. Yet none of these properly belongs among the problems of association.

Social psychology, social morphology, social mechanics—all of them are, it seems to me, but convenient segments of a science, the subject-matter of which is *social phenomena.* I say "phenomena" in preference even to "activities," because it embraces beliefs and feelings as well as actions.

"But," it will be urged, "what phenomena *are* social? People yawn, sleep, mope, plan. Is this sort of thing *social* just because they are neighbors? The solitary ape behaves in the same way." This query cannot be better answered than in the words of Tarde: "What a man does without having learned from the example of another person, walking, crying, eating, mating, is purely vital; while walking with a certain step, singing a song, preferring at table one's national dishes and partaking of them

in a well-bred way, courting a woman after the manner of the time, are social."

If the social is not the vital, neither is it the individual psychic. So we might add as supplement to Tarde: "When one fears the dark, delights in color, craves a mate, or draws an inference from his own observations, that is merely *psychic.* But when one dreads heresy, delights in 'good form,' craves the feminine type of his time, or embraces the dogmas of his people, that is *social.*"

But we cannot go with Tarde when he says: "The social is the imitated." Psychologists recognize that one idea calls up another in virtue of contrast as well as in virtue of resemblance. Likewise a person's behavior may be determined in way of opposition as well as in way of imitation. "Contrary" children are controlled by telling them just the opposite of what you wish them to do. Likewise non-conformists in going out of their way to flout conventions pay involuntary homage to the influence of society. Foemen, competitors, and disputants so determine one another that it is impossible to gauge them without invoking the external factor. "Social," then, are all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one human being on another. If at first blush this seems to call for a "science of things human," let us remember that we are not bound to attend to phenomena that do not manifest themselves on a considerable scale. The individual case—David and Jonathan, Lear and his daughters—challenges only the artist. Let a

case recur often enough to present a type and there is room for the generalizer.

In the rag-carpet times of our grandmothers each housewife got her warp from the store, but provided the woof from her own rag-bag. Now the woof of each human being's life is supplied by that which is individual to him—his heredity, temperament, situation, history. But the warp is supplied from without, sometimes from a very slender stock, allowing little range of selection. Whence and how commonplace people get the knowledge, convictions, tastes, and standards that constitute the warp of their lives is explained by *social psychology*—and although some regard it as the top story of psychology, I prefer to make it the lower story of sociology.

The running of boundary lines acceptable to the biologist and the psychologist is not the worst of our task. There remains the harder problem of coming to terms with the special social sciences, such as economics, jurisprudence, and politics.

Sociology, as I have described it, does not meekly sidle in among the established sciences dealing with the various aspects of social life. It does not content itself with clearing and tilling some neglected tract. It has, indeed, reclaimed certain stretches of wilderness and made them its own. With this modest rôle, however, it is not satisfied. It aspires to nothing less than the suzerainty of the special social sciences. It expects them to surrender their autonomy and become dependencies, nay even prov-

inces, of sociology. The claim is bold, and we may be sure the workers in long-cultivated fields will resist such pretensions, unless there are the best of reasons for founding a single comprehensive science of social phenomena.

Such a reason is certainly not furnished by "the unity of the social aggregate." As we have seen, there is no well-defined social aggregate. The nation is the nearest to it, but the actual distinctness and oneness of the nation is a historical incident due to past wars. Every step in the peaceful assimilation of peoples brings us nearer the time when the globe will be enmeshed in an unending plexus of interpenetrating free associations, no one of which will arrogate to itself the title of "society."

Nor is a good reason furnished by that constant reciprocal action between *socii* which is expressed in the "social organism" concept. As division of labor, exchange, and competition, these interactions have long formed part of the stock-in-trade of economics. As mental communication, they are the staple of linguistics. As party activity and civic coöperation, they have been set forth by the science of politics. Wherefore, then, a new science to teach that "no man liveth unto himself?"

Some would justify a unitary treatment of society by making one species of social phenomena the cause of all the rest. However varied the aspects of social life, if there is but one causal center, one fountain head of change, there can be but one science. To Loria's eye all the non-economic factors running

through the social system—such as law, politics, and morality—derive from underlying economic conditions. The desire for wealth is the sole architect of ethical standards, legal norms, and the constitution of the state. As Loria takes the economic régime, so Vico and Fustel de Coulanges and Kidd take religion, Condorcet, Buckle, and Du Bois Reymond take science, as the *primum mobile* of the social world. All this, however, reads into human affairs a unity and simplicity that is not really there. There is more than one desire operating in society. The endeavor to reduce all kinds of social facts to a single cause is vain.

An adequate ground for creating an inclusive science lies in none of the foregoing considerations. Let us, then, attack the problem from another side. Let us consider under what conditions the established social sciences might vindicate the sacredness of their ancient boundaries and successfully withstand any scheme of merger into a more general science.

Suppose that the desires that constitute the springs of human action and the causes of social phenomena resolved into certain basic cravings, each distinct from the others in its object, and each stimulating men to a particular mode of activity in order to satisfy it. Suppose, furthermore, these specific desires never crossed or modified one another and were intractable to the unifying control of any world-view or ideal of life. Suppose, finally, that each craving, operating on a large scale, generated

in society certain appropriate dogmas, creeds, activities, and institutions, which remained separate from and unmixed with the collective manifestations of other cravings. Religious phenomena would then be unalloyed by ethical or political considerations. The forms of the family would be unaffected by industrial changes. The fine arts would run their course heedless of revolutions in the sphere of ideas.

Under these conditions there might exist for each principal kind of craving at work in social life an independent body of knowledge. The craving for wealth would mark out a sphere for *economics.* The sex and parental cravings would do the same for *genetics* or the science of the family. The lust for power would define *politics.* The sentiment of the wronged would fix the scope of *jurisprudence.* The craving for communion with the Unseen would bound the field of the *science of religion.* The attraction of like for like would make possible the *science of association.* There would be as many social sciences as there were facets to human nature, and if any bond drew them together into a larger synthesis, it would be supplied by psychology and not by a general sociology.

The mere statement of the requirements to be fulfilled in order to assure the sovereignty and equality of the special social sciences puts a sufficient quietus on such claims. Each is not the exclusive field of action of certain impulses. So far as specific cravings exist, they react upon and modify one another, they lie under the empery of the accepted

world-view or ideal of life, they are trimmed and adjusted to fit into a plan of life. Moreover, turning from the sphere of mind to that of society, we do not find one species of activities or institutions answering to the religious man, another to the political man, a third to the ethical man, or a fourth to the sociable man. The method of abstracting from human nature all its propensities save one, in order to get that one propensity operating, as it were, *in vacuo,* received its death-stroke when economists gave up speculating about "the economic man."

Although there are several facets to human nature, although each aspect of social life has in some sort a psychic basis of its own, still, the deeper we penetrate into the causes of human affairs, the more impressed are we with the cross-relations between social phenomena of different orders, and the more evident is the consensus that unites facts the most diverse in character. "Every culture form," says Grosse,[1] "is, as it were, an organism, in which all parts and functions stand in the closest interdependence." Much of our progress in the knowledge of society consists in establishing correlations, tracing subterranean actions and reactions between remote institutions. Reputations have been made by exposing the hidden link that unites slavery with cotton culture, caste with conquest, manhood suffrage with free land, the patriarchal family with

[1] "Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirthschaft," p. 7.

pastoralism, the multiplication of wants with the rise of a leisure class.

In the earlier social philosophy the prominent features of social life are referred directly to human nature. War is ascribed to the bad passions of men, and not to the pressure of population. Theological beliefs are supposed to flow from religious intuitions. Worship is held to be the expression of universal instincts. The ethical code is looked upon as a deliverance of individual consciences. The actual form of the family is derived from the "natures" of men and women and children. The law is thought to objectify the moral consciousness of mankind. In this vein Aristotle traces slavery to the natures of the born inferior and the born superior. Filmer derives the power of kings from the "natural" obedience of children to parents. Montesquieu makes despotism rest on fear, monarchy on honor, and a republic on virtue. Adam Smith traces the division of labor to a propensity "to truck, barter, or exchange one thing for another." Carlyle sees in dignities of rank a product of the hero-worship in human nature.

This manner of interpretation is now seen to be superficial. Often an institution does not exist in its own right but as an incident or by-product. The more we delve beneath the surface, the more we discover sympathetic connections between things. The fuller our knowledge, the more impressed we are with the relativity of each class of social phenomena to other classes. Society no longer falls

apart into neat segments like a peeled orange. State, law, religion, art, morals, industry, instead of presenting so many parallel streams of development, are studied rather as different aspects of *one social evolution.*

We see that standards of conduct are in intimate relation with theological beliefs, that laws are correlated with moral standards, that both reflect economic necessities, and that these, in turn, depend on the forwardness of the arts or on the proportion between population and land. The state is explained, not out of human nature, but in connection with ethnic heterogeneity, militant activities, or economic inequalities. The development of religion is shown to follow step by step the development of relations within the social group. Thus a disturbance in one department of social life awakens echoes and reverberations clear around the circle. It is a perception of this truth which leads Ingram[1] to declare: "No rational theory of the economic organs and functions of society can be constructed if they are considered as isolated from the rest." "A separate economic science" he deems "an impossibility as representing only one portion of a complex organism all whose parts and their actions are in a constant relation of correspondence and reciprocal modification."

The antiquated systems of social theory which take metaphysical assumptions or supposed properties of human nature as the point of departure for

[1] "History of Political Economy," p. 199.

their reasoning are sterile. The disciples of the abstract political economy, the unhistorical jurisprudence, the *a priori* ethics, and the speculative politics make no headway because they shut their eyes to the interdependence of dissimilar social facts. In each field of social inquiry the laurels are going to those investigators who look over into other fields, who correlate the form of government with humble geographical, military, or industrial facts, religious progress with family or tribal development, moral crises with changes in consumption or in the constitution of classes.

The certainty that profounder research will reveal still closer relations of this sort is the ground of our faith in the future of sociology. We know we can afford to bide our time. We do not need to plead or preach in order to win. In the long run the nature of things will prevail. Vested interests in learning will yield to the logic of facts. So far as social life is one, there will be one master science of social life. If not to-day, then to-morrow, if not by this generation, then by the next, the necessity for sociology will be fully recognized. There is a vacant chair among the great sciences, and sooner or later that chair will be filled.

Assuming the vassal and dependent character of the social sciences has been made clear beyond the shadow of a doubt, we next take up the question: "Are these sciences to become mere branches of sociology, or will they retain a measure of their old separateness and individuality?"

It may be they will stand to sociology as the special to the general. This is how the theory of agriculture, transportation, or commerce stands to economics. Administration and comparative legislation are special in respect to political science, just as histology and embryology are special with reference to biology. Now, a social science will be merely special sociology in two cases: (1) if the phenomena it treats of flow from the same desires that cause other kinds of social phenomena, or (2) if they are produced by individual desires, special in character, but so socialized and fused that they amount to a social need and the satisfying of them amounts to the discharge of a social function. Let us now apply these tests to the principal social sciences.

Take the *science of religion.* Will it shrink to a mere chapter in sociology? By no means. It might if faith were nothing but an incident of speculative thought or of social discipline. If pious beliefs were an outgrowth of collective thought and never of personal experience, if in worship men sought benefits rather than obeyed impulses, we might treat religious phenomena as a mere division of social phenomena. But religion has a private as well as a public aspect. It is not all a matter of social psychology; still less is it a matter of social institution. Nor is it a side issue to something larger, a by-product of sex-feeling or moral feeling or economic calculation. It has a tap-root, and this tap-root is that strange invasion from the sub-conscious

self which is variously known as ecstasy, rhapsody, divine afflatus or *gnosis*. Experience of this kind generates religious convictions. The yearning to taste or renew this "communion" leads men to pious exercises. Let these individual phenomena occur on a large scale and you have cults, creeds, and churches standing out in bold relief on the face of society. The actual sweep of a religion is, of course, due in large measure to self-seeking, propitiatory motives, and to its maintenance as a prop of social order. Thereby it falls under the surveillance of the group-interest and comes to sympathize with the changes in other departments of social life. Religion is, in fact, a growth springing from the soil of human nature, but taking its shape and hue from the social medium. The science of religion is for this reason under a dual dependence, owing allegiance to psychology no less than to sociology. It is this situation Mill has in mind when he says[1]: "The different kinds of social facts are in the main dependent, immediately and in the first resort, upon different kinds of causes, and therefore not only may with advantage, but must be, studied apart."

The relation of *ethics* to sociology bristles with difficulties. In the first place, ethics aspires not only to explain phenomena, but to appraise them. It differentiates ends. It values actions. It assumes the rôle of a normative science, whereas sociology does not venture beyond the causes and laws of the phenomena it considers. But there is an ethics that

[1] "A System of Logic," p. 565.

aims to understand, not to appraise, and it is this ethics alone which is on a footing with sociology.

Again, ethics may undertake to explain *actions,* or it may limit itself to those actions which affect other persons, *i. e., conduct.* Usually it has ignored what are termed "indifferent actions" and addressed itself to classifying and explaining the feelings, choices, and judgments of men in respect to modes of conduct. It is, of course, only in this narrower sense that ethics can be accounted a social science.

Now, is this "science of conduct" a semi-sovereign member of a federal empire or only a province in a unitary state? The answer depends upon the relative importance in ethical phenomena of special and general factors.

As regards *choices,* men are brought to take a socially safe line of conduct by all manner of sanctions, suggestions, standards, ideals, and valuations imposed from without. With all this social control there coöperate, however, two specific impulses—sympathy and the sense of justice. These are other-regarding, it is true, but they do not seem to have their origin in the influence of man on man. The one has its roots in instinct, the other is an off-shoot from early mental growth.[1]

Still more marked is the private factor in the *judgments* that men in their capacity of disinterested spectators pass upon the conduct of other men. If these judgments were always grounded on social utility, if they invariably encouraged safe actions,

[1] See the author's "Social Control," chs. II, III and IV.

and discouraged unsafe actions, they would amount to a self-preserving instinct in society. They would be *functional,* just as courts and reform schools are functional. Collective judgments as to good and bad would be, in effect, *institutions*—strong, upright pillars of society.

But, in point of fact, people do not praise or blame altogether as *socii.* The moral judgments, imperatives, and ideals they emit, although in the main purposeful, do betray considerable admixture of crude sentiment. The general reprobation of vice, idleness, waste, sacrilege, or impiety does not voice concern for the corporate welfare. It merely voices common, private sentiments. Of some of our judgments—abhorrence of unnatural practices, for instance—the roots run far down into our ancient, pre-social instincts.[1]

At a moment when ethicians, weary of juggling conscience, innate ideas of right and wrong, the Ten Commandments, and what-not out of the individual mind, are coming to perceive the social bases of morality, one is loth to lay a straw in their way. Yet it is well to recognize that, after all is said, ethics is more than a mere wing of sociology. Some of the piers that support it rest in biology, some in individual psychology, some in social psychology, and some in social morphology.

Politics, like ethics, has the double task of explaining what *is* and determining what *ought to be.* In so far as it aims to arrive at principles for the guid-

[1] "Social Control," ch. VIII.

ance of political action, it is more like an *art* than a *science,* but it may be termed a normative science. Still, it is possible to regard matters of government as phenomena, and to study them with a view to ascertaining the causes and laws of their occurrence. Political science of this ætiological sort will stand in some close relation to sociology. Whether it will stand to it as part to whole or as special to general, depends, as in the preceding cases, on the specificness of the forces and facts it deals with.

Now, government is not the sphere of operation of characteristic forces, but the meeting-place of nearly all the kinds of forces present in social life. "The functions of the state," it has well been remarked, "are coextensive with human interests." This is true only because the more important human desires—greed, vanity, sympathy with the weak, love of truth, passion for homogeneity, craving for justice—make themselves felt in moulding the policy of government. One motive leads to public relief of the poor, another motive inspires state endowment of research, a third impels to the artificial assimilation of the foreign elements in the population, a fourth dictates the seizure of tropical markets. In fact, almost every species of interest sooner or later records itself in government.

There are, to be sure, two special traits of human nature which come to light in government. The one is *the lust of dominating;* the other, its counterpart, is *the impatience of restraint.* In other words, power is sought for its own sake, and liberty is

prized for its own sake. Were these two forces alone implicated in government, political science would have a basis of its own apart from sociology. But who will seriously contend that the "will to power" is now the chief motive tending to enlarge the authority of the state, or that hatred of restraint is the chief counteracting force? In the early stages of social development a state is often the creation of a single energetic will. Says Mr. Bryce of the East:[1] "A military adventurer or the chief of a petty tribe suddenly rises to greatness, becomes the head of an army which attacks all its neighbors, and pursues a career of unbroken conquest till he has founded a mighty empire." With greater social advance, however, there is sure to arise a compact fabric of government and law, which offers successful resistance to the vaulting ambition of the individual. As regards the antagonistic force, Mr. Bryce observes:[2] "The abstract love of liberty has been a comparatively feeble passion." "Rebellions and revolutions are primarily made, not for the sake of freedom, but in order to get rid of some evil which touches men on a more tender place than their pride."

In fact, the political is simply imbedded in the social. Political grouping is not distinct from, but tends to be a resultant of, the linguistic, cultural, religious, and economic groupings of population. Political organization is only a part of social organ-

[1] "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," vol. II, p. 16.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 25.

ization. The substance of the state is prestige, time-hallowed relations, habits of coöperation and obedience. The sphere of government becomes an expression of collective need. The will that sets in motion the public organs is not the mere sum of individual wills, but the highly elaborated will of sections, classes, or the nation itself. Government is becoming functional to society, and if political science remains distinct, it will be because the breadth of the field calls for the specialist, and not because there are well-defined natural boundaries marking it off from sociology.

Comparative jurisprudence deals with phenomena which exhibit the working of two special principles of human nature—*the thirst for vengeance* that torments the sufferer of a wrong, and *the desire for fair play* that moves the beholders of a wrong. These formidable impulses were early led into the safe channels of legal redress, in order that society might be spared the evils of feud and retaliatory violence. In time, however, the law-originating impulses became socialized and rationalized. Inwrought with other motives, they come to express the will of the Social Personality.[1] The just settlement of disputes, from a private need, becomes a public function. When we consider the transformation of law by jurisconsults and judges, the enlargement of it by the action of the legislator, and the renovation of it in the name of the principle of

[1] See the chapter on "Law" in the author's "Social Control."

social utility, it is plain that jurisprudence cannot hope to be more than a feudatory state in the realm of sociology.

There is no reason why what is known as "the sociology of the family" together with the "population" section of political economy should not have been set apart as *genetics*. The family is certainly distinguished from other social structures by owing its existence to the highly special instincts of *sex-attraction* and *philoprogenitiveness*. These instincts, moreover, being gratified individually, do not call into being joint activities or distinct professions such as we find in the religious or economic spheres. An institution it may be, but the family is not, properly speaking, a social organ.

It is unlikely, however, that we shall see split off a science treating of the social phenomena that center in the reproductive function. One reason is that the sex and family relations, since they are always standardized in law and morals, are, at every moment, in the most intimate sympathy with the reigning culture. Furthermore, all our researches go to magnify the importance of the non-instinctive factors in fixing the duration, size, and internal structure of the family. Not long ago Maine and Hearn and Fustel de Coulanges brought to light the religious factor. Now it is the economic factor that is exalted. As motive to marriage the sex attraction has been reinforced, it appears, by man's desire for a servant and woman's desire for a protector. Children have been reared, not from par-

ental love alone, but because a daughter can be sold for cash, while the son can be kept as a helper, a protector, and an avenger. Grosse therefore hits the bull's eye when he says:[1] "If we wish to grasp a particular social structure—say a form of family organization—in its essence and significance, we must study it in its natural connection with the civilization in which it grows, lives, and works."

As regards *noetics,* by which term we would designate the science that deals with the phenomena that arise from efforts to satisfy the craving for truth, and *æsthetics,* or the science that treats of the phenomena that arise in connection with endeavors to satisfy the craving for the beautiful, there is no doubt that, owing to their close and immediate dependence upon the psychology of the individual mind, they will retain a good deal of independence with respect to sociology. We are, in fact, coming to recognize in inventions and discoveries the first causes of many of the great transformations in society. Even in these branches of inquiry, however, new social factors are coming forward. In tracing the evolution of philosophies, sciences, and the fine arts, more causes and influences are being recognized. Attempts to review the course of intellectual progress without taking due note of changes in the state of society have shown opinions and movements succeeding one another without meaning or logic. Those who would comprehend intellectual or æsthetic advance must consent to take into considera-

[1] *Op. cit.,* p. 7.

tion such factors as the geographical environment, the prevailing occupations, the plane of comfort, town life, the influence of a leisure class, the attitude of the priesthood, the organization of education, the diffusion of learning, and the degree of honor attaching to intellectual and artistic pursuits.

The piers on which rests *economics,* the greatest of the social sciences and (save linguistics) the most independent, are certain properties of the external world and certain properties of human nature. The latter are *the desire for wealth, the aversion to labor,* and *the reluctance to postpone present gratifications.* The first of these calls into being productive energy, the second and third limit this energy, the one in respect to labor, the other in respect to capital. All three co-operating distribute productive energy among places, seasons, occupations, and enterprises in a way that is termed "economic."

It would be a mistake to regard these three subjective foundations of economics as simple traits of human nature. The aversion to labor has in it, indeed, an element of organic repugnance to sustained effort. But it also contains a social factor, namely a conventional dis-esteem of labor derived from the stigma that a leisure class attaches to the functions of the industrial class.

As to the desire for wealth, it is exceedingly complex. It has a threefold tap-root in *hunger,* or the craving for food, *want,* or the craving for clothing and shelter, and the *love of bodily ease* which expresses itself in a demand for comfort. Its side

roots, moreover, connect it with nearly all the specific desires we have considered in the foregoing pages. The passion for sex spurs a suitor to amass the riches that can win him his bride. The lust of power is a demand for the wealth that procures power. The craving for beauty is a demand for costly artistic products. The religious impulse gives off a demand for the material accessories of worship. Even the most spiritual wants demand leisure for their satisfaction, and wealth is a means to leisure. The acquisitive lust is further whetted by the honor that attaches to profuse consumption and conspicuous waste.

Thus, sooner or later, all the cravings of human nature put in a requisition for wealth, and the confluence of these tributaries with the main stream of desire rolls down a veritable Nile-flood of greed which beslimes, yet stimulates, nearly every profession and function in society. This generic virtue of wealth it is, which makes it stand for desirability in the abstract, and gives rise to the plausible myth that the lust of acquisition is the sole motive of human endeavor, the direct or remote cause of all social phenomena, the single force that holds together the social frame even as gravitation holds together the solar system. The economic sociologists, although mistaken, are not without excuse.

The social economy that is sequel to the universal pursuit of gain is beautifully law-abiding, and presents a well-defined field for the science of economics. But when economics comes to treat of the consump-

tion of wealth, it becomes vague and quickly loses itself in sociology. The reason is very simple. It is after goods have been produced and distributed that the dissimilar interests that united to spur men to acquisitive effort reappear in all their separateness. The desire for wealth splits up into its components. Most wealth-seekers follow a line of action which is properly termed "economic." But as wealth-consumers they behave differently. One man spends his surplus for sensual gratifications, another uses it to found a family, a third turns it into objects of beauty, a fourth makes it a votive offering, a fifth employs it to win power, a sixth makes it procure him social consideration. Its actual destination depends upon the age, the race, the stage of culture; in a word, upon *the state of society*. The salient features of the society—social composition, matrimonial customs, class relations, political habits —must all be taken into account in order to understand the consumption of wealth.

The relation of the trunk of a tree to its branches is, I believe, a fit symbol of the relation of Sociology to the special social sciences. But the tree in question is a banyan tree. Each of the great branches from the main trunk throws down shoots which take root and give it independent support in human nature. In the case of a branch like politics these special stems are slight and decaying. In the case of a branch like economics the direct support they yield is more important than the connection with the main

trunk. In every case an independent rootage in unsocialized desire is the fact that entitles a branch of social knowledge to be termed a science, and differentiates it from those branches which, having no source of life other than the main trunk, must be termed departments of special sociology.

II

THE SOCIOLOGICAL FRONTIER OF ECONOMICS[1]

The student of economics cannot remain unaware that his is a realm bordered by other realms. He pushes his inquiries as to the rôle of nature in production, and lands in economic botany or zoölogy. He goes deeply into the subject of labor, and finds himself studying physiology. He undertakes to reach the basis of rent, and, ere he knows it, is poring over the bulletins of the experiment stations. The principle of division of labor takes him into technology. Transportation drives him to the law of carriers. The study of property involves him in jurisprudence. International trade or monopoly conducts him to political science. Consumption, with its study of wants and choices, is a short cut to ethics. Now, I wish to raise the question, "Is there not a field of investigation lying up against economics which, although social, is yet not jurisprudence or political science or ethics?"

The theory of population betrays such a field. At first Malthus wrote of man and his increase much as Darwin might have written of rabbits. But later he made more of the "preventive check"; and out of this grain of mustard-seed has grown a flourishing

[1] From the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, July, 1899.

tree. The recognition of the fact that custom, by regulating the age of marriage, the plane on which housekeeping shall begin, the comfort in which children shall be reared, and, even, in a general way, the size of the family, has a good deal to do with the increase of population,—all this has sprung a host of questions which economists wisely forbear to answer. Whence come these standards? Who makes them? Do they change? Do they respond to economic changes alone or to manifold social changes? Is there wisdom and adaptation hidden away in them? If so, how did it get there? What makes a man conform to them? What happens, if he does not?

We are beginning to see that a check much more effective than a definite standard of comfort is universal ambition and the pressure of new wants. Malthus made much of "moral restraint." But how about egoistic restraints? How, if people are keen-witted enough to realize that, the more babies, the fewer beefsteaks, bicycles, and outings? Will not the size of the family be affected by the rise of a furiously competitive democracy where strict class lines have been swept away, where old contentment is gone, and everybody is straining every nerve to get a little higher in the social scale? Or suppose the value of woman rises. Will not the keener appreciation of her burdens in child-bearing and child-rearing be a check to numbers? Again, how is the size of the family affected by the ambition of women to be something else than mothers and household drudges, by the higher education of women, by the

opening of the professions to them, by the adoption of rational dress?

Besides the fact that society, as it becomes more democratic, whets the eagerness of parents for pleasures and luxuries that are incompatible with large broods, there is a further complication of the problem of increase by different ways of starting children in life. Taine describes France under the old régime as a series of staircases separated by landings. One could elbow his way upward on his own flight of steps; but he did not expect to invade the staircase above. Besant describes the English professions as pleasant parks, guarded each by a turnstile where a thousand pounds is demanded of the lad who would enter. Now, in a stratified society, where in general a man is content to bring up his children to his own trade and manner of life, the restraint on numbers will not be so strong as in a society stirred to its depths with hope and ambition, where to talent equipped with knowledge all doors are open, where the higher education is accessible, and where the competition of parents to get their sons on in the world has made schooling needful in the battle for life to an almost preposterous degree.

The question of population is not the only one that ramifies into a region not economic. The writer once undertook a study that should bring to light the forces that fix the time of labor. There is, of course, the *physical* limit, at which the arm refuses to lift the pickaxe and the eye to follow the stitches. There is the *psychical* limit, at which the pain of

further toil becomes intolerable. There is the *technical* consideration that prolongs the labor-day of those engaged in the hotel, railroad, street-car, restaurant, theatre and cab services. There is the *objective economic* consideration, which stops labor when further strain will impair to-morrow's work. There is the *subjective economic* limit, at which the disutility of another quarter-hour of labor exceeds the utility of that quarter-hour's product. And this inverse relation of hours and reward of labor is found to prevail through the whole social gamut, from bank presidents and theatrical managers to cobblers and charwomen. Then there is the fixing of the length of the labor-day by this consideration working through a body of men, as in a factory. The day's limit is the consensus of the trade, as in brick-laying, or of some other trade, as in hod-carrying.

So far, so good. But, when the writer began to inquire what fixed the days of labor in the year as well as the hours of labor in the day, new and lawless forces were encountered; and the essay on "The Time of Labor" was never written. Why are there fifty-two holidays a year for almost every kind of labor? Why should this quota of rest time be reserved for the destitute as well as for the comfortable, in bad times as well as in good times, in poor societies as well as in rich communities, in cold climates as well as in hot climates? How is it that the six-day period of labor introduced by the duodecimal Babylonians among the state slaves em-

ployed on public works, in order to prevent their being driven to death by their taskmasters, has come to be universal in the Western world? Is it tradition, belief, or expediency that upholds the Sabbath, that stupendous institution which disposes of one-seventh of the time of man with an authority certainly more than economic? If the last, is it valued for its uses in this world or for its bearing on the next? Is it primarily for the good of the man who is told to rest or for the benefit of the society that bids him? Is it a hygienic measure to guard the vigor of the race, a socialistic measure to compel the capitalist to furnish the laborer seven days' keep for six days' work, or a police measure intended to fortify a religion that is considered indispensable to the existence of social order?

Again, take the twin pillars of exchange—security and probity. Security is of course explained by what political science can tell us of law and of the state. But whence this probity? Is it an individual quality, like color of eyes? Or does it vary with social conditions? At the present moment Japanese firms are importing Chinese to fill the fiduciary posts. Is this because commercial trickiness is a Japanese race-character? Then why was this trait so rare under the old régime? Here is a quality of great economic importance, which varies in mysterious sympathy with social changes. What is the correlated fact in the new social era of Japan? Is it bad Western example, or an appetite for wealth whetted by new wants, or a flood-tide of new ideas, weaken-

ing the grip of the old standards and ideals that held fast the egoistic individual in a kind of moral matrix?

The honesty of Chinese bankers and merchants is well known. Yet the rottenness of government is proverbial. We read: "Mines do not pay the proprietors, because the laborers pilfer the production; cotton factories, because the mill-hands carry off the raw material stowed away in their clothes. The most important Chinese companies are machines for the wholesale misappropriation of funds." The explanation of the paradox seems to be that for the traditional and familiar business relations the Chinese have slowly elaborated, as a *sine qua non* of commerce, a professional morality which rules very authoritatively those trained under it. But in novel relations and responsibilities not provided for in the professional ethics the native slipperiness of the Celestial comes to light. But this, in turn, opens up attractive lines of inquiry. How do these professional standards and ideals grow up? What gives them their binding power? Are they imposed for the good of society at large or for the good of the trade or profession? Can the larger social group impose its standards in the same way? Should abuses be cured by invoking law or by stiffening professional ethics?

Capital takes wings, and, surveying the planet from China to Peru, alights wherever there is a railroad to build or a mine to develop. But it is otherwise with labor. If the economist is allowed only a

single sentence on the mobility of labor, he will probably say that, like borax or bicycles, it seeks the best market, but that its cost of transportation is high. If, however, he is granted a chapter, he will find himself compelled to follow up this problem to its head-waters in another region. Why does the Englishman migrate only to English colonies, the Frenchman to French colonies? Why are there streams of migration that can be directed or turned aside? There are not streams of wheat or lumber that can be so easily diverted. Why is it that the tide flows easily enough after the first few boat-loads of Italians have gone to Brazil or the first Norwegian settlements have been planted in Minnesota? We are told American labor and enterprise will invade the Philippines, if we keep them. Why do they not invade them now? The economic situation will not be changed by annexation. All this suggests that there are non-economic forces that influence the groupings, coöperations, and dealings of peoples.

At this moment Germany is losing her Scandinavian trade through the hostility aroused by the expulsions of Danes from Schleswig-Holstein. An anti-Semitic journal in Paris has just been ruined in paying damages to tradesmen whose business it had injured by publishing them as Jews. French unfriendliness is resented by fewer American orders for *articles de Paris.* Here is uneconomic behavior in response to powerful sympathies and antipathies that we had assumed to be dying out. There is cer-

tainly room for a science that shall inquire how far social groupings correspond to economic interest, and how far they ignore it; that shall assign to religion, race, language, nationality, and propinquity their due share in the formation and division of groups; and that shall lay down the conditions favorable to the blending of such groups, comparing in assimilative value the Russian policy of persecution with the American policy of freedom and equality.

The tame treatment of the consumption of wealth by most economists has been due to a dim perception of many factors which are not economic. The *façade* type of expenditure, that lavishes on show and luxuries and scrimps on necessaries, goes with a development that removes the old landmarks and stimulates social ambitions. Fashion extends her baleful sway with the disappearance of fixed classes of peasants, burghers, gentlefolk. The fact that all genuine, plain, homespun articles disappear before the universal demand for cheap, tawdry imitations of the furniture and clothes of the wealthy is due to the democratic constitution of society. Our buggies and parlor organs, our plated silver and veneered furniture, are as eloquent of equality as our corridor cars. The absence of distinct ways of living for the well-to-do and the ill-to-do produces a smooth-sloping outward uniformity in costume and furniture and ornament, which, whenever possible, sacrifices reality to appearances.

The demand for food and fuel is original; but most of the wants that drive the industrial machine

are inspired by example. If these imitations were haphazard, there would be nothing more to say. But are they not law-abiding? The desire for parasols, billiard-tables, and bath-rooms descends in a series of cascades from the social superior to the social inferior; and we can distinguish a society in which each class imitates the class just above it from one in which the decay of reverence permits the humblest grades to ape, as well as they can, the topmost grade, and so produces the sweeping uniformities of democracy. Nor will other inquiries prove fruitless. How are wants transplanted from age to age and from folk to folk? What is the rôle of an aristocracy in the propagation of wants? What is the relation of city to country, of the smaller cities to the large ones? If the eight-hour day comes, what are the influences that will determine how the workingman shall dispose of his margin of leisure? What is the influence of education in the spread of wants?

As the time and energy of labor are directly related to the number and intensity of wants, we might expect each man's economic effort to depend immediately on his utility scale. But this is not the case. Societies themselves get a characteristic adjustment between work and wants, and this consensus overrides the individual calculus. It is natural that a younger son, like Seattle or Portland, should begin the day earlier and work harder than New Haven or Springfield. But what, save the might of usage and the contagion of example, can explain why the West-

ern business man, even when he has made a fortune, goes on working till he drops? Moreover, the same society changes its calculus from age to age. The England of Arthur Young was slower-pulsed than the England of to-day. And in America, since 1825, we appear to have been fevered with a gigantic, continent-conquering ambition which has made repose almost a lost art.

The economist, if challenged to differentiate economics from social science, might point out that his science deals with simple and well-known individual quantities and phenomena, manifesting themselves in the social theatre on a vast scale. Volumes of demand, or products, or sales, or imports, or deposits, or investments, are mere aggregates of individual acts. If one should object that the socio-economic fact—the market, bank, clearing-house, or factory—differs from the individual fact underlying it, he might retort that an accident is an individual fact, but if it happens often you get an emergency hospital; that a fire is an isolated occurrence, but if there are many fires you get an engine company.

So far the economist is right. But how about cases where the social fact is not the mere footing up of the column of private facts? To-day's demand for a stock may be composed of a multitude of unrelated individual preferences; but to-morrow there is a flurry, and nine-tenths of the desires to get or dispose of that stock may be due to the apparent desire of other people to get or dispose of it. A run on a bank has quite a different composition from the total

withdrawals on an ordinary day. A Tacoma boom has a much more complex structure than the real estate market in Cohoes. The analysis of a Klondike rush reveals more factors and problems than the dissection of the westward drift of our population. Comparing the value of an African mining stock with the value of cattle or shirts, it will be apparent that the individual estimates underlying the former have been much more compounded and re-compounded than those on which the latter is based.

In other cases we have to do with persistent currents of imitation rather than transient waves. To the authority of tradition must we ascribe the exceptional esteem in which landed property continues to be held in England, the Jewish predilection for trade and finance, the British willingness to take speculative risks, the Scotch regard for the "mony mickles" that "make a muckle," or the American farmer's obstinate adherence to the isolated homestead.

Now, the laws of cross-imitation and of up-and-down imitation are revealed only to him who studies the most various social phenomena. Tulip manias and Black Fridays and Denver booms and South Sea bubbles and Kaffir circuses must be referred to a series of phenomena ranging all the way from mobs and revivals to political landslides. What is the nucleus of such a movement? What are the stages of its growth? How can it be stopped? What social conditions favor it? How does prog-

ress affect it? For light on these questions the economist must cross the frontier.

I have cited enough illustrations to show that the economist is sometimes led to push his inquiries over into an adjoining tract of knowledge, that covers human action and yet is not jurisprudence or ethics or political science. This adjacent science that busies itself with imitation and custom and tradition and conventionality; that seeks the origin, meaning, and authority of the standards and ideals shaping individual action; that traces the connection between the constitution of a society and the opportunities and ambitions of its members; that inquires into the causes and the consequences of the spontaneous sentimental groupings of men; and that deals with the development of the social mind and the means and extent of its ascendency over the desires and valuations of individual minds,—this science is Sociology.

The empire of the Czar is bounded on its western frontier by the clearly defined and well-explored territories of highly organized governments like Austria and Germany. On its eastern side, until recently at least, it melted vaguely into the little-known lands disputed among the khanates of Central Asia. Economics likewise is bounded for the most part by regions that have been well defined and thoroughly explored by highly organized sciences. But on one side it is embarrassed by an uncertain and disputed frontier with a little-known territory, subject to the conflicting and unreasonable claims of rival chieftains. Sociology is its Central Asia.

III

SOCIAL LAWS[1]

The quick mastery of things that science assures us is due to the fact that science presents all comers with truth packed away in neat portable formulæ. The strength of an ox in a tea-cup, the virtue of a beef-steak in a capsule, the healing power of a plant in a pellet—such is the ideal of the investigator as he labors to establish laws. No branch of knowledge is felt to possess in high degree the scientific quality unless it has found regularities and constant relations among the phenomena it contemplates. In dealing with the more complex phenomena, to be sure, some of the precision and absoluteness of physical and chemical laws must be renounced. Out of the tangled skein we shall rarely get anything better than an empirical law. Few, indeed, are the formulæ that can be so phrased as to hold for all occasions and circumstances. But this has not discouraged the biologist or the sociologist from trying to distill into vest-pocket phials the tincture and essence of innumerable cases. It is our present purpose to sample and test the shelf of phials purporting to contain the quintessences of social facts.

[1] *Vide The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1903.

Sociology differs from its older sister sciences in that it was built by certain great synthesists—Comte, Spencer, Von Lilienfeld, Schäffle, De Roberty, and Fouillée—who were more renowned for their wide acquaintance with many provinces of knowledge than for their close familiarity with any particular division of social facts. In their spacious philosophic surveys, all of them came upon the same great cantle of unknown territory, and in their endeavor to stake off and explore this expanse they created sociology. It is true this region was not quite a wilderness, having been effectively occupied in spots by the economists. But to their achievements the philosophers paid about as much heed as the early explorers of America paid to the constructions of the mound-builders.

The philosophers, no doubt, hastened the day of sociology, but they burdened the infant science with two faulty methods. One is the fondness for the objective statement of the behavior of associated men in preference to the subjective interpretation. The other is the excessive reliance upon superficial analogies between social facts and other facts. Owing to these errors the earlier formulations of social law are not based upon the accumulation and comparison of social data, but are built out laterally from the more advanced neighboring sciences. Sociology is at first a balcony—or shall I say a "lean-to"?—projecting from physics or biology or psychology.

The first notable example is Spencer's demonstra-

tion that the various propositions which make up his grand law of evolution apply to society.[1]

That *motion follows the line of least resistance* is as true, he says, for societies as for molecules. He instances the congregating of men at places of abundant food supply, the lines of migration, the growth of industrial centers, the location of trade routes and many other economic facts. Now, this proposition can hold only in so far as men *economize.* If there is a *play* side as well as a *work* side to human life, if men are squanderers of energy as well as economizers of energy, they will not follow lines of least resistance. The development of games and social festivity, the self-expression of artistic and religious activity, as well as the devotion to sport, adventure, and exploration, show that there is such a thing as a *surplus* of human energy.

But even economic men do not follow "the line of least resistance" in the same way as molecules. Compare the path of a flood with that of an army. Water will meander a score of leagues to find an outlet but a furlong away. An army clambers over an intervening ridge to reach its objective. Each moment of its course the river follows the line easiest *at that moment.* Man knows his goal and, having foresight, takes the line that *on the whole* is easiest. This is why man leads water to its destination by much straighter channels than nature does.

The thesis that *societies,* like all other aggregates, *pass from less coherence to more coherence* (law of

[1] See "First Principles."

integration) is tenable enough, but the explanation of the process is unsatisfactory. Spencer apparently lays it to the interdependence resulting from the division of labor. But later thinkers account otherwise for the undoubted integration of men into larger and larger social wholes. Gumplowicz derives it from the law that *every group strives to utilize all weaker groups within its reach.* From this result war, conquest, absorption, and finally the fusing of conquerors and conquered into one people ready to repeat the process with some other people similarly formed. On the other hand, Tarde—the St. John among sociologists — finds the cause of integration not so much in the constrained association of victors and vanquished as in that peaceful intercourse between contiguous groups which promotes reciprocal imitation, creates a common plane of culture, and fits them to enter easily into a larger human synthesis.

Spencer's law that, like the Cosmos, *society passes from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous* (law of differentiation) is open to the gravest objections. The illustrations are all taken from the active and especially the vocational side of life. Now, it is true that in a plastic society men specialize more and more with reference to the performance of unlike tasks; but while they become more unlike as producers, they become more like as consumers. The longer men dwell together, the more readily they respond to powerful currents of imitation which assimilate them in their tastes, desires, and ideals.

The sway of custom or fashion proclaims *the instability of the heterogeneous.* The triumph of a national speech, religion, patriotism, music, costume, or sport over old provincial and local diversities is unquestionably a more pregnant fact in social history than is the specialization of employments.

If Spencer's illustrations of the march of heterogeneity are taken too exclusively from the industrial sphere, he falls into just the opposite error when he strives to prove that *societies show increasing definiteness of arrangement.* He draws all his facts from State, Church, and Law, from those spheres which touch social order and therefore exhibit the greatest sharpness of outline and rigidity of form. Moreover, he cites from composite societies, where there are castes corresponding to races anciently stratified, and where the iron distinctions of function and occupation are a heritage from successive conquests.

Notice the fact that Spencer, after seeking to prove the preceding thesis from a *plastic* society would prove his present thesis from an *ossified* society, a tacit admission that the laws in question do not apply to all social groups. It is true that a community long undisturbed is likely to exhibit crystallization and rigidity. But it is no less true that a community agitated by inventions, migration, conquest, or culture-contacts exhibits fluidity and vicariousness of function. Here there is great instability of political and social position, great facility of individual ascent and descent, a rapid subversion of

old fortunes by new wealth, of old classes by new groupings, of old conventions by new standards and values.

Against the proposition that *in society,* as elsewhere, *a single cause produces a number of unlike effects* (law of the multiplication of effects), there is nothing to be said.

The statement that *incident forces tend to collect the like and to separate the unlike* (law of segregation), is doubtless as true of people as it is of particles. Nevertheless, by implying that human segregation is the result of "incident" forces it veils the real reason why like joins with like. That the recognition of resemblance inspires a fellow-feeling which unites men into unlike groups is a *psychical* fact and nothing is gained by assimilating it with purely *physical* processes like the sorting of particles by wind, or water, or electrical attraction.

The thesis that *social evolution tends toward a more perfect equilibrium* (law of equilibration) does not seem to be justified by Spencer's evidence. It is true that electricity and steam are facilitating the adjustment of economic supply to demand, but it is likewise true that the increasing use of fixed capital entails only too frequently that rupture between supply and demand which we call a commercial crisis. As for what he styles the better equilibration between the demand for government and the supply of it, *i. e.,* the lessening oscillation between political revolution and reaction, one questions if it is at all bound up with the social process. It appears rather to be a

natural consequence of the growth of capitalism on the one hand and the diffusion of knowledge on the other. To say nothing of disturbances arising from general causes such as the unequal fecundity of classes, races, or nations, it is evident that, until every Peter the Hermit, Gutenberg, Watt, or Napoleon is strangled in the cradle, society will never long remain in balance.

The case admirably exemplifies the danger of formulating social laws on hints from other sciences. The law may be true, yet if there is no patient digging into social facts to get at the root of the matter, *i. e.,* to uncover *the specific cause* of the observed tendency, one is likely to state as valid, for all times and all societies, something that holds only since the decline of the tribal system, the advent of gunpowder, or the prevalence of machine industry.

Although during the interval between *First Principles* and his *Principles of Sociology* Spencer grew cautious in the use of analogy, and came to prefer the laws of life to the laws of matter as the key to social processes, his treatment of society as a mass rather than a consensus, as an aggregate of bodies rather than an accord of minds, had meanwhile given much encouragement to social physicists. The most extreme of these is Carey, whose maxims, "All science is one and indivisible" and "The laws of physical science are equally those of social science" would throttle sociology in its infancy. To the combinations of men he applies the chemical law of multiple proportions, and the phys-

ical law of the composition of forces. From the law of gravitation he deduces that *the attraction of cities is directly as the mass and inversely as the distance!*

Writing early in the seventies at a time when the philosophical world was profoundly stirred by new and splendid generalizations in the field of life, Von Lilienfeld seeks to bring society under biological rather than physical laws. He insists[1] that society is a "real organism," and declares, "It is an unscientific, dualistic dogma which asserts that human society develops according to other laws than natural organisms."

Following Haeckel's thesis that among the existing species of organisms can be found types corresponding to the successive forms by which in the past the higher species developed out of a simple cell, Lilienfeld lays down the law[2] that *within any social group can be found coexisting all the types of culture traversed by man in his ascent from savagery.* As an illustration of this grandiose "Law of Parallelism" he adduces the fact that older and inferior agencies of transportation—pack mule, stage coach, sailing vessel—persist alongside of later and higher agencies. Alas for hollow phrases, the explanation of the fact lies in quite another quarter! In every society there are transportation routes of every degree of importance. On routes of little traffic the earlier and technically inferior means of carriage,

[1] "Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft," vol. II, p. 109.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 147.

the pack train or the stage coach, is economically superior and is therefore retained. Hence the diversity.

But go deeper yet. In weaving or metal working or any branch of manufacture we do not find primitive appliances surviving as we do in transportation. Why is this? Simply because the agent of transportation produces a service and not a commodity. Seeing that a service must always be supplied by an agency on the spot, the Eastern four-track railroad cannot supplant the Arizona mule team in the same way that the Minneapolis flour mill supplants the local grist mill.

From the law that the embryo of a creature recapitulates in its development the entire life history of the species Von Lilienfeld infers analogically that *the individual in his development from childhood passes through the culture epochs traversed by human society.*[1] But is this sound? The embryo recapitulates the development history of its species from force of heredity. As Haeckel puts it, "Phylogeny is the mechanical cause of ontogeny." Now, the course of historical development in no wise determines personal development. The boy does not camp out because his ancesters did so in Cæsar's time. Racial experiences of cave-dwelling, hunting and barter cannot get into the blood. The correspondence, if it exists, can be explained only by assuming that the stages of social ascent are determined by the stages of mental evolution; that culture epochs answer to

[1] "Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft," vol. II, pp. 113, 198.

the gradations in the intellectual life of mankind; that the thinking of savages is child-like, of barbarians is boy-like, of civilization is man-like. It is vain, however, to correlate closely the actual course of evolution of a society with intellectual development, seeing that so many other factors influence it, *e. g.*, the character of the geographical environment, the movement of population, contact with and borrowing from other societies, the presence or absence of inventive geniuses.

De Greef is another of those who work out from the adjacent built-up sciences. He prefers to project a generalization cantilever-fashion over the vacant lot, rather than to delve and lay deep a firm foundation in the social soil itself.

From the general principle[1] that *aggregates are variable in proportion to the heterogeneity of their parts,* he infers that society will be more plastic than an organism, seeing that it is larger and more differentiated than the latter. But why make a simple matter so hard? A society can change more than an organism, because its units are *thinking persons* and not *blind cells.* The clamp of custom, moreover, is by no means so firm as the grip of heredity.

It is a well-known fact that, whereas Athens, Corinth, Thebes and other Greek communities passed through the same series of political forms—patriarchal, monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic—their colonies in Asia Minor and elsewhere skipped the earlier stages and began their existence

[1] "Introduction à la sociologie." Première partie, pp. 125-6.

with the political form of the mother city. This very natural and sensible proceeding strikes De Greef[1] as an illustration of the law that *the development of the embyro recapitulates the development of the species!*

In like vein a recent champion of "parallelism" discovers a grand "Law of the Evolution of Colonies." "Up to the point in the growth of a colony when it ceases to be dependent on its metropolis, the political and social evolution recapitulates in a few years the entire evolution which the mother country may have taken centuries to accomplish."[2]

Well may the economist gibe at such sociology! The development of the mother country has, forsooth, no more to do with the development of the colony than has the Dog Star. The cause of the resemblance is the fact that new countries begin with a sparse population which gradually becomes dense. Hence the sequence of hunting, pastoralism, agriculture, industry. Hence the minor sequences of barter, merchandise money, coined money, and credit, of pastoral feudalism, plantation slavery, and the wage system. The slow growth of religion, learning, and literature is due simply to lack of numbers, of intercourse, of leisure, and of cities. The irregularity of sex relations in a colony is not an echo of primitive times, but the consequence of the lack of white women and the abundance of native women. There is no "law" discernible here save the law that,

[1] "Le transformisme social," pp. 458-9.
[2] Collier, *Popular Science Monthly*, vol. 54, p. 807.

for colony as well as for mother country, *the increase of population relatively to resources is a prime cause of social evolution.*

In searching for the law of social decadence De Greef[1], instead of interrogating the history of declining peoples, makes wide excursions into biology and psychology. He is struck by the law that the organs and characters recently acquired by a species are less stable and more liable to disappear than the older parts more deeply rooted in heredity. Something very similar is true of the mind. It appears that in mental disease, senility, asphyxia, or dissolution, the higher, more complex, and more special faculties disappear before the lower, simpler, and more automatic processes. As Ribot puts it: "Mental dissolution follows the inverse order of evolution, the more complex voluntary manifestations ceasing before the simpler. and these before the automatic actions."

Extended to society this principle yields the law that *those traits and institutions most special, complex, and recently acquired are the first to disappear when social decadence sets in.* Now, is there really anything at all in this law? It is true that the later-acquired practices and institutions are unstable until they have become fixed in the custom of the folk. Nevertheless, in not all societies is custom strong. Where it is strong, the more recently adopted institutions may be the last to be surrendered, because they

[1] Le transformisme social." Deuxième partie, chaps. III and V.

are most suited to present needs; whereas the more ancient institutions, being already partly obsolescent, are the first to go when the strain comes. Adversity is a test of the old rather than of the recent.

Nor does the law seem to apply, as De Greef supposes, to the various orders of social facts. A religion begins with a faith and later adds thereunto a liturgy. But when the religion decays the liturgy is not the first to go but the last. An art beginning with an ideal acquires in time a technique; but the technique, exaggerated into a mannerism, persists long after the ideal has vanished.

The hard-headed, clear-sighted Gumplowicz studies his facts first hand and has no faith in long-range deductions from neighboring sciences. He believes, however, that there are certain laws which hold equally for the inorganic, vital, psychic, and social spheres of phenomena.[1] Before proceeding to establish specific social laws Gumplowicz briefly indicates ten universal laws, the recognition of which in the realm of social phenomena justifies one's faith in the possibility of a social science. We may compress them into the following seven:

1. For every phenomenon there is an adequate cause.
2. Phenomena run in sequences.
3. These sequences are law-abiding.
4. Concrete objects have parts.
5. A developmental process is initiated by the contact or conflict of unlike elements.

[1] "Outlines of Sociology." Part II, sec. 2.

6. Forces differ only in strength and direction.
7. Identical forces produce similar effects.

The Austrian thinker does not illustrate these laws, and, as they are exceedingly abstract and general, we may safely accept them. His fifth law, be it noted, is one of the most fruitful principles to be found in modern sociology and under the name of "synergy" has been greatly developed by Dr. Ward.

We have tested the application to society of physical, biological and psychological laws and have seen that the method does not yield lasting results. All this work will have to be torn out and replaced by better masonry if the walls of sociology are to rise very far. No one denies that the extension into the social sphere of regularities discovered in other fields has greatly helped to bring order out of chaos. It is better to interpret the career of a nation analogically, than to interpret it providentially, as did the old "philosophy of history." Analogy has suggested what to look for. It has taught us to notice similarities and to throw like phenomena into the same pigeon-hole. To its life-lines we have clung while groping in the unfamiliar social deeps. It is certain, however, that no recognized science borrows its laws from other departments of knowledge. The lasting possessions of sociology will be regularities which, instead of being imported from without, have been discovered by patiently comparing social facts among themselves.

With Analogy has gone the vice of Exteriority. The social group has been studied from the outside

as if it were a nebula, a crystal, or an ovule. But in the study of nature this reliance upon sheer observation is not a sign of strength but a confession of limits. How differently we should conceive the tasks of crystallography if we could question the molecules and learn just why they comport themselves as they do! How otherwise we should describe chemical processes if the atoms could tell us of the "affinities" they obey! Not all our observations of the canals of Mars are worth for science a five minutes' interview with the Martian Commissioner of Public Works. Now, by contenting himself with uniformities instead of causes the sociologist, with his "law of differentiation" or "law of parallelism" lightly renounces at a stroke the enormous advantage of living inside of society and having a chance to learn just why its units behave as they do.

We want to know causes, and the cause of a collective phenomenon must be something that influences behavior. Society is, indeed, not the temple of reason but neither is it the theatre of mechanical forces. There is little important human action which is wholly blind and unconscious. A causative interpretation of social facts must consider the thoughts and the feelings of the units whose behavior is to be explained. Until they are adequately motived common beliefs or actions have not been accounted for. Now, after eschewing analogy sociologists did not at once proceed, as they should have done, to seek the *causes, i. e.,* the motivation,

of occurrences. They dallied away precious time at a half-way house we may call the Genetic Interpretation.

The aim of the genetic sociologist is not to show why, under the circumstances and taking folks as they are, a given institution exists, but to establish *a law of sequence* within each department of social life. Morgan[1] insists that there have been five successive types of family, and that the order of appearance has been everywhere the same. Gumplowicz[2] avers that there is "a strictly regular development from fetishism through anthropomorphism, polytheism, and monotheism, to the atheism of free thinkers." Letourneau[3] declares that politically "human societies evolve regularly by successive stages which are anarchy, the communal clan, the tribe, at first republican, later aristocratic, then monarchy, at first elective and later hereditary. Finally certain élite peoples repudiate monarchy and return to a régime republican but very unlike that of the primitive tribe." De Greef[4] sets up as the law of æsthetic development that "architecture always precedes sculpture, and sculpture precedes painting."

Now, formulæ of this sort not only quarrel scandalously with historical facts, but they rest on wrong notions of social causation.

To-day we can foretell the series of transforma-

[1] "Ancient Society." Part III, ch. I.
[2] "Outlines of Sociology," p. 108.
[3] "L'évolution politique dans les diverses races humaines," p. vii.
[4] "Les lois sociologiques," p. 120.

tions through which a human being will pass from the earliest embryo stage on. To-morrow we shall be charting his mental evolution from the first weeks of infancy to the end of adolescence. In vain, however, does the sociologist aspire to do for society what the embryologist does for the body and the genetic psychologist for the mind. The organism obeys the wand of heredity, but society has no heredity. It is not unfolding what was once folded into it, as the embryo unfolds the predetermined parts and organs. Institutions have not developed, as Morgan suggests, from "a few primary germs of thought." "In any order of social facts," says Tarde,[1] "evolution takes place by successive insertions . . . . thereby making the course of progress not a smooth, gentle, upward slope, but a ladder with rungs at very unequal distances." Far from traveling a common highway the peoples have followed routes as various as have been their conditions of life.

If the genetic sociologist does not conceive of an institution as having an "organic development" of its own, he is very liable to conceive it as exhibiting continuous improvement, like a tool or a utensil. The succession of political forms is regarded as a perfecting of government, of domestic types as a perfecting of the family, of industrial systems as a perfecting of economy. Hence attractive sequences, such as, autocracy, aristocracy, democracy; promiscuity, polygamy, monogamy; slavery, serfdom, free

[1] "Psychologie économique," p. 284.

labor! Each form is "higher" than the preceding, and the series is never reversed. We can therefore arrive at a "law" for each ascending series.

But the actual series of forms is sometimes neither "evolution" nor "progress." One will be disappointed if he looks either for a uniform evolution of the family from "the small, incoherent, and indefinite" to "the large, coherent, definite, and complex," or for a steady progress from the ethically "lower" to the ethically "higher." In its metamorphoses the family is not piloted by the ethical ideal, nor does it exhibit an evolution of its own. It follows closely economic changes. "To every type of economy," concludes Grosse,[1] "there corresponds a particular type of family." Thus polygyny thrives most where men control the source of the food supply; monogamy where woman has a certain food-getting capacity. The family is strictly patriarchal with the pastoral nomads; the matriarchate appears only when the woman disposes over economic resources of her own. Among hunters and pastoralists the clan will be paternal. In the Lower Agriculture it is often maternal. If now the family form is intimately sympathetic with the economy of a people, and if in the succession of these economies there is no fixed order—some hunters skipping the pastoral stage to become tillers, some nomads skipping the tillage stage to become carriers or traders—how

[1] "Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirthschaft," ch. I.

will it be possible to establish an invariable sequence in domestic development?

Vain, likewise, is it to frame a universal law for the succession of political forms. These forms are not so many stages in the perfecting of government but are adapted each to the prevailing economy, the make-up of the population, or the relation of the group to neighboring groups. Suppose the writer is justified in his thesis that political power becomes concentrated during a static epoch, when there is great inequality of economic opportunity coinciding with great inequality of possessions, and that it becomes diffused during a dynamic epoch when the doors of opportunity stand open to all.[1] Suppose Giddings is right in declaring that political forms will be coercive if society embraces marked diversities and inequalities in its membership, liberal if between its members there is great moral and mental resemblance.[2] Suppose Gumplowicz is right in asserting that the state is most oligarchic and coercive just after a conquest, and that as the assimilation of conquerors and conquered proceeds it becomes more mild and liberal.[3] No one granting any of these suppositions will venture, as does Letourneau, to contend for a fixed sequence in political forms. For if political evolution is at the mercy of general social evolution, it will not be the same for all peoples unless general social evolution is the same for all peoples.

[1] "Social Control," pp. 401-403.
[2] "Inductive Sociology," p. 228.
[3] "Der Rassenkampf," § 38.

But *is* general social evolution the same for all peoples?

There is, to be sure, one great cause of uniformity in the order of experiences in different societies. Seeing that the human mind is at bottom everywhere the same, those developments which have *inner* rather than *outer* causes are likely, even when peoples are remote from one another in space or time, to run parallel, to follow, as it were, a series of logical steps. A science—mathematics or astronomy for instance — pursues everywhere the same course. The same problems present themselves to all, and are solved, if solved they are, in much the same order. However varied their surroundings all tribes flounder through animism, invent similar myths, or travel the same route of speculation. It is not by chance that in the early developments of speech, of sex-life, of the practical arts, of ceremonies, symbols, and games, we come across those deeply worn paths which Tylor has called "ethnographic parallels."

Regularity, then, will naturally characterize those species of social phenomena which are functions of man's thinking, and respond least to outer circumstance. The linguistic, æsthetic, mythological, folklore, philosophic, scientific, and technological developments have in them too much of the subjective not to repeat themselves under different skies and in diverse settings. There is, moreover, in ethical, religious, and juridical development, an assimilating subjective factor working along with external fac-

tors. But we cannot venture so far as did Comte generalizing from his extensive studies in the history of the sciences. Had his acquaintance with the metamorphoses of institutions been wider, he would not have concluded that—as Mill puts it—"the order of human progression in all respects will be a corollary deducible from the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind."

For there are classes of social phenomena that are more objectively determined, and these do not easily lend themselves to laws of succession. Data vastly fuller than Comte had at his disposal force upon us the conviction that the coarse structural facts of society do not obey the lead of mind. The industrial, domestic, military, political and ecclesiastical institutions do not follow the same course for all peoples, but develop in thraldom to outer conditions—in the final analysis, to the environment, physical or human. Desert, steppe, forest, valley, seaport—each working, be it noted, not directly but through demographic and economic factors, moulds a social type which will undergo certain transformations of its own. Then, too, much depends upon access to alien social groups. The presence or absence of other societies and cultures decides whether a people shall stagnate or progress, be militant or industrial, develop as a simple or as a composite society.

We may, in fact, think of society as developing with reference to two foci, the *subjective* and the *objective*. The unfolding of the mind being apparent-

ly the same among different peoples, those social phenomena which lie nearest the subjective focus will exhibit in their transformations a certain logic and regularity. Environments, on the other hand, impose modes of existence extremely unlike, and therefore in differently situated social groups those social phenomena lying nearest the objective focus will undergo not parallel but divergent evolution.

Moreover, owing to the fact that from the very unity of the mind every culture stage presents itself as a whole, in which each element acts upon every other element; owing to the fact that the forms of industry, of family, of government, of law, of worship, and of art, are sympathetically adjusted to one another, it is likely that even the forms about the subjective pole—art, philosophy, religion and the like—will be tinged with something local and distinctive. Hence, I cannot but conclude that the development of a particular order of institutions is, in a greater or less degree, *multilinear,* and that the endeavor to establish in each sphere of social life a single, typical sequence of changes is bound to fail.

For a different reason we reject formulations like De Greef's law[1] of the development of exchange, viz., that merchandise money gives way to weighed metallic money, this to coined metallic money, this in turn to the bank note, and the bank note to the clearing-house set-off. The sucession here is indubitable, but have we a law? If we raise to the dignity of a law the series of steps in the perfecting

[1] "Les lois sociologiques," p. 103.

of any instrument or process, social laws will be cheap. There will be volumes of them. The history of the arts furnishes us with formulæ for the evolution of the plow, the pot, the gun, the loom, the process of weaving, of smelting, of brewing, and of hundreds of other practical items. Does anyone care to make these the building stones of a science of society?

Let no one suppose that the foregoing aims to bar out true dynamic laws disclosing a chain of causes and effects. It is because an institutional form is not the *cause* of its successor that we cannot admit a law of succession for each aspect of social evolution. But there is no objection to formulating the relation between a prime motor of social change, and the developmental process it initiates, between the leaping spark and the train of consequences it ignites. We can, therefore, welcome as a foundation pier of sociology the law[1] established by Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer that *the conjugation of two societies through conquest and subjection is followed by a rapid evolution of structure,* and the law of cross-fertilization adumbrated by Buckle and Tarde and formulated thus by Tiele:[2] *"All (spiritual) development, apart from the natural capabilities of men and peoples, results from the stimulus given to self-consciousness by contact with a different stage of development, whether higher or lower."*

[1] Rassenkampf," §§ 34, 35; "Sociologische Erkenntniss," chs. 13 and 14.

[2] "The Science of Religion," vol. I, p. 239.

Spencer's dictum, that increase of social mass is followed by greater differentiation and higher organization, can be adopted in the amended form suggested by Durkheim.[1] *"The division of labor varies directly as the size and density of society, and if it progresses continually in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally larger."* With the time-honored thesis that *as the arts are perfected the state of society becomes less dependent on local conditions,* may, perhaps, be joined Patten's law[2] that *as a race emerges from a local environment into a general environment a pain economy gives way to a pleasure economy.*

Besides the agencies of social change the operation of which is recognized in the foregoing laws, there is the movement of the human intellect to be reckoned with. Ward's law that *spontaneous progress gives way to telic progress and individual telesis in turn yields relatively to collective telesis,* expresses better even than Comte's famous formula the necessary course of intellectual evolution, because it is founded on the demonstrable tendency of an expanding intelligence to substitute the indirect method of obtaining ends for the direct method.

The most promising field for the discovery of valid laws is, however, the coexistence of social phenomena, rather than their succession. In social life, what goes with what? Which phenomena *always*

[1] "De la division du travail social," p. 289.
[2] "The Development of English Thought," pp. 5-10.

occur together or *never* occur together? Of these laws of coexistence the less ambitious relate to the mode of occurrence of phenomena. As examples of such *laws of manifestation* may be cited Giddings's proposition[1] that *"Impulsive social action tends to extend and intensify in a geometrical progression,"* and Tarde's thesis[2] that *imitations proceed from the reputed superior to the reputed inferior.*

Other correlations are expressed in *laws of repugnance.* Thus Ward announces[3] that *the less a type is specialized the more likely it is to persist.* Tarde asserts[4] that *where custom imitation is strong, mode imitation is weak, and vice versa.* Durkheim concludes[5] that *suicide of the egoistic type "varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social group to which the individual belongs."* Giddings declares that *"Impulsive social action varies inversely with the habit of attaining ends by indirect and complex means,"*[6] and that *"The degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases."*[7]

The typical relation, however, that the investigator aspires to establish is that of cause and effect. The number of such relations established is a true measure of scientific advancement, and it is therefore a great pity that a generation of sociologists

[1] "Inductive Sociology," p. 176.
[2] "Laws of Imitations," pp. 213-243.
[3] "Pure Sociology," pp. 76-7.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 245-248.
[5] "Le suicide," p. 223.
[6] "Inductive Sociology," p. 177.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

spent their time gathering the Dead Sea fruit of analogical and genetic laws, instead of seeking those *laws of causation* which are the peculiar treasure of a science. Within the last dozen years, however, scholars have thrown themselves into the quest for true causes, and their gains have availed to take away from sociology the reproach of barrenness. Those spokesmen of the more developed branches of knowledge, who, because of her early errors of method, dispute the youngest of the sciences her rightful place, are simply ignorant of what is being done.

We have Tarde with such laws as *Tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion to its antiquity,*[1] and *The likelihood of a given invention varies directly as the number of minds possessing and capable of fusing the ideas composing it, and inversely as the number of antecedent inventions necessary to be made.*[2] With regard to social organization Giddings sets up two laws,[3] one that it is coercive *in proportion as the population is heterogeneous,* and the other that it is coercive *in proportion as sympathetic and formal like-mindedness predominates over deliberative like-mindedness.*

Veblen has established the significant law that *in proportion as a leisure class becomes influential, the reigning standards of right, of decency, of beauty, and of ritualistic fitness, conform to the principle of*

[1] "Laws of Imitations," ch. VII.
[2] "La logique sociale," ch. IV, secs. III and V.
[3] "Inductive Sociology," pp. 226-228.

Conspicuous Waste.[1] Bouglè has won ground from the ideologists by proving that *notions of human equality make their way in proportion as society becomes large, dense, mobile, complex, and unified.*[2] Miss Simons[3] has formulated for assimilation five laws which so thoroughly reveal the process that the subject is for the present done with. The writer, in addition to the laws he has formulated in *Social Control,* believes the following to be true: *Social order is stable in proportion as the power of each to resist exceeds his power to aggress, and his will to resist exceeds his will to aggress.*

Although some set up a *law* for any constant relation discovered between facts, the usage of the long established sciences restricts the term "law" to the relation between facts of variation. The relation between one set of unvarying facts and another set is expressed in a *generalization.* Of valuable formulæ of this kind the progress of sociology furnishes numerous examples. There is Buckle's thesis,[4] that *intellectual progress rather than moral progress is the driving force of civilization.* Recall Spencer's conclusion[5] that *the kind of activities (militant or industrial) predominant in a society determines the type of military or industrial organization, the principles of law, the spirit of religious and ethical*

[1] "Theory of the Leisure Class," ch. VI.
[2] Les idées égalitaires."
[3] *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1901, p. 807.
[4] "History of Civilization in England," vol. I, ch. IV.
[5] "Principles of Sociology," vol. II, part V, chs. XVII and XVIII.

ideals, and the status of the weak. Ratzenhofer[1] sets up the proposition that *conquest and subjection entail necessarily the passage from the tribal to the civil organization.* Tiele[2] avers that *the influence of general development manifests itself later in religion than in any other department of human life.* Dr. Ward[3] has made it clear that *social structures are the products of the interaction of unlike social forces.* De Greef[4] is convinced that *the more general social phenomena determine in a general way the more special social phenomena.* Tarde[5] has demonstrated that *imitations are refracted by their media,* and that *imitation is unilateral before it is reciprocal.*

Such are the principal formulæ contributed by sociology to the common stock of scientific truth. When these have been criticised, broken up and recast half a dozen times, we shall begin to possess a stable body of doctrine. The exhibit certainly ought to reassure all sociologists. "The lips of the morning are reddening." Shafts of light pierce the jungle in many directions. Every year sees new roads and clearings, and the time draws near when the whole region will lie open to the day.

The question sometimes arises as to whether a certain law is to be counted to sociology or to economics, politics, or jurisprudence. It seems well to ap-

[1] "Sociologische Erkenntniss," p. 212.
[2] *Op. cit.,* pp. 228-230.
[3] "Pure Sociology," pp. 183-4.
[4] "Le transformisme social," Deuxième partie, ch. I.
[5] "Laws of Imitations," pp. 22-3, 371-9.

ply here De Greef's distinction[1] between *simple* and *compound* laws, the former expressing relations between phenomena of the same class, the latter relations between phenomena of different classes. When we unite two economic facts, as in the proposition that *the investment of capital varies directly with the rate of interest,* we have an economic law. When we unite two political facts, as in the proposition that *as national oppositions grow, party oppositions weaken,* we have a law of political science. When, on the other hand, we join a political to an economic fact, as in the proposition that *with the diffusion of economic opportunity the tension between classes lessens,* we have a social law. By the same right we may count as social Robertson Smith's law[2] that *the rise of a commonwealth or hierarchy of gods follows step by step the coalescence of small social groups into larger unities,* and Nieboer's generalization[3] that *"Slavery as an industrial system is not likely to exist where subsistence depends on natural resources which are present in limited quantity."*

In general, however, the typical social law is not the statement of a relation between facts of different classes. It is more apt to develop a fundamental truth underlying, rather than connecting, the special social sciences. The action of one ethnic group upon another as formulated in Gumplowicz's law is determinative of political, military, economic, and domestic facts. In other words the law discloses a

[1] "Les lois sociologiques," p. 138.
[2] "The Religion of the Semites," pp. 39-41.
[3] "Slavery," p. 387.

basic truth. Veblen's principle is of equal interest for ethics, æsthetics, and the science of religion. The laws of imitation formulated by Tarde are helpful to the linguist as well as to the economist, to the demographer as well as to the political scientist. Many of Giddings's laws disclose characteristics of all manner of associations, or tendencies present in all departments of social life. In sooth, an inventory of its results convinces one that sociology is not so much a sister science to politics or jurisprudence, as a fundamental and comprehensive discipline uniting at the base all the social sciences.

IV

THE UNIT OF INVESTIGATION IN SOCIOLOGY[1]

In Bunyan's allegory the pilgrims to the Celestial City find, even at the very gateway of heaven, a little wicket that admits to a path leading down to hell. In like manner the student of society, after he has traversed the theological and the metaphysical methods of explaining his facts, and has come to the very threshold of the scientific method, finds innocent-looking side-paths that lead off into the waste. Two of these—the analogical and the genetic interpretations—have been pointed out. I now propose to show how one wanders off into the wilderness by adopting a wrong unit of investigation.

That bizarre forerunner of sociology, the philosophy of history, assumed that the experiences of a particular society—Sicily or Poland, for example—are but parts of a single mighty process. The life of humanity—or at least of Occidental humanity—can be brought under a single formula. History is a swelling stream formed of the confluence of many tributaries, all taking their rise within the limits of a single vast basin. To explain history as St. Augustine or Bossuet would explain it, is to de-

[1] *Vide The American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1903.

termine the goal of the whole process and the contribution of each of the various parts.

The widening of the ethnological horizon, however, kept bringing into view other valleys traversed by other streams. Scores upon scores of currents of social development were discovered—no Father of Waters, it is true, like the flood that bears along us Occidental millions, but still rivers having a source and a direction of their own. All the variety the philosophers of history could get came from tracing up some tributary of the Occidental current, the Etruscan, the Egyptian, the Phœnician, or the Hebrew culture. But latterly we have found many independent streams of civilization, such as the Peruvian, Cambodian, Mayan, and Chinese civilizations. What of the Ashantees, the Damaras, the Bantu, the Aztecs, the Amerinds, the Samoyeds, the numerous hill tribes of India, or the little human clusters in the islets of Oceania? What of the Japanese, the Javanese, the Coreans, the Afghans? What of the early Celts, the Germans, the Slavs, the tribes of the Caucasus? Each of these has a development and a fate of its own; and if its language, its arts, or its religious speculations be partly borrowed, it nevertheless passes through stages of industry, law, and government which are determined by local and special conditions and not by foreign influences. Here are (or rather *were,* for some have sunk into the sand, and others have emptied into larger rivers) so many social streams, each with its own slope and cataracts and with fluctuations betraying nothing of

the ebb and flood we have gauged in the Nile of our European civilization.

It is the signal merit of Spencer that, like Aristotle, he perceived that humanity has toiled upward in separate bands and along many paths. By heavily ballasting his sociological theses with facts gathered from numerous remote and outlandish societies, by sternly denying us the panoramic effects so dear to the philosophers of history, he broke the spell of the near, and taught us how vast and how varied is the field of social evolution. It is now clear to all that the independent linguistic, religious, political, and domestic evolutions brought to light are sufficently numerous to afford a fair basis for comparison and induction. By assembling facts of a given kind from every society, past and present, of which we have any knowledge, Letourneau has been able to build up his great studies in marriage, slavery, commerce, education, and religion.[1] These, although they are not sociology, are so many collections of sorted materials ready to the hand of the inductive sociologist.

In the last paper it was shown how futile is the endeavor to establish laws of succession based on the parallelism in all societies of any special development (*e. g.*, domestic or political) *taken in its entirety*. Since there is but one sequence of this sort for each society, the number of cases cannot exceed the number of societies; but as the known societies are under very dissimilar conditions, their developments

[1] See bibliography at end of volume.

of family or state are not sufficiently parallel to yield a valid law of succession. The error here lies in *taking too large a unit.* To reach inductively true laws of succession, we have only to pass to the little series of transformations that occur repeatedly in the life of a single society. Such are the consecutive changes by which a luxury is transmuted into a conventional necessity, a difference in wealth passes into a difference in rank, an elective head becomes a hereditary head, a usurping dynasty becomes legitimate, an innovation becomes orthodoxy, a custom turns into a right, a vice comes to be a sin. Such is the cycle that lies between two conquests or two economic crises, or two revivals of religion. Thus from numerous cases it is possible to formulate the normal development of an innovation or a fashion, to declare what is typical in the formation of a myth, the fixation of a tradition, the canonization of a hero, or the assimilation of an immigrant.

In social life there are indeed cycles, only they are much more minute and numerous than old Vico supposed. It is only the petty phenomenon that is often repeated. The bane of sociology has been the employment of large units, the comparison in lump instead of the comparison in detail. Parallels have been drawn between the English Revolution and the French Revolution, between Cæsar's usurpation and Napoleon's, between classic society and modern society, between England and Carthage, between the Roman empire and the British. We have, furthermore, the supposed similarity of all nations with the

same form of government, of all civilizations developed in the same climatic zone.

Tarde is perfectly right when he says: "This attempt to confine social facts within lines of development, which would compel them to repeat themselves *en masse* with merely insignificant variations, has hitherto been the chief pitfall of sociology."[1] We shall never make headway until, renouncing the comparison of a few huge and only superficially integrated complexes of phenomena—such as nations, epochs, and civilizations, we condescend to compare and group together great numbers of small and elementary social facts. Instead of generalizing on the basis of a few gross and fanciful resemblances, we ought to generalize on the basis of numerous minute and exact resemblances. Just as the scientific classification of plants and animals founded on the minute evidences of relationship brought to light in cells and organs supersedes the classification based on broad superficial characteristics, so every step toward a true science of society removes us farther from those groupings of social fact which appeal to the tyro. It is better to look for the common features of crowds or clans, or secret societies, or mining camps, or towns, than to compare nations. It is better to draw parallels between systems of kinship or tenures of land, than between civilizations. Still better is it from the inspection of many cases of the same kind to arrive at general conceptions or

[1] "Social Laws," p. 25. There are in the book many other passages bearing on this question.

laws concerning imitation or discussion or compromise or coöperation.

What would have been the fate of economics if it had conceived itself as Comparative Industry, if it had contented itself with drawing parallels between national economies? Economics has become a true science because *within the same national economy* it has found hundreds of commodities, of establishments, of markets, of prices, of bargains, of individual acts of saving or investment or readjustment. Sociology, likewise, in order to reach general truths, must penetrate from the mass to the molecule. It must select some simple relation or interaction and pursue it through all the infinite variety of its manifestations. From detecting vague and superficial analogies among a small number of complex wholes it must pass to the discovery of true and deep-lying resemblances among a large number of simple elementary facts.

The *contrasts* that first attract the notice of students of society are no less ambitious and sweeping than we have found the *resemblances* to be. St. Augustine makes the history of humanity turn on the antithesis of the Pre-Christian and the Post-Christian epochs, Bossuet on the contrast of the Chosen People with the heathen peoples, Cousin on the opposition of the Finite and the Infinite. Among the crude attempts at the differentiation of social phenomena are Hegel's balancing of Orient against Occident, Renan's opposition of Semite and Aryan, St. Simon's alternation of "organic" with "critical"

periods in the life of society, Buckle's broad contrast of the Asian with the European environment, Benloew's division of history into periods ruled respectively by the ideals of the Beautiful, the Good, and the True. Even the keen-eyed Marx opposes to a social Past dominated by class struggle, a classless, strifeless Future under the collectivist régime. Living exemplars of this way of treating things are Mr. Kidd,[1] with his polarity of "Western" with "Ancient" civilization, and (on a much higher plane) Mr. Brooks Adams,[2] whose over-fondness for pivotal events and moments leads him to see in history, not the sinuosities of a stream, but the zigzag path of the lightning.

A great stride is taken when it is perceived that many broad contrasts of periods, races, and civilizations resolve themselves on closer inspection into simply a *more* or *less* of contrasted social phenomena, which are found in varying proportions with every people and at every period. Why should we with St. Simon oppose so sharply organic and critical *epochs,* when the essential contrast is between organic and critical *tendencies,* which coexist in every society? Why confront the "Age of Authority" with the "Age of Reason," when the two principles are found side by side in every community, each bringing forth fruits after its kind? Why with Maine and Bagehot fare afield to contrast Stationary and Progressive peoples, when progressive and un-

[1] "The Principles of Western Civilization."
[2] "The New Empire."

progressive types are all about us, and without leaving our own time, or even our own town, we can fathom the principal conditions of stagnation and progress? Even Spencer's antithesis of militant and industrial societies resolves itself—seeing that hardly any society is wholly militant or wholly industrial—into the contrast in effects between *fighting* and *working*.

The diametrical oppositions worthiest to figure in sociology are such unlikenesses as conflict and compromise, competition and combination, class struggle and social solidarity, status and contract, coercive coöperation and voluntary coöperation, imitation and innovation, custom and fashion, persecution and toleration, rural life and city life, honorable employments and demeaning employments, pecuniary occupations and industrial occupations, the leisure class and the productive class, the self-supporting and the pauper, interest groupings and likeness groupings, differentiation and assimilation. These dateless and placeless antitheses that appear not once but continually, not between societies but within the same society, and so frequently that the society or the epoch often derives its distinctive character simply from the numerical preponderance of the one term of the antithesis over the other—these are the proper construction materials of a science.

As it has been with *resemblances* and *contrasts,* so has it been with *causes.*

The theocratic philosophy of history predicated for all events of consequence a single cause, namely,

the Divine Purpose. Then came metaphysicians such as Hegel, who detected behind history the Idea striving to realize itself, and Cousin, who supposed each nation to embody a particular idea, so that war is simply the violent collision of Antagonistic Ideas. Akin to this is the theory of a national or racial "genius," which so dominates all the individuals of a given nation or race that they cannot think or act save conformably to it. Even to-day large vague terms such as "Christianity," "democracy," and "evolution" are constantly used as if they stood for primary history-making forces.

When sociologists, emerging at last from the metaphysical into the positive stage, began to come upon real and ultimate forces, they erred by recognizing only a few large causes. *Environment* is a true factor, but who nowadays would take continents as unit areas of characterization, as did Guyot, Draper, and Buckle? It is now perceived that within the four corners of a country are several distinct environments, each sculpturing the souls of its denizens in its own way.[1] *Race* is a true factor, but instead of definite race areas—Latin, Teutonic, Slavic —identified broadly with the domain of a particular family of nationalities or languages, cranial measurements have brought us to recognize in the European population three ethnic types, mingled in every conceivable proportion and crossed in every possible way.[2] *The individual* is a true factor, but there is

[1] Demolins, "Comment la route crée le type social."

[2] Ripley, "The Races of Europe"; G. V. de Lapouge, "L'Aryen."

little of value in the Great-Man theory, which sets up a Hero for each epoch or movement and subjects multitudes of men through centuries to the spell of his purpose or his ideal. For every genius whose name is remembered a hundred minor innovators have fallen into oblivion. As for the leader, he accomplishes nothing without the consent of the led.

There are, in brief, as many causes to a social phenomenon as there are human wills involved. Every free individual is a cause. If, nevertheless, it is possible to discern large and simple factors behind human affairs, it is because a few omnipresent needs or conditions or influences incline many wills in the same direction. Just as a wave passes over a wheatfield because the breeze strikes and bends every stalk, so a historical movement occurs because a common desire, dread, confidence, or admiration shapes the choices of multitudes of men. *For the ultimate cause of a social manifestation must be motive or something that can affect motive.*

The more minute the fact or relation we study, the more frequent will be the cases of its occurrence, and the more likely they are to be so similar that they can be treated as equivalents. The adoption of petty elementary units will therefore hasten the advent of the day when, by the simple counting of cases, we can measure the degree of sympathy or repugnance between one kind of social phenomenon and another, or between a social phenomenon and a physical, vital, or psychical phenomenon. Only recently we have gotten new light by counting suicides, conver-

sions, and lynchings. In time we shall tabulate feuds, mobs, insurrections, riots, revivals, custom imitations, mode imitations, race inter-marriages, etc. The statistical method, which enables us to measure social phenomena exactly and to substitute quantitative truths for qualitative, constitutes an instrument of precision, which certainly is destined to be applied to sociological problems in ways yet undreamed of.

"But what of the historical method?" I hear it said. "If you insist on the simple, how can you utilize the critical occasions, the momentous events, the dramatic facts furnished by the historian?"

"History repeats itself." "History never exactly repeats itself." Here are two truths, the one the corner-stone of sociology, the other just as surely the basis of a science of history. There is a notion abroad that the scientific historian turns out partly generalized matter, whereas the sociologist turns out wholly generalized matter. The truth is, the two men do not usually deal with the same materials and, when they do, they handle them differently.

Sociology is one of the abstract sciences. The sociologist aims to rise from particular cases to general terms which he can employ in formulating generalizations and laws. He wants not unique facts, but recurrent facts, for which he can frame a concept that shall neglect details and emphasize common properties. The facts he uses are in many cases too numerous and too insignificant to attract even the notice of the historian. Take, for instance, the

data that seem to warrant the generalization that *every new article of consumption is prized for its prestige before it is prized for its utility.*[1] So far as they are not thrust upon us by common observation, they are gleaned from myths, literature, biography, descriptions of manners, records of travel, etc., from anywhere almost save the stately page of history!

History is not, as many suppose, the quarry to which sociologists resort for their material. The records of the past—its monuments, survivals, legends, documents—are the common quarry for both historian and sociologist. The former explores them for *events, i. e.,* things that occur only once, and are definite as regards date, place, and person. The latter prizes most the humble facts of repetition, which interest the historian only at those rare intervals when he interrupts the current of his narrative to exhibit the *state* or *transformations* of domestic life, manners, industry, law, or religion.

The iridescent personages, deeds, situations, and scenes that most engross the historian and justify his purple patches—the impeachment of Hastings, the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, the death of Mirabeau, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the battle of Waterloo, the siege of Leyden, the sack of Magdeburg, the Field of the Cloth of Gold, the Diet of Worms—these are intractable to the sociologist until abstraction has been made of the particular in them. Ere he can use them he must fade their bril-

[1] Gurewitsch, "Die Entwickelung der menchlichen Bedürfnisse und die sociale Gliederung der Gesellschaft."

liant tints to sober colors. On the other hand, he is intent on those numerous and minute occurrences which record themselves in the movement or redistribution of population, the changes in the tenure or tillage of land, the shifting of routes and markets, the rise of cities, the multiplication of wants, the accumulation of capital, the growth of organization, the rearrangement of classes, the alteration of standards, the hardening of dogmas, or the mutations of opinion.

These dull-hued materials, while they do not lend themselves to picturesque narrative, while they lack the epic or dramatic flavor of riots, battles, sieges and pageants, are the only kind of stuff from which we can distil *general truths* or *laws*. This is why, as we turn the pages of the best sociological writing of to-day, we see so few proper nouns, we are struck with the dearth of allusion to dates, places, persons, or events. The phenomena explained are so common that everyone is familiar with them, and so numerous that none of them ever attains the dignity of a historical event.

If history really repeated itself, every historian would be a sociologist in the gristle. But the life of a people is not like a game of bowls, where the pins are set up again and again. It is rather a drama in many acts and scenes. Centuries, dynasties, rulers, parliaments, always differ, and this individual quality is the staple of the historian. He does not disown the particular, he does not shut his eyes to all but the common quality in his facts, in order there-

with to build a general notion. He clings to the particular, whereas the sociologist cancels out the particular. The historian who aspires to be "scientific"—rather than a mere chronicler or narrator—is eager to know causes, to find the connection of events with one another and with their underlying conditions, to fuse a complex of many individual facts into a characterization that will give you the Reformation or the Victorian Era in a nutshell. But with all his bird's-eye views of nations and of epochs, he never ventures on a *law,* lest he should therewith divorce himself from his subject-matter, which is always the unique.

The sociologist, on the contrary, pursuing as he does the same ideal as the natural scientist, has no use for the fact that occurs but once, unless, by driving out of it that which is individual, he can break it up into familiar components. For him, the Neronian, Decian, Diocletian, Albigensian, Waldensian, and Hussite persecutions disappear as historical events in order to yield up to sociology something in the way of general notion or statement with respect to religious persecution. The Crusades are too unique to furnish a law of crusades. But they may contribute to the framing of concepts or truths under such rubrics as crowd psychology, coöperation, colonization, race-struggle, cross-fertilization of cultures, etc.

Just as the old Ionic philosophers sought to resolve the universe into a primitive element—matter, water,

fire or air—so the thinkers of a decade or two ago imagined a single elementary fact, which should be to sociology what the molecule is to physics and the cell to biology. Some held *contract* to be the characteristic social fact; others, *mutual aid* and the *division of labor*. On the one hand, *conflict* was held to be the essential social process; on the other, *imitation* was brought forward as the distinctive fact antedating all coöperation or contract. Finally it was insisted that at the bottom of every social phenomenon lies the *constraint* of the individual by conventions and institutions.

Now, there never has been a good reason for supposing we shall be able to reduce everything social to a single element. The straining for an elementary social fact was really due to the desire of the best minds to break away from the deadening clutches of the organic analogy. The society-is-an-organism philosophy drew social phenomena into such close relations with vital phenomena that sociology had not room to live. Hence, the restless casting about for that in society which differentiates it from the organism, for some quality in social phenomena which is *specific*. Now that the analogy incubus has been shaken off, there is no reason to look for a single elementary social fact. When the assay is completed, at the bottom of the crucible will probably be found several ultimates.

What, now, are the final units of investigation in sociology?

We cannot take the *individual* as our unit unless

we rob anthropology of *its* unit. Only a part of man—the spiritual part—is moulded by association. He gets hungry, tired, or sleepy as a man, not as a *socius*. Many of his instincts, cravings, and thoughts are pre-social, or, if you prefer, extra-social. Like the walls of old castles that have weathered into oneness with the cliff, the socialized part of us is so weathered that you can hardly tell where it leaves off and temperament or individuality begins. It is certain, nevertheless, we cannot reduce the whole man to a "cell" in a "social organism." Not everyone has that blotting-pad texture which makes him absorb the ideas and prejudices that prevail about him. Some of us do get printed with the full design of our time and tribe. But most of us take the pattern only in spots, and there are, moreover, eccentrics and recalcitrants who utterly refuse to be drawn in between the social rollers.

Nor can we take as our unit the *social organ*, meaning thereby the functional group. So long as division of labor was regarded as the leading feature of society, it was natural to be chiefly interested in the coördinated groups of workers, fighters, or directors. But it has come to be perceived that there are many groups which can in no sense be said to fulfill in society an office analogous to that of an organ in a living body. Alongside of their functional groupings, men are found associated into guilds, corporations and parties, bound together by a community of aims, and striving each to gain an advantage at the expense of the rest. Nor is this

all. Besides these *interest groups,* we recognize in classes, castes, and sects *likeness groups,* held together by the consciousness of kind. Beyond them we may distinguish *natural groups,* such as family and neighborhood, and *fortuitious groups,* such as crowd or public.

In truth, people are ever clasping and unclasping hands, uniting now for a day, now for life. Could we run history through a biograph, we should see groups forming, dissolving, and re-forming, like the figures of dancers on the floor of a ball-room. What, then, is more natural than to conclude: "The *group* is the true unit of investigation in sociology"?

Now, whoever will acquaint us with the genesis, development, and maintenance of all kinds of groups will lead us far, very far, toward our goal. But social bonds appear in *relations,* as well as in *groupings.* Here are friends, comrades, partners determining one another. Here is a nexus between apostle and disciple, leader and follower, principal and agent, pastor and layman, liege and vassal. To set forth the content of the various typical relations that exist or have existed is surely a duty of the sociologist.

Even *group* and *relation* do not exhaust the aspects of social life. These are objective facts. They evince themselves in behavior, and there is no reason why our neighbors on Mars might not study them on this planet if their telescopes are powerful enough. But there are subjective facts that solicit the attention of the sociologist. A rubric must be

provided for the mythologies, sciences, and arts erected by the joint efforts of men, and for the conventions precipitated from their interaction.

There are some who think to unite the subjective with the objective facts by adopting as their unit the *institution.* But this, too, is narrowing. Intent on the institution sociologists have neglected temporary groupings like the crowd, and so raised up a swarm of crowd psychologists, who make sport of their institutional lore. They have also neglected illicit social formations, such as have not received the baptism of social recognition and approval. To the scientific eye a Camorra or Mafia, a furtive gang of criminals or "combine" of boodlers, is as interesting and significant as a College of Cardinals or a Supreme Court. But the institutional bias scorns them, and so writers on government have enlarged on the parts and organs duly constituted and presented to the public view, and have ignored the veiled apparatus of parties, caucuses, rings, machines and bosses, that work the mechanism in front of the curtain. Only recently have political scientists shown a disposition to explore the real springs and forces behind the government.

There is, moreover, a distinction between *institution* and *structure* the neglect of which has created much confusion. An institution is a grouping or relation that is sanctioned or permitted by society. The actual may or may not conform to the sanctioned. The polyandry of our great cities, however rife, is not an institution. The monogamic union,

however rare, would be, nevertheless, an institution. Spencer, confounding monogamy *de jure* with monogamy *de facto* is unable to find "that social progress and progress toward a higher type of family life are uniformly connected." Had he drawn the above distinction, he would have viewed the pairing family of the Veddahs and other low types as a practice, but not an institution. "Property," too, is used in both senses. Sometimes it designates "things possessed"; sometimes it means "a conventional right to things." As an institution, property is certainly a subjective fact, to-wit, a general willingness to enforce by social sanctions a man's claim to things that have come to him in approved ways.

Again, if the institution is the thing to be explained, the ground is cut from underneath the lower human and sub-human sociology. For in a group of animals we find interactions, modes of mutual aid, habits of coöperation, etc. But do we find modes of life with a collective sanction annexed? Can we detect authorized relations imposed by the community upon reluctant members?

Since not only our relations to others are matters of social surveillance, but also our private life, some suggest that we adopt the *social imperative* as the unit. Now, an institution is a sanctioned relation; an imperative is a sanctioned action or belief. But in addition to these there exist important *uniformities* of belief, action, or feeling, which are in no wise binding on the individual. Imitation, or the influence of a common environment, extends

through a population great *planes* of knowledge, opinion or desire, which support the forms of collective life. Upon these platforms of common opinion or common will are erected imperatives and institutions. It is true that a uniformity of any kind tends to stiffen into a convention, tends even to develop the hard cutting-edge of a social imperative. It is true that the prevalent tends to become the uniform, the uniform the expected, the expected the obligatory, the obligatory the compulsory. Still Durkheim is not warranted in enlarging the term "institution" so as to include myths, dogmas, legends, languages, arts, and sciences. Not until these planes extend themselves by constraint is it proper to term them institutions.

Moreover, unless we include the *uniformity* among our units, we shall have no place for the phenomena of crowds, since the social nature of these agglomerations is too undetermined to leave a precipitate in the form of an imperative or institution. Durkheim, indeed, sets these crowd unanimities apart as "social currents." It seems better, however, to bring them under the rubric of *uniformities.*

The five units so far favorably considered—groups, relations, institutions, imperatives, uniformities—are *products.* They precede the individual and they survive him. To the onlooker they appear as gods or fates, moulding the lives and disposing upon the destinies of ordinary men. Nevertheless, they have all risen at some time out of the actions

and interactions of men. To understand their genesis we must ascend to that primordial fact known as *the social process.*

Take, for instance, a social uniformity. In what ways may it originate? It may arise through *exposure* to similar external influences, such as climate or occupation. It may come about through the *propagation* of an idea or a practice from person to person, from class to class. It may be due to *transmission* within the family, or to identity of *instruction.* It may come from the *orientation* of many minds by a common shock or experience. It may come from the *fascination* of the Many by the One, or from the *intimidation* of the One by the Many. At the beginning, then, of every uniformity may be found a *process,* which process exhibits a regularity that permits the formulation of laws.

Certain influences have conspired to divert the attention of social investigators from processes. The product uprears itself like the mast of a ship or the steeple of a church. Here is the institution—primogeniture, *lex talionis,* trial by jury—huge, conspicuous, enduring. We inspect it, handle it, describe it, but neglect the generative process, that which Emerson terms "the quick cause before which all forms flee as the driven snows, itself secret, its works driven before it in flocks and multitudes."

Spencer, in his *Descriptive Sociology,* has listed the institutions and structures of vanished peoples, these being the hard, durable parts of a society, that can most easily be recovered from the records. But

of the processes that brought them forth we have no hint. Just as the cave breccia yields us fossil bones, but not fossil flesh, so the past renders up its institutions, but not its social life. Attacking the problems of social evolution rather than those of social theory, Spencer had to work much with bygone societies, and hence missed many processes which later observers have detected in the life about us. This is why he makes his institutions arise and evolve almost without the intervention of the human will. His phraseology seems to endow them with inherent tendencies to become this or that.

A product is, moreover, discovered sooner than the process that lies behind it. It is easy to perceive that the commonplace person is what he is by reason of the culture and conventions which have surrounded him from childhood. But it is difficult to rend the veil that enshrouds these elements and detect how they themselves arose out of the initiatives and interactions of bygone men. Just as anatomy was developed long before embryology, so the presence of deposits of collective thought and action was perceived long before the chemistry by which they were precipitated. Professor Durkheim's case well illustrates this point. Here is a thinker who realizes vividly the constraint exercised upon the individual by the plexus of social forms about him, yet stands helpless before the task of explaining just how these forms came to be.[1]

The study of products to the neglect of processes

[1] "Les règles de la méthode sociologique."

leads men to impute to an institution a kind of individuality, to imagine that it is endowed with a vitality of its own and endures until this life-force has departed from it. For instance, the origin of the stigma currently attaching to manual labor is attributed to remote servile conditions, and its presence here is ascribed to *vis inertiæ*. The true explanation is that this spiritual attitude is natural to the members of a leisure class, and from them it spreads out through society, until, strange to say, it infects the manual laboring class itself. The stigma, far from being a mere survival, is constantly reproduced by the process of *invidious comparison.*

Again, we commonly hear contemporary aristocracy interpreted as a remote historical phase petrified into a rigid institution. But it is, in point of fact, the visible product of an unceasing process of economic differentiation. Save as it attaches itself to permanent forms of wealth, a superior caste cannot endure without taking in new blood. Should it close its doors on the rich, it would soon cease to dominate. The differentiation process is continually bringing to the top a new crop of successful men, who will undermine the position of the nobility unless they or their children are admitted into its ranks. The studied archaism which a nobility habitually affects should not blind us to the fact that it is the product, not of a remote past, but of a continuing process.

In fact, institutions, however hoary their brows, are not really old, for they are ever re-created. The

authority of Pope or Kaiser persists to-day, not from the momentum accumulated in the far past, but because our generation builds it up as rapidly as it is torn down. The power of noble or prelate endures only because it is ever renewed. The load the past rolls upon us is not its *institutions* — we shake them off impatiently enough when we find them really burdensome—but its *ideas,* which constrain us to go on and on reproducing arrangements unsuited to our present needs. It is the *thoughts* of dead men that enslave us, not their social order.

The mistaken endeavor to make social life hinge on a single typical or characteristic process has stamped with one-sidedness nearly everything that has been written on sociology. The economists, preoccupied with competition, are apt to overlook combination. Spencer, busy with the division of labor, disregards imitation. Gumplowicz, engrossed in the struggle of races, fails to note the process of pacific assimilation between peoples. Tarde is so interested in the propagation, opposition, and adaptation of ideas that even war seems to him a collision of ideas rather than a clash of desires. Accommodation so monopolizes Durkheim's vision that he has no eyes for innovation. Loria sees class struggle so clearly that he cannot perceive socialization. In short, each of the paladins has seen a part of the truth and only a part. It is necessary to recognize in social life a variety of processes which arise from diverse conditions, obey different laws, and have dissimilar effects.

The appearance of planes of thought or feeling, as well as the formation of groups, is conditioned by certain processes, which do not involve the action of man on man, and are not, strictly speaking, *social.* These may be termed *preliminary processes.* All the denizens of a given geographical area, inasmuch as they are being insensibly moulded by the same physical surroundings, are thereby being fitted to receive the same culture, or to draw together into one society. Persons of the same calling are assimilated by the impressions and experiences connected with their work, and are thus qualified to embrace the same class ideal or to unite in defense of their class interests. Those who have the same manner of life, or receive the same education, become by that fact potential *socii.* Anterior to all these assimilations there goes on in childhood the "dialectic of personal growth"[1] by which the thought of the other person is built into the very foundation of the thought of one's self.

The chief ways in which the potentially social become actually associated are the collision of groups and the congregating of individuals. In the former case a series of processes is set up which leaves a rich sediment in the way of institutions and groupings. These have been fully described by Gumplowicz, Vaccaro, Ratzenhofer, and Ward. The processes that follow upon the pacific association of

[1] Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development," ch. I.

strangers have been described by Sighele, Rossi, Le Bon, Tarde, Giddings, and Cooley.

Whatever the mode in which grouping takes place, the interactions do not long remain on the psychic plane. Coöperation, either voluntary or compulsory, is instituted, and ranges from the simplest cases of mutual aid to the highest organization of industry and exchange. All these processes have been copiously treated by the economists and by such writers as Spencer, Schäffle, Von Lilienfeld, Durkheim, and Kropotkin.

An incidental effect of nearly every social process is that it renders men more unlike. If they do not compete with equal vigor, combine with equal promptness, or imitate with equal discrimination, they become *differentiated* as regards wealth or culture or mode of life. Hereupon ensues an *invidious comparison* of self with others, and the *segregation* of the members of a society into non-fraternizing classes or castes. Professor Veblen has made this process peculiarly his own.[1] Stratification is, however, limited by certain processes of *socialization* which tend to assimilate the members of different classes, and to oppose a barrier to the growth of extreme heterogeneity. These have been set forth by Tarde, Giddings, Baldwin, Royce, and Cooley.

Thus forms the crust, the firm fabric of arts, sciences, world-views, conventions, and institutions, upon which generations of men dwell in concord and security with perhaps no inkling of the time when

[1] "The Theory of the Leisure Class."

this crust was fluid. But from time to time there occur elevations and subsidences of the social crust, akin to those which disturb the terrene crust. These processes we may term *reconstructive* or *dynamic.* Natural increase in numbers compels men to adopt a more intensive economy, which in turn brings many changes in its train. From prolonged saving there result in time great accumulations of capital which react powerfully upon the industrial organization, the constitution of classes, and the political system. Through draining, deforesting, the domesticating and diffusing of animals and plants, there are wrought lasting changes in the environment which react upon the social life of later generations. The gathering of men into cities quickens the movement of ideas and forms centers of incandescent intellect which flood with light the rest of society. By migration to new seats men rid themselves of the old confining shell, and become free to wind for themselves a new and better cocoon. The springing up of intercourse between peoples that have advanced on independent lines permits a cross-fecundation between their marriageable ideas, and brings about a rapid elevation of culture. Lastly, there is the man of originality, the innovator, who, with his invention, or discovery, or example, switches men on to a new track. To recur to our former metaphor, no matter how tough the social crust, sooner or later there "comes by a great inquisitor who with auger and plumb line will bore an artesian well through our

MAP OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL FIELD

PROCESSES

PRELIMINARY.....
- Assimilation by environment
- Assimilation by occupation
- Assimilation by mode of life
- Assimilation by "dialectic of personal growth"
- Assimilation by education

SOCIAL. .....

Genesis of Society
- Multiplication
- Congregation
- Conjugation

Association
- Communication
- Fascination
- Intimidation

Domination
- Exploitation
- Forcible assimilation

Opposition
- Class struggle
- Competition
- Discussion

Adaptation
- Toleration
- Compromise
- Amalgamation

Co-operation
- Mutual aid
- Division of labor
- Organization
- Regulation

Stratification
- Differentiation
- Segregation
- Subordination

Socialization
- Imitation
- Intercourse
- Education
- Social control

Alienation
- Estrangement
- Antagonization

Individualization
- Diversification of culture
- Liberalizing of control
- Dissolution of social bonds

Crystallization

RECONSTRUCTIVE..
- Increase of numbers
- Accumulation of capital
- Incidental modification of environment
- Selection
- Urbanization
- Migration
- Cross-fertilization of cultures
- Innovation

SUBJECTIVE PRODUCTS

UNIFORMITIES (OR PLANES)

Particular

	combining into
Ideas	Languages
Symbols	Mythologies
Beliefs	Religions
Knowledge	Arts
Valuations	Sciences
Desires	Manners
Ideas	Customs
Opinions	Standards of living

General
- The soul of the crowd
- Group character
- The *Zeitgeist*

IMPERATIVES
- Mandates
- Injunctions
- Rules
- Conventions
- Dogmas

INSTITUTIONS
- Domestic
- Juristic
- Political
- Military
- Ecclesiastical
- Industrial
- Professional

OBJECTIVE PRODUCTS

RELATIONS
- Fellowship
- Reciprocity
- Suretyship
- Discipleship
- Agency
- Patronage
- Clientage
- Pupilage
- Vassalage
- Slavery

GROUPINGS

Fortuitous groups
- Crowds
- Publics

Natural groups
- Families
- Kindreds
- Communities

Likeness groups
- Castes
- Classes
- Sects
- Parties
- Professions
- Nations

Interest groups
- Tribes
- States
- Confederacies
- Guilds
- Corporations

Functional groups
- Purposive associations
- Social organs

Authorities

Hierarchies

conventions and theories, and pierce to the core of things."

The program of investigation herewith outlined is broad, but it is not too broad. Some will complain of omissions, but certainly no one will here discover anything that ought not to be considered by a science of society. Recently, social investigators have shown a slight tendency to narrowness. Each has been sure that the center of sociology lies just where his pick-axe turns up the richest ore. This is perhaps a good sign. It means that the promised land once surveyed afar from a mountain peak by Comte and Schäffle is now overrun with prospectors. It is well, however, for each of us occasionally to climb out of his gulch, inspect the nuggets his brethern are finding, and from some commanding point realize how vast are the dimensions of this new El Dorado.

V

MOB MIND[1]

In observing social life among animals one is struck by the contagion of feeling in a herd or flock. Whatever the feeling called up, whether terror, hostility to a stranger, rage at hereditary enemies, or sympathy for a stricken fellow, all the members of the group feel it, and feel it at once. If anything unusual occurs, a wave of excitement passes over the herd, followed by instant and unanimous response. Of inquiry or doubt or reflection there is no sign.

This prompt obedience to suggestions from one's fellows is accounted for the moment we recall the harsh conditions of animal existence. It is the gregarious animals that are least formidable by nature and hence most dependent on mutual aid. Instant fight or flight is the condition of their existence, and failure to coöperate promptly means death. By oft-repeated sifting out of the stupid, the heedless, or the willful, Nature builds up a marvelous suggestibility and a prompt response to sign. Not otherwise can we explain why a feeling should run like wildfire through a band of elephants or terror should strike through a herd of deer as a shock passes through a solid body.

[1] *Vide The Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1897.

The human analogue to the agitated herd is the mob. Mob comes from "mobile," and refers to mental state. A crowd, even an excited crowd, is not a mob; nor is an excited crowd bent on violence a mob. Great mental instability marks the true mob, and this characterizes only the crowd that is under the influence of suggestion. A lynching party may be excited, disorderly, and lawless without being a true mob. The crowd that lynched thirteen Italians in New Orleans a few years ago, far from showing the wavering indecision of the genuine mob, seemed to know exactly what it wanted and just how to go about it. In this respect it stood in high contrast to the Cincinnati mob of 1886. What distinguished the New Orleans crowd was the absence of epidemic. Its perfect unanimity came not from an overmastering suggestion, but from the coming together of all who had been affected with the same grim rage at the news of Chief Hennessey's assassination.

Again, we must refuse the name "mob" to the disorderly masses that in times of tumult issue from the criminal quarters of great cities. In such cases there is an unchaining in each man of the evil and secret lusts of his heart on observing that opportunity is favorable and that others are like minded. Safe from punishment or shame, the ragamuffin or hoodlum burns, loots, and riots in obedience not to a common impulse but to his natural inclination. It is this peculiar effect of numbers in bringing on the criminal mood that chiefly marks off the human crowd from the animal crowd.

More than any other animal, man is restrained by a morality founded not on impulse but on discipline. Animal morality is mainly the prompting of fellow-feeling. But by the long pressure of an artificial environment man is brought to submit himself to the constant sway of a moral code often quite alien to his impulses. Remove the fear of consequences by the anonymity of the crowd, take away the sense of personal responsibility by the participation of numbers, and people will step by step descend into depths of evil-doing and violence that measure how far their prevailing inclinations lie below the moral standard which social pressure has forced upon them. Animals, because they have been less *moralized* than men by education, rarely show any such collective *demoralization.*

A *one-mindedness,* therefore, the result not of reasoning or discussion or coming together of the like-minded, but of *imitation,* is the mark of the true mob. We think of the mob as *excited* simply because it is under stress of excitement that men become highly imitative. *Fickleness* and *instability* characterize it simply because mood changes promptly with every change in the nature of the suggestion. It is *irrational* because dominated not by the remembered teachings of experience but by the fleeting impressions of the moment. It is *cowardly* because its members, actuated not by stern purpose or set resolve but by mere suggestion, scatter in craven flight the moment the charm is broken. It is *transitory* because the orgy of excitement leads to fatigue and

lessened power of response to stimuli from without. In a few hours the hyperæsthesia wears away, physical wants and sensations turn the attention inward, the psychic bond is broken, and the crowd disperses and goes home. A mob, then, defined for purposes of social psychology, is *a crowd of people showing a unanimity due to mental contagion.* Other mob traits of which much is made — such as ferocity, shamelessness, criminality, and courage—need not flow from suggestion at all. More often they are the effect of the sense of numbers.

Analyzing the mob as thus defined, we find at the base of it that mental quality termed *suggestibility* which comes to light in gregarious animals, children, certain lunatics, hysterical patients, and hypnotized subjects. It dominates childhood, but fades as character sets and the will hardens. In adult life it is so overborne by habit and reason as to be dominant only under abnormal conditions such as disease, fascination, or excitement.

Why, now, should this quality be heightened when one is in the midst of a crowd?

The inhibitive power which measures our ability to go our own way unperturbed grows with the variety and number of suggestions that reach us. This may be because conflicting suggestions block each other off. The power of independent choice seems to develop best when the clash of suggestions reduces to a minimum the ascendency of the outer world over the individual. This is why age, travel, and contact with affairs build up character. But when numer-

ous identical suggestions beset one, one's power of resistance is gradually undermined. As many taps of a hammer fracture the bowlder, so the onset of multitudinous suggestion breaks the strongest will. Men who can readily throw off the thousand suggestions of everyday life will be quite swept away by the reiteration of a single idea from all sides. As a mighty organ compels even benches and windows to vibrate in unison with it, so the crowd dominated by a single mood emits a volume of suggestion that gives an emotional pitch and tone to every individual in it.

Besides the volume of suggestion possible in a crowd, there is usually a condition of excitement or expectancy. Frequently, too, there is a pressure on the body which prevents voluntary movement and wilts individuality while conveying promptly to each all those electrifying swayings and tremors that express the emotions of the mass. People are usually more demonstrative on their feet than when seated and the standing position of an assemblage is less self-possessed than the seated portion. The mere physical contact in the excited crowd, therefore, provides certain conditions of suggestibility.

A cross-section of the mob sometimes shows a concentric structure. There is in the center a leader from whom suggestions proceed. These, caught up by those near by and most dominated by his personality, are transmitted to the next circle with an added force. In this way the suggestion passes outward from zone to zone of the crowd, at each stage gath-

ering volume and therewith power to master the rest. That, therefore, which started at the center as fascination becomes sheer mental intimidation at the rim. This symmetrical type of mob has led some to look in every case for the *leader* who controls the mass by his personality or prestige. But the quest for a nucleus, while it makes the study of mobs more mysterious and sensational, certainly does not make it more scientific. Rarely does the primitive impulse proceed from one man. Usually the first orientation of minds is brought about by some object, spectacle, or event. This original phase, the moment it is observed by the members of the crowd, gives rise to three results: (1) By mere contagion the feeling extends to others till there is complete unanimity; (2) each feels more intensely the moment he perceives that the rest share his feeling; (3) the perceived unison calls forth a sympathy that makes the next agreement easier, and so paves the way for the mental unity of the crowd.

The mob is thus *a formation that takes time.* In an audience falling under the spell of an actor or an orator, a congregation developing the revival spirit, a crowd becoming riotous, or an army under the influence of panic, we can witness the stages by which the mob mood is reached. With the growing fascination of the mass for the individual, his consciousness contracts to the pin point of the immediate moment, and the volume of suggestion needed to start an impulse on its conquering career becomes

less and less. In the end, perhaps, any commanding person can assume the direction of the mob.

It must be manifest, however, that there are a hundred cases of imitation of the many for one case where the entire mass throughout obeys a single person. In accounting for the mob, hypnosis has no such scope of application as the theory of mental intimidation. If we suppose that the eye of the leader or the gesture of the orator paralyzes the will of the crowd as the "bright object" of the hypnotizer overcomes his subject, we shall not get the mob without *presence.* But if the secret of its unanimity lies in mass suggestion, why is presence necessary? May there not be mob phenomena in a multitude of people not collected at one spot within sight and sound of each other?

It has long been recognized that the behavior of city populations under excitement shows the familiar characteristics of the mob, quite apart from any thronging. Here we get unanimity, impulsiveness, exaggeration of feeling, excessive credulity, fickleness, inability to reason, and sudden alternations of boldness and cowardice. In fact, if we translate these qualities into public policy, we have the chief counts in the indictment which historians have drawn against the city democracies of old Greece and mediæval Italy.

These faults are due in part to the nervous strains of great cities. The continual bombardment of the attention by innumerable sense impressions tends to produce neurasthenia or hysteria, the peculiar mal-

ady of the city dweller. Then, too, in the sheltered life of the city thrive many mental degenerates that would be unsparingly eliminated by the sterner conditions of existence in the country. But aside from this the behavior of city dwellers under excitement can best be understood as the result of mental contacts made possible by easy communication. While the crowd, with its elbow-touch and its heat has, no doubt, a maddening all its own, the main thing in it is the contact of minds. Let this be given, and the three consequences I have pointed out must follow. An expectant or excited man learns that a thousand of his fellow-townsmen have been seized by a certain strong feeling, and meets with their expression of this feeling. Each of these townsmen in turn learns how many others are feeling as he does. Each stage in the subsequent growth of this feeling in extent and in intensity is perceived, and so fosters sympathy and a disposition to go with the mass. Will we not inevitably by this series of interactions get that "out"-look which characterizes the human atom in the mob?

The bulletin, the flying rumor, "the man in the street," and the easy swarming for talk or harangue open between minds those paths and prepare those contacts that permit the ambient mass to press almost irresistibly upon the individual. But why will this phenomenon be limited to the people huddled on a few square miles of city ground? Mental touch is not bound up with physical proximity. With the telegraph to collect and transmit the expressions and

signs of the ruling mood, and the fast mail to hurry to the eager clutch of waiting thousands the still damp sheets of the morning daily, remote people are brought as it were into one another's presence. Through its organs the excited public is able to assail the individual with a mass of suggestion almost as vivid as if he actually stood in the midst of an immense crowd.

Formerly, within a day a shock might throw into a fever all within a hundred miles of its point of origin. The next day it might agitate the zone beyond, but meanwhile the first body of people would have cooled down and would be disposed to listen to reason. And so, while a wave of excitement passed slowly over a country, the entire folk mass was at no moment in the same state of agitation.

Now, however, our space-annihilating devices, by transmitting a shock without loss of time, make it all but simultaneous. A vast public shares the same rage, alarm, enthusiasm, or horror. Then, as each part of the mass becomes acquainted with the sentiment of all the rest, the feeling is generalized and intensified. A rise of emotional temperature results which leads to a similar reaction. In the end the public swallows up the individuality of the ordinary man, as the crowd swallows up the will of its members.

It is plain that in matters of policy this instant consensus of feeling or opinion works for ill if it issues in immediate action. Formerly the unavoidable delay in focusing and ascertaining the

common will insured pause and deliberation. Now the prompt appearance of a mass sentiment threatens to betray us into taking hot-headed or ill-considered measures. Sudden heats and flushes take the place of long reflection and slow resolve; and with this comes a growing impatience with the checks and machinery that prevent the public from giving immediate effect to its will. As the working of representative government thus becomes less clumsy, there disappears some of that wholesome deliberateness which has distinguished indirect from direct democracy.

Mob mind working in vast bodies of dispersed individuals gives us the *craze* or *fad*. This may be defined as *that irrational unanimity of interest, feeling, opinion, or deed in a body of communicating individuals, which results from suggestion and imitation.* In the chorus of execration over a sensational crime, in the clamor for the blood of an assassin or dynamiter, in waves of national feeling, in war fevers, in political "landslides" and "tidal waves," in passionate "sympathetic" strikes, in cholera scares, in public frights, in popular delusions, in religious crazes, in "booms" and panics, in agitations, insurrections, and revolutions, we witness contagion on a gigantic scale, favored in some cases by popular hysteria. It is best to keep the term "craze" for an imitative unanimity arrived at under great excitement, and to apply the term "fad" to that milder form of imitation which appears in sudden universal interest in some novelty.

As there must be in the typical mob a center which radiates impulses by fascination till they have subdued enough people to continue their course by sheer intimidation, so for the *craze* there must be an excitant, overcoming so many people that these can affect the rest by mere volume of suggestion. This first orientation is produced by some event or incident. The murder of a leader, an insult to an ambassador, the sermons of a crazy fanatic, the words of a "prophet" or "Messiah," a sensational proclamation, a scintillating phrase, the arrest of an agitator, a *coup d'état,* the advent of a new railroad, the collapse of a trusted banking house, a number of deaths by an epidemic, a series of mysterious murders, an inexplicable occurrence such as a comet, an eclipse, a star shower, an earthquake, or a monstrous birth—each of these has been the starting point of some fever, mania, crusade, uprising, boom, panic, delusion, or fright. The more expectant, overwrought, or hysterical is the public mind, the easier it is to set up a great perturbation. Even clergymen noted a connection between the "great revival" of 1858 and the panic of 1857. After a series of public calamities, a train of startling events, a pestilence, earthquake, or war, the anchor of reason finds no "holding ground," and minds are blown about by every breath of passion or sentiment.

The craze, like the mob, takes time to develop. It flourishes most among people like-minded either by race or by culture and prevails more in times of change than in epochs of stagnation. The longer it

works, the wilder the statements that are believed or the actions that are done and the stronger the type of mind that falls a prey to it. The higher the craze mounts, the sharper is the reaction. The blackest glooms follow the rosiest booms and the acutest scepticism is found in the wake of the greatest popular delusions.

The *fad* originates in the surprise or interest excited by novelty. Roller-skating, blue glass, the planchette, a forty days' fast, the "new woman," tiddledy-winks, faith-healing, the "13-14-15" puzzle, baseball, telepathy, or the sexual novel attract those restless folk who are always running hither and thither after some new thing. This creates a swirl which rapidly sucks into its vortex the soft-headed and weak-minded, and at last, grown bigger, involves even the saner kind. As no department of life is safe from the invasion of novelty, we have all kinds of fads: literary fads like the Impressionists or the Decadents; philosophic fads like pessimism or anarchism; religious fads like spiritualism or theosophy; hygienic fads like vegetarianism, "glaming," "fresh air," mush diet, or water cure; medical fads like lymph, tuberculin, and radium; personal fads like short hair for women, pet lizards, face enamel, or hypodermic injections of perfumery. And of these orders of fads each has a *clientèle* of its own.

In many cases we can explain vogue entirely in terms of novelty fascination and mob mind. But even when the new thing is a step in progress and

can make its way by sheer merit, it does not escape becoming a fad. It will have its penumbral ring of imitators. So there is something of the fad even in bicycling, motoring, massage, antisepsis, skiagraphy, or physical culture. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to distinguish faddism from the enthusiastic welcome and prompt vogue accorded to a real improvement. For the undiscerning the only touchstone is time. Here as elsewhere "persistence in consciousness" is the test of reality. The mere novelty, soon ceasing to be novel, bores people and must yield to a fresh sensation; the genuine improvement, on the other hand, meets a real need and therefore lasts.

Unlike the craze, the fad does not spread in a medium specially prepared for it by excitement. It cannot rely on heightened suggestibility. Its conquests, therefore, imply something above mere volume of suggestion. They imply prestige. The fad owes half its power over minds to the prestige that in this age attaches to the new. Here lies the secret of much that is puzzling.

The great mass of men have always had their lives ruled by usage and tradition. Not for them did novelties chase each other across the surface of society. The common folk left to the upper ten thousand the wild scurry after the ruling fancy or folly of the hour. In their sports, their sweethearting, their mating, their child-rearing, their money-getting, their notions of right and duty, they ran on quietly in the ruts deeply grooved out by generations of men. But a century or so ago it was found

that this habit of "back"-look opposed to needed reforms the brutish ignorance, the crass stupidity, the rhinoceros-hide bigotry of the unenlightened masses. Accordingly, the idea of the humanitarian awakening that accompanied the French Revolution was to lift the common folk—the third estate—from the slough of custom to the plane of choice and self-direction. And for a hundred years the effort has been to explode superstition, to diffuse knowledge, to spread light, to free man from the spell of the past and turn his gaze forward.

The attempt has succeeded. The era of obscurantism is forever past. With school and book and press progress has been taught till with us the most damning phrase is "Behind the times!" But we now see that a good deal of the net result has been to put one kind of imitation in place of another. Instead of aping their forefathers, people now ape the many. The multitude has now the prestige that once clothed the past. Except where rural conservatism holds sway, mob mind in the milder forms of fad and craze begins to agitate the great deeps of society.

Frequently a half-education has supplied many ideas without developing the ability to choose among them. The power to discriminate between ideas in respect to their value lagging far behind the power to receive them, the individual is left with nothing to do but follow the drift. Ideas succeed one another in his mind not by trial and rejection, but in the order of their arrival on the scene. Formerly

people rejected the new in favor of wont and tradition; now they tend to "go in" for everything, and atone for their former suspiciousness by a touching credulity. The world is a-buzz with half-baked, ecstatic people who eagerly champion a dozen different reforms in spelling, dress, diet, exercise, medicine, manners, sex relations, care of children, art, industry, education, and religion, each of which is to bring in the millenium all at once.

These minds that, broken from the old moorings of custom, drift without helm or anchor at the mercy of wind and tide, are social derelicts. They follow the currents of opinion; they can not create them. At all times ripples chase each other over the surface of society in the direction of improvement—sudden but all-pervading interest in "how the other half lives," in the abolition of war, in rational dress, in out-of-door sports, in "a white life for two." Had these ripples a real ground swell beneath them, the world might soon be made over. But, alas! they are only ripples. They wrinkle the surface of people's attention for an instant, but in a moment their fickle minds are responding to a new impulse in a different direction.

If this were to be the outcome of the attempt to emancipate the common man and fit him to be helmsman of society, we might well despair. Certainly the staid, slow-going man of olden times, plodding along the narrow but beaten path of usage, is as dignified a figure as the unsteady modern person whose ideas and preferences flicker constantly in the cur-

rents of momentary popular feeling. The lanes of custom are narrow; the hedgerows are high, and view to right or left there is none. But there are as much freedom and self-direction in him who trudges along this lane as in the "emancipated" man who finds himself on an open plain, free to go in any direction, but nevertheless stampedes aimlessly with the herd.

Not that the hedge-rows of custom are to be replanted. The remedy for mob mind is to push on to greater individualization, not to fall back on authority. The past is discredited; then discredit the mass. The spell of ancestors is broken; let us next break the spell of numbers. The frantic desire of frightened deer or buffalo to press to the very center of the herd does not befit civilized men. The huddling instinct has no place in strong character. In a good democracy blind imitation can never take the place of individual effort to weigh and judge. The ideal is a society of men with neither the "back"-look on the past nor yet the "out"-look on their fellows, but with the "in"-look upon reason and conscience.

VI

THE PROPERTIES OF GROUP-UNITS[1]

In his *Study of Sociology*[2] Spencer shows that, just as the form of a pile of bricks or cannon balls is conditioned by the form of the bricks or balls themselves, and the form of crystallization is characteristic for each kind of molecule, so the properties of a social aggregate are derived from and determined by the properties of its members. We should therefore expect that, other things being equal, the diversity of any two societies would correspond to the diversity in character of the peoples composing them.

In his *Principles of Sociology*[3] Spencer is more cautious. After stating that the primary factors in social phenomena are the characters of the units and the nature of the physical environment (for all minor groupings within a population this factor, being common to all, may be ignored), he goes on to enumerate certain derived factors, one of these being the reciprocal influence of the society and its units:

> As soon as a combination of men acquires permanence, there begin actions and reactions between the community

[1] *Vide The American Journal of Sociology,* November, 1903.

[2] Ch. III.

[3] Vol. I, § 10.

and each member of it, such that either affects the other in nature. The control exercised by the aggregate over its units tends ever to mould their activities and sentiments and ideas into congruity with social requirements; and these activities, sentiments and ideas, in so far as they are changed by changing circumstances, tend to re-mould the society into congruity with themselves.

The principle that seemed so self-evident to Spencer has not passed without challenge. De Greef protests against the proposition that the character of an aggregate is determined by the essential characters of its constituent units, on the ground that it gives up the existence of a distinct social science. He says:

If the social aggregates are only the larger and more complex image of the units that compose them, if social science is concerned only with the morphological or functional relations between the series of units and the resulting aggregates, it evidently follows that, although there are social phenomena, these are not markedly distinct from biological or psychological phenomena.[1]

Gumplowicz, unlike Spencer, begins with groups, not with individuals. Human aggregates are the true social elements, and they are sufficiently simple and uniform in their behavior to allow social laws to be formulated. In its interaction with other groups each group is a perfect unit. It acts solely in its own interest and knows no standard of conduct but success. However the individual may blunder, the group never errs in seizing and applying the right means to gain its end.

Gumplowicz declares that the individual is to be

[1] "Introduction à la sociologie," Première partie, p. 19.

understood through his social group, instead of the group through its component individuals. The great error of individualistic psychology is the assumption that man thinks. The truth is, it is not the man that thinks, but the community. The source of his thoughts is the social medium in which he lives, the social atmosphere he has breathed from childhood. The individual unconsciously takes his qualities from his group, and the qualities of his group are determined by the nature of its dominant interests, the conditions of its life, and its situation with respect to other groups.[1]

It is clear that this theory of the relation between the aggregate and its units is not intended to apply to voluntary or ephemeral unions, but only to those great permanent groups—horde, tribe, community, social class—into which we are born and from which we rarely escape.

Simmel holds that the character of a group-unit does not correspond either intellectually or morally to that of its average member, but as social development proceeds, falls more and more below it. He points out[2] that the differentiation and specialization that take place in the social mass make it difficult for people to recover a common plane of thinking and feeling when some occasion arises for joint action. This plane, if it does actually get established, is sure to be low, because those who are mentally beneath this plane cannot possibly rise to it, whereas

[1] "Outlines of Sociology," Part IV.
[2] "Ueber soziale Differenzierung," pp. 79, 85-87.

those who are above it in intelligence or ideals can stoop and reënter it. In a differentiated population, therefore, all common thought or feeling or purpose will be, not simply mediocre, but positively crude, because only in the simplest mental life is it possible to find a plane that can include everybody.

From their study of crowds Sighele,[1] Tarde,[2] and Le Bon[3] conclude that, contrary to Spencer's hypothesis, the group-unit does not faithfully reflect the characteristics of its members. The whole is not the algebraic sum of its parts. It is not a resultant of its units, according to the "law of the parallelogram of forces," but is a chemical combination possessing properties different from those of its elements. For this reason crowds are more alike than are their members. A mob of sages and a mob of hoodlums will think and behave in about the same way. The reason is that in the crowd men lose their acquired traits and revert to their instincts. Renouncing the individualities they have built up by reflection and education, they meet on that substratum of unconscious life which is common to all of them. Tarde points out that the character of a homogeneous crowd is that of its members, only intensified, but a heterogeneous crowd gives us, not a *product,* but a *combination,* of individual qualities. He also insists—and this is the key to the mystery—that there are various modes of association, and that

[1] "La foule criminelle."
[2] "L'opinion et la foule."
[3] "The Crowd."

with the same membership these may yield very different results.

Let us now pass in review the chief types of association, see to what extent and why the properties of the resulting group-units cannot be explained on Spencer's principle, and formulate such additional principles as shall be found necessary.

The current account of what takes place in the crowd is very lame, and the matter is in need of a fresh analysis. The discovery that people are suggestible, and are more than ordinarily suggestible when assembled, does not of itself explain the behavior of crowds nor refute Spencer's principle of average. It leaves us just where we were. It is true that the more plastic the minds of men, the surer they are to reach a common plane of feeling or purpose. But will this plane lie near the top or near the bottom or in the middle zone of the mass? The greater the susceptibility to contagion, the sooner a unity will appear. But will this group-unit be wiser or sillier, nobler or baser, than the average of its component individuals?

Some light is thrown on the problem by considering if the suggestibility of all those who form the crowd is heightened in an equal degree by the influence of propinquity. If it is, then the aggregate will still reflect the prevailing character of its units.

But such is not the case. There are at least two descriptions of people who in the give-and-take of the throng are more likely to impose suggestions

than to accept them. The intelligent are able to criticise and appraise the suggestions that impinge upon them. They are quick to react if a suggestion clashes with their interests or their convictions, whereas the ignorant are at the mercy of the leader or the claque, and may be stampeded into a course of action quite at variance with their real desires. The fanatical and impassioned are little responsive to impressions from without because of their inner tension. Being determined from within, they emit powerful suggestions, but are hard to influence. There is thus a tendency for the warped and the inflamed members of a crowd to impart their passion to the rest and to sweep along with them the neutral and indifferent. This is why, as the crowd comes under the hypnotic spell of numbers, the extremists gain the upper hand of the moderates.

It is owing to reciprocal suggestion that *association in a crowd renders every psychic manifestation more intense.* Masked by anonymity, people dare to give their feelings exaggerated expression. To be heard one does not speak; one shouts. To be seen one does not simply show one's self; one gesticulates. Boisterous laughter, frenzied objurgations, frantic cheers, are needed to express the merriment or wrath or enthusiasm of the crowd. These exaggerated signs of emotion cannot but produce in suggestible beholders exaggerated states of mind. Insensibly the mental temperature rises so that what once seemed hot now seems lukewarm, what once felt tepid now seems cold. The

intensifying of the feelings in consequence of reciprocal suggestion will be most rapid when the crowd forms under agitating circumstances. In this case the impulse to the unbridled manifestation of feeling is rife from the first, and the psychic fermentation proceeds at an uncommon rate.

Granting that association widens the amplitude of feeling what does this imply as to the moral character of the crowd? Will it be higher or lower than that of its members? The earlier writers on the crowd regarded it as necessarily criminal in its tendencies, but of late it has come to be recognized that the crowd is capable of opposite extremes—of savage criminality on the one hand, of sublime heroism on the other; of cowardly panic, but also of desperate courage. Now, there are moral emotions as well as immoral ones. Since feelings are intensified by numbers, it may plausibly be argued that generosity and courage are just as likely to be exalted as wrath and greed. Making due allowance, of course, for the influence of the occasion or the leader, the moral quality of the crowd will be an exaggerated reflection of the dominant moral characteristics of its members.

This reasoning, however, ignores an important distinction between the springs of virtue and the springs of vice. Some of the motives to right conduct are, indeed, purely emotional. Such are sympathy, love, generosity, and courage. But in most cases the spring of virtue has in it an intellectual element. On the whole, *right* conduct is *thought-*

out conduct. Second thoughts make for righteousness. The upright man is "considerate"; he is animated, not by spurts of good impulse, but by the sense of justice, respect for a principle, devotion to an ideal; his good conduct is an outcome of his thinking, of his "conscience." On the other hand, the springs of utter wickedness are for the most part not pondered malevolence, but simple primal passions, such as blood-thirst, love of destruction, lust, anger, envy, jealousy, and greed. Now, feeling is much richer in means of prompt vivid expression than thought, and in a throng each is more impressed by the looks, cries, gestures, and attitudes that express his neighbor's feelings than by the words that convey his neighbor's ideas. Emotion here pulls the longer oar. Thronging, moreover, usually occurs under perturbing conditions which tend to paralyze thought. In the crowd, therefore, the reason is so beclouded that the motives to virtue, so far as they are a function of one's thinking, can by no means compete with the motives to evil. Such virtues as are bound up with self-control—law-abidingness, veracity, prudence, thrift, respect for others' rights—if they survive in the crowd, will do so by sheer force of habit.

Turning next to the intellectual traits of the crowd, we note first of all that it is more dogmatic and intolerant than its component individuals. This trait should not be ascribed to the sense of invincibility that is inspired by numbers for the explanation is simpler. Although an idea is totally differ-

ent from a feeling, we may have feelings about ideas. Belief is a form of emotion. We speak of "energy of conviction." We speak of persons as "warm," "luke-warm," or "cold" in their faith. Faith is rightly thought of as a force able to "move mountains." Now, conviction, like all other emotions, reaches its highest pitch in the crowd, and so crowds tend to be intolerant. People united by identity of belief are, of course, more impatient of contradiction than people united by identity of passion or aim. Hence the paradox that throngs of gentle, pious persons—pilgrims, monks, nuns, devotees—become the most ferocious in the presence of counter-manifestants. Every crowd is formidable on the point it cares most for, and in the ages of faith it is as natural that mobs should riot over the nature of the Trinity as it is that in our age there should be tumults over Wagner's operas or the difference of a cent an hour in the pay of workingmen.

What, now, as to the wisdom of the crowd? Will it be an average of individual wisdoms or will it be something else?

Ideas do not reinforce one another as feelings do. This is because ideas differ, not in degree, but in kind. If from the countenances and gestures of those about him a man perceives that all are moved as he is, his feeling becomes more intense. But if he observes that others entertain the same idea, his idea does not thereby become clearer to him. He simply believes in it more intensely, this belief being itself a mode of feeling. In the crowd Peter's

wrath or courage reinforces Paul's and *vice versa.* But Peter's idea does not reinforce Paul's idea so as to produce an idea superior to either. Impulses are accumulable, but not thoughts. A crowd can be more sagacious than its members only in case people think better in a crowd, or in case the ideas of the wiser supplant the ideas of the foolish.

Do people think better when packed together and tingling with the herd-thrill? No doubt it is friction that produces sparks. Many a mind is most clairvoyant and fertile in the presence of others. Great orators have confessed that their best thinking was done in the presence of the multitude, real or imagined. Nevertheless, it is generally true that strong emotion inhibits the intellectual processes. In a sudden crisis we expect the sane act from the man who is "cool," who has not "lost his head." Now, the very hurly-burly of the crowd tends to distraction. The excitement that brings people together hinders consecutive thinking. Finally, the high pitch of feeling to which the crowd is gradually wrought up paralyzes the thought processes and results in a temporary imbecility. It is therefore safe to conclude that, taken herdwise, people are less sensible and less original than they are, dispersed. Fruitful thinking is not done in the crowd. Ideas or ideals germinate only in self-possession and quiet. It is in the desert, in the field, in the cell, in the study, that great new truths are cradled.

Consider now the other possibility. If ideas are

not accumulable, may they not, at least, be substitutive, so that in an assemblage the best thought, the soundest opinion, the shrewdest plan, that comes from any quarter will prevail. A beneficent selection does, indeed, take place in every deliberative body. Where there is cool discussion and leisurely reflection, ideas contend and the fittest are accepted by all. In the fugitive, structureless gathering, however, there can be no fruitful debate. If it happens to have a wise leader who can keep his head, the crowd may act sagaciously. Under his stimulus its commonness may be transfigured into broad and profound ideas. But there is no guarantee that the master of the crowd shall be wiser than his followers. The man of biggest voice or wildest language, the aggressive person who first leaps upon a table, raises aloft a symbol, or utters a catching phrase, is likely to become the bell-wether.

It is safe to conclude that amorphous, heterogeneous assemblages are morally and intellectually below the average of their members. This manner of coming together spells deterioration. The crowd may generate moral fervor, but it never sheds light. If at times it has furthered progress, it is because the mob, with its immense physical and emotional force, serves as an ice-breaker to open a channel for pent-up humanity, as a battering ram to raze some mouldering, bat-infested institution and clear the ground for something better. This better will be the creation of gifted individuals, of deliberative bodies, never of anonymous crowds. It is easier

for masses to agree on a Nay than on a Yea. This is why crowds have destroyed despotisms, but have never built free states, have abolished evils, but have never instituted works of beneficence. Essentially atavistic and sterile, the crowd ranks as the lowest of the forms of human association.

Yet there are times when crowds socialize men and fit them for better modes of association. Upon the sudden collapse of a worm-eaten social framework in which people have felt themselves imprisoned there comes a moment of deliquescence, of atomism. Now, the crowd which at such crises comes forward as the chief means of collective action may by the very unisons and sympathies it inspires aid in re-socialization, and so pave the way to a higher social life. Overruling with its mighty diapason the old dissonances of rank, birth, occupation, and locality, it helps form "the people." The national spirit of France did not spring into life full-statured at the fall of the Bastille. It grew up gradually out of great common experiences in mobs, risings at the sound of the tocsin, *levées en masse,* political gatherings, and vast concourses at civic festivals. Likewise the American national spirit seems to have had its birth in the numerous tumultuous gatherings that near the beginning of our Revolution mobbed the officials and persecuted the friends of George III. Perhaps even the unexpected unity of southern feeling in 1861 was prepared in the crowds that wildly cheered the secession speeches of Yancey and Toombs during their years of agitation.

From the clear inferiority of crowds some draw a very unfavorable opinion of human groupings. To the maxim, "In union there is strength," they would add, "In union there is deterioration." By insisting that all associations possess less wit and conscience than their members, they virtually impeach social evolution, which implies, for one thing, a development of group-units in variety, extent, and complexity. Since in the very heart of social life lies coiled the worm of decay, there seems to be no hope for the triumph of wisdom short of the rule of the strong man, the *Uebermensch* of Nietzsche. But sociology of this sort is sadly out of focus. The crowd is only one extreme of a long gamut of forms that stretches through the mass-meeting, the assembly, the representative body, the public, and the sect, up to the corporation. At the upper end of the series the group-unit shows traits precisely opposite to those of the crowd. In fact, each form of human association has its own characteristics and needs to be studied independently.

The first improvement on the crowd is the *mass-meeting* — an assemblage heterogeneous, but not wholly formless. The mass-meeting has a platform and a chairman, listens to regular speeches, and preserves a semblance of order. Responsible persons, recognized by the chair, speak to resolutions usually drafted in advance, and the will of the whole is ascertained by a formal vote. The mass-meeting is therefore likely to show more self-restraint and rationality than the crowd.

The next stage is the *deliberative assembly*—the purposeful gathering of a particular description of persons, say the workmen of a trade, the stockholders of a company, or the householders of a ward. The fact of homogeneity marks it out as a higher form. A body of persons cannot possess group-traits unless they converge upon certain emotions which all may feel, certain ideas which all can grasp. Now, in a heterogeneous mass there is no common ground save the elemental, the primitive. Persons of all sorts and conditions cannot be brought to vibrate in unison unless there is an appeal to the crudest of impulses, the simplest of ideas. In a homogeneous assemblage, on the other hand, a basis of sympathy is already provided in the common experience or characteristic, and it is not necessary to descend so far in order to find a meeting-point for minds.

In the deliberative assembly there is a kind of natural leadership depending on the nature of the interest that has brought people together. Investors expect the men of millions to speak first and oftenest. The church-meeting looks to the "elders in Israel" to point the way. Workingmen defer to the time-tested trades-unionist. The primary or caucus expects some "old war-horse" to give the cue. People meet with a scale of worthies in mind, and the guidance of their deliberations drifts spontaneously into experienced hands. Most of the ancient popular assemblies listened only to chiefs and dignitaries. The undistinguished had the right to express assent

or dissent, but not the right to be heard. If a Thersites ventured to speak up, he was likely to suffer for it.

It is hard to get a great company to *deliberate*, because in the throng it takes so little to make the heart overflow and put out the light in the brain. The big assembly skirts ever the slippery incline that leads down to the abyss, and all manner of guard-rails in the form of prescribed modes of procedure are necessary in order to save it from a mis-step. A well-known chairman described the body he presided over as a wild beast he could feel tugging and springing against the leash. Now, this leash is the code of parliamentary law. This venerable body of usage anciently wrought out in the House of Commons is a miracle of applied psychology, and counts not the least among England's contributions to the world. Mirabeau did well to translate for the French Constituent Assembly Romilly's little book on parliamentary procedure, and it was an evil hour when the Assembly rejected it as "too English."

The Rules of Order constitute a strait-jacket put on a giant liable to convulsive seizures. The rules requiring that a meeting shall have a chairman, that the chairman shall not take part in debate, that no one shall speak without recognition, that the speaker shall address the chair and not the assembly, that remarks shall pertain to a pending motion, that personalities shall be taboo, and that members shall not be referred to by name—what are they but so many devices to keep the honey-tongued or brazen-

throated crowd-leader from springing to the center of the stage and weaving his baleful spells! The rules that the hearers be in order, that they remain seated, that they forbear to interrupt, that they patiently listen to all speakers regularly recognized, and that their signs of approval or disapproval be decorous—are not these so many guard-rails that help the assembly get safely by certain vertiginous moments?

The highest association of presence is seen in the *representative body,* exemplified by legislatures, party conventions, church councils, trade parliaments, and congresses composed of delegates from various sections, professions, or interests. Being answerable to their constituents, its members are not likely to be swept off their feet by gusts of feeling. The dumb-bell form of many of these bodies works to the same effect. Polarized into majority and minority parties, a legislature rarely degenerates into a mob, because an engulfing vortex of agreement is almost impossible. So long as domestic affairs are up, a wave of contagion is shattered by the party line. It is in dealing with external policy that a legislature unified for the nonce by a common pride or wrath is likely to show mob characteristics.

"The Roman Assembly," says Freeman, "died of the disease of which every primary assembly in a large country must die. It became too large for its functions; it became a mob incapable of debate, and in which the worst elements got the upper hand." Now, the representative body through its power to

fix the basis of representation is able to control its size, and thus remove one source of danger. Recognizing that numbers breed confusion, that the oratory addressed to a large assemblage is apt to be exaggerated in matter and manner, and that the demonstrations arising from a great body are likely to upset the judgment, most legislatures wisely restrict their number to four or five hundred. It is a pity the lesson was learned so late. The earlier parliaments were too big, and so brought discredit on the beginnings of popular government. In France and elsewhere the representatives of the people showed imbecility, no doubt, but their aristocratic and clerical critics would have acquitted themselves no better had they undertaken to deliberate in equally large bodies. One has but to recall the turbulence of those great meetings of the whole Polish nobility to choose the Polish king.

Another means of giving wisdom the weather-gage in the battle with folly is to require adjournment and an interval of private reflection before action is taken. By forbidding a measure to be voted on at the sitting in which it is proposed, by forbidding it to be discussed on the day of voting, by requiring it to be read at two sittings before voting, by requiring that the more serious measures be considered in the committee of the whole house, it is sought to break any spell that the orator may weave about his hearers, and to evoke as the foundation of the collective judgment the best individual judgment of the members.

There are two kinds of associations—with presence and without presence. Crowd, mass-meeting, assembly, parliament, constitute a series of *associations with presence* ranging from the amorphous to the highly organized. To this the scale of *associations without presence*—public, sect, corporation—runs nearly parallel. In many points the public matches the crowd, the sect corresponds to the assembly, and the corporation is twin to the representative body.

The *public* is the dispersed crowd, a body of heterogeneous persons who, although separated, are so in touch with one another that they not only respond to a stimulus at almost the same moment, but are aware each of the other's response. Much depends on *how soon* after receiving an impression one learns how others have been affected. In the crowd cheers and hisses fall upon the ear while yet the speaker's words are ringing. The member of a public brought into touch by the daily press cannot learn how others respond until hours have elapsed. In the meantime, perhaps, he has reflected and got his bearings. This want of simultaneity is not, however, the only thing that differentiates the public from the crowd. If by the aid of a telephonic news service people were brought into immediate touch, there would still be lacking certain important conditions of the mob-state. The hurly-burly, the press and heave of the crowd, are avoided when contact is purely spiritual. We have seen that in a throng the means of expressing feeling are much more copi-

ous and effective than the facilities for expressing thought. In a dispersed group feeling enjoys no such advantage. Both are confined to the same vehicle—the printed word—and so ideas and opinions run as rapidly through the public as emotions; perhaps more rapidly, for is it not easier for a writer to be clear than to be forceful?

One is member of but one crowd at a time, but by taking a number of newspapers one can belong to several publics with, perhaps, different planes of vibration. So far as these various unanimities cross and neutralize one another, the vortical suction of the public will be weakened. The crowd may be rushed head-long into folly or crime by irresponsible or accidental leaders. The public, on the other hand, can receive suggestions only through the columns of its journal. The editor is like the chairman of a mass-meeting, for no one can be heard without his recognition. Since he is a man of some consequence, with a reputation to make or mar, the guidance he gives his readers will be on a level with that guidance which the experienced orator supplies to the crowd.

For all these reasons the psychology of the public, though similar to that of the crowd, is more normal. The public suffers from the same vices and follies that afflict the crowd, but not to the same extent.

Ours is not the era of hereditary rulers, oligarchies, hierarchies, or close corporations. But neither is it, as Le Bon insists, "the era of crowds." It is, in fact, the era of publics. Those who perceive

that to-day under the influence of universal discussion the old, fixed groupings which held their adherents so tenaciously—sects, parties, castes, and the like—are liquefying, that allegiances sit lightly, and men are endlessly passing into new combinations, seek to characterize these loose associations as "crowds." The true crowd is, however, playing a declining rôle. Where are the numbers that once pressed about Abélard or St. Bernard? The mass-meeting and the primary assembly have plainly sunk in political importance. Universal contact by means of print ushers in "the rule of public opinion," which is a totally different thing from "government by the mob."

The *sect,* composed of those who vibrate to the same chord or cleave to the same article of faith, is, broadly speaking, a homogeneous group. It will therefore present the salient characteristics of its units and present them in an exaggerated form. Why this will be so is easy to see. Take a category of persons—a class or race, perhaps only a strain or type—with a certain predisposition. So long as these persons remain apart their idiosyncrasy will not assert its full strength. The eccentricity of opinion, the intensity of emotion, or the violence of action of a person mingling with those of another mental stripe, is moderated by their indifference or ridicule. Amicable relations with minds of an alien cast prompt us to emphasize agreements and to minimize differences. This instinctive accommodation is the entrance fee we pay in order to enjoy social

life. The full tide of intercourse is the best corrective of crankiness, and it is bad symptom when the eccentric shuns the unsympathizing world and seeks solitude.

If, now, those of a certain bent become aware of one another, draw together in fellowship, formulate articles of faith, glorify distinctive ideals, perhaps even frame a manner of life and develop their own leaders, gatherings, and literature, a sect is formed. To the degree to which the sectaries segregate into a "peculiar people," the old check ceases to operate. For each reveling in this new social environment renounces part and lot with the "unbelievers," the "Philistines," the "*bourgeoisie*," the "unillumined," the "world," as the rest of society is variously styled. The moderating influence is withdrawn. Finding countenance, each now rises to the full stature of his eccentricity. If it is class pride, he will assert it with an impudence and unreasonableness he would never show by himself. If it is some notion about the Second Coming or the treatment of disease, he exalts it into a dogma. If it is a dislike, it hardens into a murderous hatred. If it is a prejudice, it mounts to the pitch of fanaticism.

From the too exclusive intercourse of union workingmen, how mortal is the antipathy that springs up toward the "rat" or the "scab"! In priestly seminaries, with what hoofs and horns they picture the freethinker! What bizarre notions of "*bourgeois* society" circulate in the taverns where anarchists touch glasses! What strange growths of belief or

worship flourish in closed communities like the Shakers or the Doukhobors! What warped ideas of right and wrong become hallowed in codes of tribal or professional ethics! What absurd idolatries strike root in the Latin Quarter! What crazy cults in coteries of artists or writers!

In the crowd the dominant emotion becomes exaggerated partly owing to the unrestrained manifestation of feeling, partly owing to its reverberation by means of reciprocal suggestion. But in the sect all the characteristics, ideas as well as feelings, are exaggerated. The cause of this is not heightened suggestibility, but segregation, spiritual in-and-in breeding. The germs of these monstrous fungi were in the minds of the members ere they came into association. The formation of the sect simply supplies the conditions of seclusion and twilight that favor such cellar growths.

The drawing together of the like-minded into a sect is, therefore, a momentous step. It may mark the genesis of a tangent group that will disturb the peace of society. Since the sect is a whirlpool that sucks in all persons of its type and communicates to them its own motion, it is not surprising that the keepers of public order have always been suspicious of closed assemblies and secret societies. It is justly felt that publicity ought to be forced upon all large groups founded upon antithesis to the rest of society, and that the astringent of public criticism or public ridicule is needed to correct the eccentricities

that grow up in too intimate and exclusive an association.

Blind strength can tear down, but only brain-directed force can build up. Amorphous masses can destroy the evil, but they cannot create the good. The great beneficent and ameliorative associations among men are *organized.* Of this sort are *collegia,* guilds, fraternal orders, trades unions, coöperative societies, churches, religious orders, brotherhoods, scientific societies and academies, as well as eleemosynary, trading, and industrial corporations.[1] Here we find order, precedence, discipline. In such unions capacity holds the long arm of the lever and in many things directs drudging, workaday people better than they can direct themselves. That men rightly combined can secure a guidance far transcending their average wisdom is shown by the

[1] "Within these bounds (of English group-life) lie churches and even the mediæval church, one and catholic, religious houses, mendicant orders, non-conforming bodies, a presbyterian system, Universities, old and new, the village community which Germanists revealed to us, the manor in its growth and decay, the township, the New England town, the counties and hundreds, the chartered boroughs, the gild in all its manifold varieties, the inns of court, the merchant adventurers, the militant 'companies' of English *condottieri* who returning home help to make the word 'company' popular among us, the trading companies, the companies that become colonies, the companies that make war, the friendly societies, the trades unions, the clubs, the group that meets at Lloyd's Coffee-house, the group that becomes the Stock Exchange, and so on even to the one-man-company, the Standard Oil Trust and the South Australian statutes for communistic villages."—PROFESSOR MAITLAND in the Translator's Introduction to GIERKE'S *Political Theories of the Middle Ages,* p. xxvii.

achievements of the Benedictine monks in clearing and civilizing northern Europe, by the success of the mediæval burghs, by the preternatural shrewdness of Jesuit policy, by the prosperity of the coöperative undertakings under the management of the Mormon church. The victories of trades unions and the triumphs of joint-stockism, from the East India Company to the latter-day Trust, trumpet the merits of the corporate form of association. Says the latest investigator of American communistic societies:

> There is not one coöperative community in the country ten years old that has popular government. . . . . Those communities have lived longest and been most prosperous in which the general membership has had least to do in shaping the government or business management, and in which an almost military discipline has been exercised by some central authority. . . . . In a sense they have all been theocracies, laying claim to an inspired leadership, through which, they believe, they have enjoyed divine guidance, and so been saved from the mistakes and follies that have brought ruin to so many others.[1]

The secret of corporate wisdom is differentiation and specialization. Out of the common run are winnowed a directing few, and these specialize upon their work till they become experts. An organ—a brain in any case, sometimes also a group-hand or group-eye—is constituted. The towering capacities are formed into a board, council, cabinet, bureau, or standing committee, and intrusted with the conduct of the corporation. The methods of bringing

[1] *"Bulletin of the United States Department of Labor,"* No. 35, pp. 642, 643.

about this concentration of power are various. Full members may be distinguished from novices or probationers. Members may be graded by seniority or services or degree of initiation, so as to award power to the time-tested and discerning. The members may choose their managers directly or choose their choosers. Directors may hold power for life, for a stated term, long or short, or until ousted. In the exercise of power they may be absolute, or they may be hampered by the constitution or the referendum. The responsibility of an executive board may be directly to the members or to a representative assembly, itself responsible. The organ of direction may be simple, compound, or doubly-compound. These details we must hurry by, for they involve the whole philosophy of government.

In the corporation the group-judgment or group-will is no longer—as in the crowd or the sect—the immediate outcome of the interactions of the members. The justification for thus handing over thought and choice to the few is threefold. In the first place, associates are unequal in capacity. Secondly, those steeped in any business soon distance the layman in expertness. This principle of specialization would call into being directive organs even if associates were precisely equal in ability. Thirdly, only in small assemblages, probably of less than twoscore, occurs that happy and ever-to-be-desired intellectual synthesis which yields a collective judgment superior to even the best individual judg-

ment. Large assemblages inhibit thinking. But in the council that gathers about a single board, that is addressed in ordinary tones, that neither applauds nor hisses, but only *listens* and *thinks,* minds easily fecundate one another. Each acquaints the rest with the facet of life he has seen, the arc of experience he has traveled. Since no one looks upon all the faces of the infinite polyhedron of life, even the master-mind learns something in the council-chamber. Amid the stillness and measured speech brains join, as it were, into one great brain that ponders and decides wiselier than can any individual. Hence the saying: "Many to advise, one to execute."

Let no one imagine, however, that the concentration of power in organs is without its drawbacks. Broadly speaking, the action of any group-unit has reference to the assuming of certain burdens with a view to enjoying certain benefits. Such action is successful when every associate reaps a benefit that outweighs the burden he has had to bear. But the action, albeit blameless as regards the adjustment of means to contemplated ends, may, nevertheless, miss this happy outcome. The reasons are three: the benefit may have been overestimated; the burden may have been underestimated; the benefit may be shared otherwise than the burden has been shared.

Now, just because it is select, small, and specialized, a directive organ is liable to get "out of touch" with the membership. Aloof in sympathies and appreciations, a board of sages easily misapprehends the desires of its people, misconceives what will

really benefit them. Thus the committee of a book club buys books the subscribers do not care to read. The trustees of a church inflict on the members a preacher they do not care to hear. A park board mulcts taxpayers for a city park so remote that few of them can visit it on week days. Or the burden may be underestimated, seeing that only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches. The physicians on a board of health impose fussy sanitary regulations which are an intolerable annoyance to the masses. Labor leaders order a strike the miseries of which they do not fully realize. Directors build up a reserve with earnings that the stockholders had counted on receiving as dividends. Well-intentioned rulers exercise the right of quartering troops, of impressment, of search, or of taxation, with little idea of the galling burdens they impose.

Most serious of all, power is liable to be diverted to the private benefit of the power-holders. Always and everywhere the passive category of citizens sheds more than its share of blood, pays more than its share of taxes. Always and everywhere public moneys are spent chiefly for the few, when the few rule. Power without responsibility is demoralizing. With every grant of power should go strict accountability for its use. If the commons are not competent to judge *projects,* they are at least competent to judge *results.* The pudding is proved in the eating. By this touchstone even blockheads can tell sages from quacks and knaves. Grant the wise few power to act for all, but couple therewith the

obligation to surrender that power if the many find the consequences not to their liking. Life-tenure, coöptation, hereditary transmission, secrecy, censorship, terrorism—all these devices that enable a grant of power to be usurped—divide associates into shearers and shorn, and so destroy the unity and harmony of the group.

The intellectual superiority of the corporation being established, let us turn to its moral characteristics. Does the delegation of power exalt justice as much as it exalts wisdom?

The corporate form leaves the choice of means and methods to the worshipful few—its aldermen, directors, or trustees. Now, these know that they stand or fall by results. If the fruits of their management are pleasant, who will scan too curiously the means employed? They are bidden succeed. If from excess of scruple they fail, others less scrupulous will take their places. Suppose, moreover, the directors regard their power as a sacred trust, or are devoted heart and soul to the aggrandizement of their group. In such case their very conscientiousness will blunt their impulses to justice. Their *esprit de corps* will qualify their allegiance to moral standards. One altruism will block the other. This is why good men on behalf of their group will stoop to misdeeds they would shrink from committing for themselves.

More rarely than other group-units does a corporation pursue wicked ends. If the corporation is without sentiment, neither does it come into being

in order to glut some diabolic passion. It never wantonly razes, burns, kills, tortures. Chosen openly, deliberately, and under the sobering influence of the sagacious, its goals bear inspection. This, no doubt, is why the corporation is so often legitimized and adopted as a regular social organ.

But in its choice of means the corporation is less scrupulous than most other collectivities. Its sins are not prompted by anger or vindictiveness, but by pure egoism. The more complex its organization, the more Machiavellian will the corporation show itself in the pursuit of its ends. It is unmoved by generosity or malevolence. It knows no standard but success. It cherishes no malice, but woe to him who stands in its path. It gravitates toward its goal with the ruthlessness of a lava-stream. Remember the church's way with "disturbers," Pascal's arraignment of Jesuit ethics, Reade's *exposé* of trades-union crimes, Brigham Young's Danites, the black record of joint-stock companies! As for the state, the organ of the national group, its crimes are mountain-high. For calling the state's lies "diplomacy," its violences "war," its murders "punishment," and its robberies "annexation" or "indemnity" cannot change the moral complexion of such actions.

In general, companies of men are more consistently selfish than are the men themselves. To prick of conscience, to honor and shame, individuals are more sensitive than are group-units. In the clash of crowds, classes, sects, and corporate bodies, how nearly is it true that might makes right! One rea-

son is that a divided responsibility evaporates, becomes no responsibility, when we can creep under the cloak of anonymity. Another is that most of us need the caustic comment of our fellows to keep us in the high road. When we are all tempted at once, there is no one to cry "Shame!" and we plunge into the mire together. Finally the group-unit engrosses the moral capital of its members. Suppose the strength of my regard for the rights of others is ten. Against an immoral hankering with an energy of eight my conscience will triumph. I will do the right. But if my group-unit evinces this same immoral desire, there is now ranged on the side of my hankering my *esprit de corps,* with an energy, say, of four. This time my sense of justice encounters twelve units of energy and is vanquished. As member of the group I will demand the iniquity, as representative order it, as agent execute it. For nearly everyone *feels,* if he does not *avow:* "My class, my church, my party, my country, right or wrong!" Thus the special altruism that so often prompts the individual to virtue—clannishness, class loyalty, sectarianism, corporate feeling, patriotism—works on the devil's side when a group is tempted to do wrong.

For these causes group-units in their behavior to one another recall the saurian monsters of the Cretaceous. No need of dwelling on the far ferocities of hordes, tribes, cities and factions. Even to-day the beak-and-claw struggle, renounced as between individuals, continues between companies, unions, parties, sects, and nations. Everything, therefore,

that crystallizes men into rigid group-units turns back the clock and puts off the hour of justice. Spencer is right. The lock-step forms of coöperation which reduce the man to a cipher are reactionary. Tolstoi is right. The iron machines — administrative, military, ecclesiastical—that cramp the individual reason and conscience prolong into our age the reign of brute force. Group-units are not moral unless they have to cater to the moral sense of the individual in order to win or keep members. *The cause of right is bound up with the triumph of free associations giving play to the conscience and judgment of each individual.*

Certain under-ripe philosophers assure us that character is everything, machinery nothing. Constitution-tinkering is time lost. Never shall we get better government or laws or creeds or standards till we get better citizens. The stream cannot rise higher than its source. Castaways can never make a living "by taking in one another's washing." No "silk purse out of a sow's ear." No social progress save by individual improvement. And as the improving of millions of men and women is the most formidable of undertakings, the practical conclusion is, "Do nothing!"

Nevertheless, if it is true—as I have shown—that the sagacity and virtue a given body of persons display depends in no small measure upon their mode of association, a vista opens. Why not improve the mode of association? Faultily organized at many points, society by no means realizes on its present

spiritual assets. Argal, teach it to exploit them more skillfully. Let the making of better men go on. 'Tis a grand work, though slow. But why not in the meantime exalt wisdom and justice by organizing men in better ways? Let us by all means thresh out the jury system, municipal home-rule, proportional representation, the referendum, the mode of choosing senators, the direct primary, the responsibility of directors, the general army staff, the walking delegate, bishop *vs.* congregation, mayor *vs.* council, superintendent *vs.* board of education, advisory *vs.* mandatory commission, and questions of that ilk. These matters have greatly to do with the triumph of intelligence, conscience, and faculty in social affairs, and are by no means to be airily waved aside as "mere machinery."

To sum up:

The properties displayed by a social group depend, for one thing, upon the Characteristics of its Units.

But this is not all the truth.

When people throng under exciting circumstances, actions and reactions are set up which presently bring them to a state of mind marked by high suggestibility, emotional tension, great credulity, and confused thinking. The group-unit reflects, not the normal self of its members, but this pseudo-personality—this mob mood induced by the way persons affect one another in the throng. The traits of a collectivity, therefore, depend in part upon the Manner of Interaction of its members.

Again, the manner of constituting the group-unit may give leverage to the wise or give it to the rash, favor the man of words or exalt the man of ideas, put the helm into the hands of the worthy or leave it to be grasped by the first-comer. The character exhibited by an aggregate of men depends, therefore, in some degree on their Mode of Combination.

VII

THE SOCIAL FORCES[1]

In his *First Principles* Spencer adopts a mechanical interpretation of society, and dwells on those aspects of social life which seem to illustrate the principles of his evolutionary philosophy. I have already shown that he established analogies, but not identities of principle, and that the social laws he set up by the simple process of extending cosmic laws over social facts are in many cases untrue.

In his *Principles of Sociology* Spencer renounces these earlier theories, and they might well be left unnoticed had not Giddings given them a new lease of life. He conceives that social facts admit of a double interpretation, the objective and the subjective. In society things happen, no doubt, because of men's desires, but also because a part of cosmic energy is converted into organic and social energies. "Social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution."[2] In the expansion of states, the movement of population toward opportunities, the concentration of men in cities, the course of exchanges, the lines of legislative policy, and the direction of religious, scientific, and educational movements, he sees

[1] *Vide The American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1904.
[2] "Principles of Sociology," p. 363.

motion following the line of least resistance. "Religion, morals, philosophy, science, literature, art, and fashion, are all subject to the law of rhythm."[1] The integration, differentiation, and segregation that go on in society have like causes with the corresponding cosmic processe

It is hard to find good warrant for this dual interpretation. After a human activity has been explained in terms of motive, why reëxplain it in terms of energy? If a principle such as *men go where they can most easily satisfy their wants* accounts for the currents of migration, why try to account for them on the principle that *motion follows the line of least resistance?* If the rhythms we find in every field of human interest from dress to religion occur because "attention demands change in its object," why class them with rhythms due to "conflict of forces not in equilibrium." As for the processes of integration, differentiation, and segregation among men, I have already shown that they differ in principle from the processes of cosmic evolution.

A more common error is the assumption that social phenomena flow from the interaction of two sets of factors, one external, the other internal. Under such terms as "race and locality," "man and environment," "folk and land," this dualism constantly recurs in sociological writing.

There are, no doubt, social processes which have both internal and external causes. The growth of population may be conceived as the product of

[1] "Principles of Sociology," p. 370.

psychic factors—procreative impulses, desire for offspring, etc.—which determine the birth-rate, with physical factors—seasons, crops, etc.—which determine the death-rate. Again, the size of a crop depends upon the acreage—which men can control—and upon the weather—which men cannot control. The herring catch depends at once on the market demand for herring and on the size of the "run."

Most of the instances, however, that form the stock-in-trade of the environment school do not support their case at all. Migrations and colonizations, the territorial distribution of population, the distribution of labor among the various occupations, the investment of capital, the location of cities, the lines of communication, and the currents of trade, have human volitions as their proximate causes, and not the features of the physical environment.

The ground for so bold an assertion is the neglected distinction between the factors of a telic event and the factors of the volition that brings about the event. Let me illustrate. If a boatman, aiming to reach a pier on the other side of a swift river, fails to allow for the current, he may be swept a quarter of a mile below his destination. In this case it may be permissible to explain the outcome as the joint effect of the man's volition and the force of the current. But if the boatman "allows for" the current, and keeps the bow of the boat sufficiently upstream to land him at the pier, we explain the outcome either as the realization of a purpose, or as the resultant of the force of the current and

the muscular force applied to the propulsion of the boat. We can adopt either the teleological or the mechanical explanation. But since both the physical factors *were perceived and calculated in advance,* we should never combine the two explanations; they are alternative, not dual.

Now, the local distribution of immigrants in a region can and should be explained in terms of purpose. It is only when, pressing further back, we undertake to account for their purposes that we come upon considerations relating to climate, soil, water, timber, and the like. Similarly, a railway net has all its causes in the volitions of the men who had it built. The topography of the country enters into the case only as affecting the motives that determine these volitions. It is a dim recognition of this distinction that leads most writers to speak of the physical environment as "influence" rather than cause.

Undoubtedly men's choices are conditioned and their projects limited by the physical framework they live in. *Mesology* or the study of the influence of the environment will always be a fascinating chapter in our science. Still, since the external facts are foreseen and taken into account in intelligent telic action, it is necessary to regard social phenomena as essentially psychic, and to look for their immediate causes in mind.

Another error consists in identifying these causes with *needs* rather than *wants.* Usually *need* means what we think people *ought* to want. But it is actual

desire that controls the behavior of people. Their follies and frivolities, their vanities, lusts, and vicious inclinations, cannot be left out of the reckoning in a theory of society as it is, *or even of society as it might be.*[1]

Some would lend the needs theory a philosophic basis by interpreting *need* as "requisite for survival," as that which helps one live, work, compete, reproduce. They argue that those who do not crave the useful will, in the long run, be eliminated. Since natural selection is constantly trimming down wants to make them square with needs, all the principal social activities can be looked upon as "functions." Here the fact is overlooked that man has climbed out of the cock-pit, and his life is now, on the whole, a struggle for happiness rather than for bare existence. Because they multiply up to the food supply, animals pass their lives in providing for their needs. A living is all they get. If a people gives rein to the reproductive instinct, it too will be absorbed in supplying its needs. But foreseeing man *underbreeds,* and so wins elbow room, gains a margin of energy which is soon claimed by new wants. Property is a stockade which keeps the wolf of hunger at bay and permits the owner indulgences and gratifications that have no bearing on survival. Had

[1] Assuming that the defects of individual character flow from defects in society the Utopian asks himself: "What social arrangements would be possible among perfect men?" The practical reformer inquires: "Given average human nature as we find it under benign conditions, how may society be improved?"

no such space been cleared, how could the higher interests and pursuits have come into being?

In the presence of the great recurrent social activities the needs theory looks plausible. Of course, family life, industry, government, and defense can be looked upon as welfare activities. It is even possible to give to religion, law, morals, education, and art a functional interpretation and to ignore the specific non-essential cravings that in these spheres seek their satisfaction. But the theory breaks down when confronted with those dynamic activities which, because they are *occasional,* must rank as *luxuries* and not as *necessities.* Such are the expansion of the Arabs incited by Mahomet, the monastic movement, the Crusades, the Renaissance, the wars of religion, the proselyting conquests of revolutionary France, the anti-slavery movement, the spread of foreign missions, and the expansion of the higher education. These have to be stated in terms of desire, and accounted for by those things which arouse desire, namely, new ideas and beliefs.

Hardly have we worked through to the great truth, first emphasized by Lester F. Ward, that *the social forces are human desires,* when we come upon a new thicket of errors.

First is the notion, fostered by the organic conception of society, that the diverse desires of individuals are, as it were, melted down into a single desire for the social welfare, and that this generalized force it is which furnishes the driving power for the various "social organs." Even Spencer is

apt to attribute a social structure either to the individual sense of a common interest or to the common sense of individual interest, and to overlook the rôle of specific desires in generating particular institutions. Thus in his theory of marriage he underrates the rôle of sexual jealousy, which in certain places has had much to do with determining the form of the family. He regards religious practices as instigated by fear, and fails to notice that in certain developments of religion the love of a benignant deity and the craving for certain ecstatic experiences have become important motives of worship.

In his account of law, after distinguishing between laws that are personally derived and those that are impersonally derived, Spencer states that the force which calls the latter into being is "the *consensus* of individual interests."[1] A more exhaustive analysis shows that along with the general desire to safeguard individual interests work such special factors as the desire for fair play, and sympathy with the resentment of the wronged man.

Again, in considering the political forces Spencer states that "governing agencies, during their early stages, are at once the products of aggregate feeling, derive their powers from it, and are restrained by it."[2] The fact is overlooked that along with the aggregate feeling there is a specific desire—the love of power—which, although animating only the few, continually crowds government beyond what the

[1] "Principles of Sociology," vol. II, § 533.
[2] *Ibid.*, § 469.

general feeling approves. On the other hand, another specific force—the impatience of restraint—may keep government below what the general feeling demands.

Truly extraordinary is De Greef's idea of the "forces" which carry on the social "functions."[1] Since there are seven kinds of social "organs" or "tissues," there are seven kinds of collective force resident in these tissues; thus there is a collective scientific force, a collective economic force, and even "a collective reproductive force"!

Another error is the assumption of a quantitative relation between desire and some non-spiritual form of energy, or between one species of desire and another species.

Winiarski,[2] for example, insists that feeling, thought and will are forms of kinetic biotic energy. The chemical energy stored up in the tissues, when it is converted into heat, gives rise to vital and psychic phenomena. The strength of a particular desire will depend upon the quantity of energy stored up in the tissues and upon the intensity of the external stimulus. The direction of the discharge is always toward pleasure. "Man is a chariot and pleasure is the charioteer."

The primordial forms of biotic energy are *hunger* and *love,* but by check these can be converted into other orders of desire just as the arrest of a moving

[1] "Introduction à la sociologie," Deuxième partie, ch. I.
[2] *Revue Philosophique,* vol. XLV, pp. 351-386; vol. XLIX, pp. 113-134.

body transforms its motion into heat, light, and electricity. Thus when, among primitive men, the strong are not strong enough to kill and eat the weak, their balked appetite reappears as a desire to dominate. If their superiority of strength becomes too slight to uphold slavery, the unsatisfied lust of domination is transformed into envy. Similarly the sex appetite, obstructed in its main channel, broadens into sympathy, philanthropy, poesy, the artistic impulses, and the longings of the religious mystic. It is the repression of the propensities that found scope in primitive promiscuity that gives rise to the domestic and social affections!

Winiarski boldly applies his principle of equivalence. He argues that, since the transformation of hunger and love into the higher wants means the conversion of potential into kinetic energy, the evolution of a civilization involves a lowering of the potential of a people and its eventual replacement by a fresh, unexhausted race. I shall later show that the race decline which does, in fact, frequently attend social progress is due, not at all to the lavish expenditure of energy in social achievement, but to needless mis-selections.[1]

He conceives further that examples, ideas, and commands radiate from the classes and persons of greater energy to those of less energy, this radiation taking the form of the authority and influence the social superior exercises over the social inferior. It follows that this passage of energy tends to termin-

[1] See pp. 343-345.

ate in an equalizing of intensities and a state of equilibrium. Winiarski forgets that, while the communication of ideas does tend to equalize the wise and the simple, the exercise of command does not tend to equalize superior and subordinate and so put an end to itself. It may continue for centuries.

The endeavor to translate desire into physical antecedents shatters on the fact that desires flow out from consciousness, and their objects depend greatly on the contents and processes of the mind. It is true that sexual desire, the craving for exercise, and such passions as hope, fear, and anger, reflect our bodily condition, and may easily figure as forms of physiological energy. But the *values* and *ideals,* which lure us with equal power in weakness as in health, in old age as in our prime, vary not so much with our bodily condition as with our way of thinking. So long as we *think* the same of an object we desire it with undiminished intensity. But if we see it in a new light, it ceases to gleam. An *ideal,* which is a peculiar set imparted to our admiration, a *value,* which is a peculiar set given to our judgment, is to be explained by our experiences. The statement that a man's ambition to become an athlete or an orator is a mode of biotic energy tells me nothing. I want to know the impressions, ideas, or reasonings which lead him to attach worth to these things.

Desire may or may not be a form of energy. In any case it is certain that a mechanical interpretation cannot help us to predict the choices of people. At the lower animal levels action is easy to gauge, be-

cause life consists in an interplay of stimulus and reaction. Higher up this is complicated by the associative memory, and the response to inner or outer stimuli is not quite so uniform and sure. At the level of primitive man we find successive individual experiences and reactions fusing and giving rise to processes of consciousness which yield such constants as language, custom, and myth. Moreover, a considerable portion of psychic energy has become emancipated from stimulus and manifests itself in spontaneous activities of a sportive or festal character.

In the civilized man we miss that mechanical simplicity which makes the lower psychic life so transparent and predictable. The key to his behavior lies no longer in the play of stimuli upon him, but in his consciousness. This has gathered in volume and consistency until his center of gravity lies here rather than in current impressions. The mental content has acquired such mass, and experience has been wrought up into such forms—idea, concept, formula, ideal—that at each moment they control more than do the external conditions. Stable character becomes possible. A quantitative relation between stimulus and reaction may no longer be assumed. The specific response is now repressed, now many times greater than one would expect. Energy no longer flows freely away in the form of play, but is largely absorbed in series of volitional acts, planned with reference to an end.

With the growth of consciousness in mass and

complexity the man's actions become ever more puzzling to those who attend only to the non-psychic factors, such as physique, temperament, state of health, climate, aspect of nature, the solicitation of the moment. The reason is that life has become spiritualized. The non-psychic factors have become less decisive than that organized body of experience we call the personality. Hence, in order to anticipate action, it is more important to explore the personality than to attend to the external factors.

Now, what *experience* is to the individual, *culture* is to the race. Just as, on the higher levels of individual life, physical and physiological causes retreat in favor of psychic causes, so, on the higher levels of social life, geographic and racial factors lose in significance, and social destiny is shaped more by such bodies of organized experience as language, religion, morals, law, the arts and the sciences. There is, in fact, a double reason for affirming that in a civilized people the causes of social phenomena will be essentially psychic. The actions of persons will reflect the influence of that organized embodiment of individual experience we call *personality,* and they will reflect the influence of that organized embodiment of collective experience we call *civilization.* In this case an interpretation of social phenomena without reference to the constitution and character of the individual mind, or to the constitution and character of the social mind, will be unsatisfying. Since, now, the main purpose of sociology is to enable us to understand and to forecast the activities

of civilized men, we are justified in insisting that it is chiefly a psychical science. Its causes are to be sought in mental processes, its forces are psychic forces, and no ultimate non-psychic factors should be recognized until it is shown just how they are able to affect motive and choice.

Having made clear the nature of the social forces, let us now consider their classification.

But do they need to be classified? Do not all desires reduce to one? About us we see men urged by a score of instincts, lured by a hundred goals, yet the hedonist insists they are all seeking the same thing, namely, the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.

In view of all the forging it has undergone, it would be strange indeed if human nature were so simple. There are the *instincts.* Long before our race had wit enough to classify actions as pleasure-yielding and pain-yielding, tree-life and cave-life had equipped it with instincts which are still alive. Then, for example, were laid down in our nervous apparatus fear reactions, once salutary, but now useless. The dread of the dark, of loud noises, of open places, of clammy objects, of loneliness, cannot now be interpreted as shrinkings from the painful. Under our present conditions of life they are meaningless.

Then there are the *impulses.* Can action under the spur of jealousy or anger be interpreted as a yielding to the greatest attraction? Panics, lynch-

ings, and riots are not forms of pleasure-seeking, but manifestations of fear, hate, or blood-thirst.

Again, the creature whose ancestors ran a gauntlet of severe tests is certain to be energetic, to deploy its powers under slight stimulus. If, now, the serious demands of existence become less taxing, the creature will relieve itself of its superabundant energy in play activities. While the free forth-flowing of energy yields enjoyment, and the obstruction of it causes distress, pleasure is not really the object of play. Mere gamboling is aimless, its cause is not a gleam in front but a thrust from behind. In sports and games the object is not pleasure, but a feat, a score, a triumph. The hedonist's theory would apply to a race of canny but tired beings.

"But," it may be urged, "granting that many of man's original promptings are not hedonic, will he not, when he has reflected upon his experiences, seek to repeat the pleasant impressions and to inhibit such actions as entail disagreeable consequences? Applying the sure touchstones of pleasure and pain, will he not free himself from the thraldom of instincts and impulses, and mould his life on rational lines?"

This assumes that the action of reason is to weed out interests so far as they do not justify themselves as pleasure-yielding. But, in truth, reason creates interests as well as destroys them. In its restless explorations it comes upon alluring problems. While critical minds are dissecting to death old ideals, creative spirits are setting up new goals. Hence every burst of intellectual activity is pregnant

with new zests and enthusiasms. As they mount above the plane of instinct men do not become simply more canny and calculating. Copernicus, Pascal, Newton, and Darwin were not arch-hedonists. Master-intellects, like Socrates and Bruno, are found sacrificing themselves for their ideals. The fact is, reason turned inward may destroy ideals, but turned upon the world or upon men it kindles fresh interests. It may be, conscious pleasure-seeking marks the morning of intelligence rather than its high noon.

Then there is a social factor to be considered. In the collective mind there are currents which carry us far out of our natural course. We like what others like, covet what they praise. If we imbibe admiration for a dexterity or a virtue, we cannot but embrace it in our ideal and strive to realize it. If others infect us with a valuation, we cannot help pursuing the thing valued. From the *élite* of a people spread feelings and opinions about the goals of endeavor, which in time harden into race ideals and race values. The rank and file for the most part accept these, because they are not able to constitute goals for themselves. So, thanks to the irony of life, it may come to pass that the multitude pursue, not the gratifications proper to their own natures, but the gratifications proper to the natures of the influential *élite*.

There is no denying, then, that the desires of men are many. Of the various human goals we can affirm just one thing: *they shine*. To affirm that they shine because they all have a component of pleasure

is to go too far. There is no social force; there are social forces.

To reject the formula of "greatest pleasure for least pain" is not to attack the foundation principle of pure economics, namely, *greatest utility for least disutility.* Material goods are *means,* not *ends.* Economic choices relate to *routes,* not to *goals.* Of rival goals we do not invariably ask, "Which promises the most pleasure?"; but of the possible routes to any goal we do ask, "Which is the easiest?" Whatever be his goal, the rational man will choose the smoothest path, provide in the cheapest manner such bridges and corduroy as may be necessary. If he has not means enough to attain all his ends commodiously, he economizes goods. If he can produce these goods, he economizes his time and exertion. Hence, his choice among possible materials, processes, occupations, and investments conforms to a principle. But we find no such universal principle determining which, among competing instincts, impulses, ideals, and values shall prevail. These are, in fact, treated as incommensurable. No one reduces them all to a common denominator.

The principle of economizing any requisite that is limited in quantity—material resources, time, energy, etc.—can be observed even in our mode of gratifying the higher cravings. The "law of parsimony"[1] is operative when the devotee seeks to become *en rapport* with his deity by a minimum of pious exercises, when the sportsman expends just enough effort to

[1] Ward, "Pure Sociology," pp. 161-163.

win the points in the game, when the student seeks out the teachers and texts that put him most quickly in possession of the coveted knowledge, when the philanthropist takes as his motto "Help the poor to help themselves," when the parent rears the least number of offspring that will insure him the sweet companionship of children.

Coming now to actual classifications, we will consider those of Small, Ratzenhofer, Ward, and Stuckenberg.

Professor Small classifies human cravings as desires for *health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty,* and *rightness.*[1] This grouping appears to be defective at a number of points. Hunger and love are *specific* demands, and not a desire for health. Health, moreover, when people do begin to care for it, is valued, not as an end, but as a *sine qua non* of all satisfactions whatsoever. As for the desire for wealth, it is secondary, depending upon the intensity of those cravings which cannot well be satisfied without the aid of material goods or services. The "lordship over things" which Professor Small advances as a primary motive to acquisition gratifies an egotic desire. It does not differ in principle from the lust of lordship over persons (power) or lordship over men's admiration (glory) or lordship over men's judgment (influence). Under sociability are lumped together desires so diverse as the craving for companionship, and the eagerness for appreciation, the one affective, the other egotic.

[1] *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. VI, pp. 177-199.

Ratzenhofer has employed the word *interest* for the force, whether vital or psychic, which calls out any activity. The term is wide enough to include function, tropism, reflex, and blind impulse, as well as conscious desire. He distinguishes[1]—

a) *The race interest, i. e.,* the impulses which center in the reproductive functions.

b) *The physiological interest, i. e.,* hunger and thirst.

With the rise of consciousness other interests develop out of these two primitive interests. The former expands into—

c) *The egotic interest, i. e.,* the entire circle of self-regarding motives.

The latter widens into—

d) *The social interest.*

In proportion as the lower interests are sated, the impetus of thought awakens a feeling of dependence upon the infinite, which gives rise to—

e) *The transcendental interest,* which creates religion and philosophy.

The above is a comprehensive view of the forces that impel living beings, but it is not the best classification of the desires at work in human societies. It is not satisfactory to group impulses solely with reference to their concrete objects, such as species, organism, self, society, cosmos.

Dr. Ward, who has done more than anyone else to elucidate the social forces, makes the following classification[2]:

[1] "Sociologische Erkenntniss," pp. 54-66.
[2] "Pure Sociology," p. 261.

- Physical Forces (Function bodily)
  - Ontogenetic Forces
    - Positive, attractive (seeking pleasure)
    - Negative, protective (avoiding pain)
  - Phylogenetic Forces
    - Direct, sexual
    - Indirect, consanguineal
- Spiritual Forces (Function psychic)
  - Sociogenetic Forces
    - Moral (seeking the safe and good)
    - Æsthetic (seeking the beautiful)
    - Intellectual (seeking the useful and true)

For the purposes of philosophy this grouping impresses me as by far the most helpful that has been made. If my own grouping is somewhat different, it is because for practical use in sociology I prefer a classification based more immediately upon the nature of the desires, and neglecting the functions to which they prompt.

Dr. Stuckenberg has grouped the social forces as follows[1]:

I. Fundamental.
   1. The economic.
   2. The political.

II. Constitutional.
   3. The egotic.
   4. The appetitive.
   5. The affectional.
   6. The recreative.

[1] "Sociology," vol. I, p. 207.

III. Cultural.
7. The æsthetic.
8. The ethical.
9. The religious.
10. The intellectual.

Without the "fundamental" forces this scheme would be excellent. It is surely an error, however, to list the desire for wealth among the original social forces. It is, in fact, clearly derivative. Avarice is so powerful because nearly every kind of craving sooner or later puts in a requisition for goods. The worth of wealth is the sum of all the furtherances we receive from it in the pursuit of our ends. The state likewise is an instrument of many uses, and appeals to no one group of desires. The specific desires that operate in the sphere of government—the love of power and the impatience of restraint—have other spheres of manifestation, and cannot properly be termed *political.* They are, in fact, *egotic.* For the rest, early government rises out of *fear*—fear of the foe, fear of the marauder. After life and property have become secure, the state is utilized for the promotion of many cultural purposes, so that nearly every group of social forces gives off a demand for state activity.

Would it not be better to arrange the springs of action in two planes, instead of forcing them into one plane? *Desires* may well be distinguished from *interests,* the former being the primary forces as they well up in consciousness, the latter the great complexes, woven of multicolored strands of desire, which shape society and make history.

Desires may be divided into *natural* and *cultural*, the former present in all men, the latter emerging clearly only after man has made some gains in culture. The *natural* desires may be grouped into—

a) *Appetitive.* Hunger, thirst, and sex-appetite.
b) *Hedonic.* Fear, aversion to pain, love of warmth, ease, and sensuous pleasure.
c) *Egotic.* These are demands of the *self* rather than of the *organism.* They include shame, vanity, pride, envy, love of liberty, of power, and of glory. The type of this class is ambition.
d) *Affective.* Desires that terminate upon others: sympathy, sociability, love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger, revenge.
e) *Recreative.* Play impulses, love of self-expression.

The *cultural* desires, which are clearly differentiated only in culture men are—

f) *Religious.* Yearning for those states of swimming or unconditioned consciousness represented by the religious ecstasy.[1]
g) *Ethical.* Love of fair play, sense of justice.
h) *Æsthetic.* Desire for the pleasures of perception, *i. e.*, for enjoyment of "the beautiful."
i) *Intellectual.* Curiosity, love of knowing, of learning, and of imparting.

While the study of the *natural* wants belongs to anthropology, the development of *cultural* desires in connection with association and the presence of culture devolves upon sociology. I pass the topic here

[1] No one who has seen people "getting happy" at a camp-meeting will doubt the reality or the seductiveness of such states. JAMES, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, studies these in the scientific spirit. BRINTON, *The Religion of Primitive Peoples*, raises a doubt if these cravings are exclusively cultural.

only because it has been adequately treated by others.[1]

There are certain huge complexes of goods which serve as means to the satisfaction of a variety of wants. They are Wealth, Government, Religion, and Knowledge. In respect to these the various elementary social forces therefore give off impulses which run together and form the *economic, political, religious,* and *intellectual* interests, which constitute in effect the chief history-making forces.

The *economic interest* finds its tap-root in the pangs of hunger and cold. These, being a direct demand for material goods, prompt men to wealth-getting activities. There is, however, in the end no class of cravings which may not lay claim to goods, and thus whet greed to a keener edge. When personal emulation takes the form of "conspicuous waste," the egotic desires prompt to acquisition. When gold "gilds the straitened forehead of the fool," it is prized as the means of winning the coveted mate. When entertainment is expensive, money is sought to oil the wheels of social intercourse. When the gods respect persons, men will seek the wherewithal for costly sacrifices and sanctuaries. When wealth gives lordship, the ambitious will rowel hard in the pursuit of fortune. When the artist works for the highest bidder, the beauty-lover will set himself to money-making. Whenever Dives enjoys greater social consideration, stands

[1] Vierkandt, "Naturvölker und Kulturvölker." Stuckenberg, "Sociology," vol. I, ch. XIII.

higher with the Unseen, is a more formidable suitor, finds bigger meshes in the law, and counts as a worthier person than the better man with the lighter purse, all the streams of desire pour into one channel, and avarice swells to monstrous proportions.

In general, the itch for wealth varies directly with its capacity to promote the satisfaction of the various desires. Since this capacity varies from place to place and from age to age, *the value of wealth is subject to rise and fall.*

The assertion that wealth in general is liable to appreciate or depreciate seems a hard saying. Have we not been taught there can be no general rise or fall in exchange values? Against what, indeed, shall wealth be measured? Where are the markets which register its fluctuations?

But such markets exist, always have existed. Are there not streets where woman's virtue is sold? Are there not commonwealths where there is a ruling price for votes? Do not the comparative rewards of occupations indicate what inducements will overcome the love of independence, of safety, of good repute? We see men sacrificing health, or leisure, or family life, or offspring, or friends, or liberty, or honor, or truth, for gain. The volume of such spiritual goods Mammon can lure into the market measures the power of money. By the choices men make in such cases and by the judgment others pass upon such choices we can ascertain what is the social estimate of wealth. When gold cannot shake the nobleman's pride of caste, the statesman's patriotism, the

soldier's honor, the wife's fidelity, the official's sense of duty, or the artist's devotion to his ideal, wealth is cheap. But when maidens yield themselves to senile moneybags, youths swarm about the unattractive heiress, judges take bribes, experts sell their opinions to the highest bidder, and genius champions the cause it does not believe in, wealth is rated high.

The fluctuations in the market where spiritual goods are sacrificed for material goods are commonly supposed to originate on the side of the higher goods. The material wants, it is reasoned, partake of the stability of the organism itself. It is the aspirations for the good, the true, and the beautiful that are variable.

This interpretation is probably wrong. Usually it is the esteem of wealth that fluctuates and not the esteem of health, or liberty, or honor. These are fundamentals and therefore relatively stable. Wantonness, sycophancy, and subserviency violate personal instincts. Hypocrisy, fraud, and espionage outrage natural feelings and come about as hard one age as another. The loathing they inspire probably varies little from fathers to sons.

In fact, we do not need to explain the zigzag course of the market for spiritual goods by assuming a shifting in the stress of human wants. Since wealth is a *means,* the importance of wealth must constantly fluctuate *because of changes in the power of material goods to gratify desire.*

These result from changes in *technique* or in *opinion.*

Thus the introduction of perfumes and spices gave new sensuous gratifications, spirituous liquors provided a short-cut to social pleasure, armor opened a way to security, the breaking of the horse to saddle provided a form of dignified locomotion. The coming in of cattle enabled heads of kine to be trophies as well as scalp-locks and captives. The discovery of medicaments gave new weapons against disease. The origination of art products provided new embodiments of beauty. The art of embalming met in a way the longing for immortality. Memorial tablets, urns, and monuments offered themselves to the same need. Since by exchange any good may be converted into any other, each of these changes adds to the desirability of wealth-in-general.

It is, however, shiftings of custom and opinion that have most affected the importance of material goods. The custom of wife-purchase, the system of *wergeld* or money compensation for crimes, the acceptance of damages as a salve for injury, the shifting of prestige from heads, scalps, and bear's claws to herds, acres, and bonds, the reliance upon clothing instead of tattooing as a means of charming the opposite sex, the belief that burnt-offerings win the favor of the gods or that masses deliver the soul from purgatory, the decline of prophetism, the passing of political power from the Elders or the Fighters to the Wealthy, the decay of the distinction between "noble" and "mean" employments or sources of wealth, the yielding of patrician ranks to the pres-

sure of the new-rich, the obliterating of caste by class, the lapsing of birth as a ground of social superiority, the gaining of "conspicuous consumption" on "conspicuous leisure" as a means of good repute, the enlistment of the artist in the service of Crœsus instead of the service of temple or church—these have at various times augmented the power of wealth and therewith the craving for it.

There are other movements which have shorn lucre of some of its brute might, and exalted the worth of personal merit or effort. The resumption of choice by women, the rise of the romantic ideal, the custom of courtship, and the dispensing with the "marriage portion" have unsealed the well-nigh choked-up spring of sex-love. "Justification by faith," the suppression of masses, pilgrimages, and indulgences, the dispensing with altar and image, the open Bible, the lay chalice, and the unadorned "meeting house" have done much to rout commercialism from religion. The protection of the law is no longer for those only who can pay for it. The courts of justice need no longer be supported by the fees of suitors. Public hospitals and free dispensaries socialize the healing art. The printing-press and the free library have democratized the sweets of literature. The abolition of hireling armies, of imprisonment for debt, of child labor, and of the property suffrage are so many dykes reclaiming smiling stretches from the dreary waste of commercialism. The struggle is endless, for while the growth of personality is limit-

ing the power of the purse on the one side, the march of technique is broadening it on the other.

A lesser derivative interest is the *political.* Like wealth, a center of power is valued because it promotes many kinds of satisfactions. The earlier state-building forces are Greed and Fear, that is, groups ally themselves in order to make or to resist attack. People dread the enemy, and hence cheerfully submit to the yoke of the war-leader. They tremble before the predatory, and therefore rally around a power that can make law respected. These fear forces are strongly seconded by the love of power which impels the masterful to supply more government than is needed. In time the absolute state arises in all its grimness, and men start back in affright before the Frankenstein they have created. There ensues a struggle to wrest from government the guarantees of individual liberties and rights. Finally, it is recognized how much the distribution of wealth in an era of social production depends upon the state, and the people grapple with the classes for the mastery of power. During these four phases—military, civil, liberal, and social—of the political interest, while men are pouring out their blood and treasure, first to create and then to control the state, their groupings will depend much on their political feelings and politics will be a maker of history.

Since the feeling for the state is derivative, it varies with the importance of what the state does. Loyalty touches its zenith when blows ring harmless on the broad shield the state holds over its people.

The flame of patriotism rises or sinks with the approach or retreat of violence. The state, moreover, enlists strong affections when it is the center of all kinds of coöperation and the active promoter of every form of culture. But with the triumph of peace, order, individual liberty, and popular government, the old fears and passions are forgotten. The industrial organization disengages itself from the political. The promotion of culture devolves to a considerable degree upon free associations. Religion relies for support on free-will offerings. Public opinion comes to be the great regulator of conduct. The non-political side of society comes forward, political concern dies down, and the state no longer plays a star part in the drama of history.

The *religious interest* is chiefly derivative. It contains, to be sure, an original factor in the craving for certain ecstatic experiences. Its prominence in the concern of mankind cannot, however, be laid to this craving. Like wealth and like government, religion has spread far beyond its first occasion, and insinuated itself into many channels of desire. The earliest non-religious force behind it is fear. *Primos in orbe deos fecit timor.* After man has by propitiation of the unseen powers assured his personal safety, he seeks to utilize them. He covenants with them that for regular prayer and sacrifice they shall grant increase and prosperity. The gods acquire economic importance. As they become more fully domesticated, they are approached with confidence, and worship is prompted by love and gratitude as

well as by hope of benefits. With the advent of public worship religious feasts endear themselves as occasions for "orgiastic gladness" and "hilarious revelry." In the phallic cults they are prized as stimuli to sexual desire. Moreover, the common worship of the gods for public ends makes them props of order, bulwarks of family, property, and state. When the ethical sense becomes active, the gods come to be thought of as deliverers from temptation rather than from misfortune. One craves from them a clean heart rather than a fat harvest. Philosophy then blends with the theory of the gods and religion seeks to answer the *Why? Whence?* and *Whither?* of the restless intellect. In the priestly cults religion becomes a stepping-stone to power, and so enlists ambition. Then the fear of a too-masterful church seizes upon men and they fervently embrace the more spiritual forms of faith as vessels of deliverance.

Thus religion has run the whole gamut of the passions. It has been the storm-center of feeling. Fear, greed, lust, sociability, gratitude, ambition, the instinct for liberty, the ethical impulses, and the intellectual yearnings have, at one time or another, coöperated with the specific religious craving to magnify religion to the prodigious dimensions of a history-making force.

The religious interest cannot but wax and wane with the adequacy of religion to meet the various needs of men. The gods are remembered in danger, forgotten in prosperity. They are valued as a prop

when the state rests on authority, discarded when government is founded on consent. They are relied on to safeguard rights only so long as Justice holds no sword. Every step in the mastery of nature and the control of men blunts the sense of dependence on the Unseen. Security from violence, or plague, or future torment lessens the poignancy of the religious feeling. As people come to look to the policeman for protection, to the physician for healing, to the inventor for victory, and to themselves for worldly success, their zeal in worship abates. Such sloughings leave religion purer and nobler, no doubt, but less able to control the destiny of society. Its new channel is deeper than the old, but far narrower.

The *intellectual interest* is likewise a blend of various desires. Had it been restricted to its primitive components, its rôle would have been insignificant. But these cravings have been reinforced from several quarters. In the first place, intellectual subtlety, always a coveted form of prowess, gratifies the egotic desires. Even in the early stages of culture a reputation for extraordinary wisdom gives the sage fame, power, and wealth. Later, learning confers distinction and is not without efficacy in bread-winning and mate-winning. At every social level, moreover, there is a standard of intelligence to be lived up to as well as a standard of decent consumption. As for real knowledge, it has always been means as well as end. The sciences were first cultivated as badges of leisure-class superiority. Later they were fostered because they allayed the dread

of disease, banished fear of the supernatural, assuaged pain, prolonged life, brought victory, and vastly expanded the production of wealth. They were cultivated, in short, because knowledge is power. When, moreover, we remember the meteoric career of speculative ideas which, besides moulding lives and shaping institutions, have knit men together or marshaled them into hostile camps, the intellectual interest must be owned to be a factor in history of no mean importance.

Like the rest the intellectual interest has its ups and downs. It wanes as men lose faith in the efficacy of speculative ideas and come to put their trust in labor or thrift. If "things are in the saddle," it is because the ideologies have not kept their promises. On the other hand, the triumphs of science lead men to value knowledge rather than religion or power. Science grants the health vainly besought by the worshiper; it turns aside the pestilence; it insures the husbandman his increase; it delivers from enemies. The decline of violence has, no doubt, done much to put the big brain above the strong arm, but even war is coming to be a test of intelligence rather than a test of brute strength. Knowledge and money, in other words, Science and Wealth, seem likely to become the heirs of the dying powers of the past.

Since food, sex, and safety are the most imperious, persistent, and universal wants of man, why, it may be asked, does not the sex-desire announce itself in

history in some dramatic fashion? Why has no one offered a "genesic" interpretation of history?

The explanation seems to be that the sex-propensity does not group or array men. It embroils individuals (witness the "crimes of passion") but not tribes, classes, or nations. Unlike greed, it rarely precipitates mass collisions. Unlike fear, it does not inspire men to combined effort. Satisfied by the union of the sex-couple, love, unlike hunger, does not give rise to coöperations, trades, and professions, the social division of labor. Nevertheless, on those rare occasions when they are summed together, the sex-desires constitute a stupendous social force. The most striking proof of this is the imposing of the monogamic relation upon the entire membership of society. The suppression of polygamy marks the triumph of the sex-needs of the many over the claims of the few, and is, beyond question, the greatest anti-monopoly achievement on record. Perhaps the broadest encroachment ever made on the "right of the strongest" is the obliging of the rich and powerful to content themselves with one wife.

The distinction we have drawn between *original* and *derivative* social forces gives us a vantage-point from which to interpret the interpretations of history. We have seen that it is a mistake to lay the shiftings of interest to be discerned in the life of a people solely to the evolution of wants. Oftener these shiftings are due to a disturbance in the relation of means to end, to a change in the capacity of the great secondary goods to promote the satisfac-

tion of desires. Now, the moment the state reaches its broadest significance, the military-political interest seems to be the swaying force in history. The moment religion reaches its broadest significance, the religious interest appears as the chief welder or sunderer of men. Let these great interests decay, and other interests come forward and grasp the scepter they let fall. It happens that in our time certain well-understood influences have weakened the political and religious interests, and thereby thrown into bold relief the other interests, chief among which is the economic. The philosophy of wealth is hence the main key to the interpretation of contemporary life. On the strength of its success here, Economism is now declared to be the "open sesame" of the locked chambers of the past, the one magic formula for the interpretation of history. Its only rival today is Intellectualism, the doctrine that makes the knowledge and beliefs of each age the pivot of its entire social life. In my view nothing can rescue us from these one-sided theories save a knowledge of human wants and a recognition of the great variety of the springs that incite men to action. *The corner-stone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the social forces.*

VIII

THE FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE[1]

It is clear that along with the organic analogy we must give up the time-honored division into social anatomy, social physiology, and social psychology. Since there is no social cadaver to dissect, why use the term "anatomy," which refers to the knowledge gained by the simple "cutting up" (*ἀνα τομεῖν*) of a body? Say rather *social morphology,* which will describe, not only human relations and groupings, but also their mutations in the course of time—their embryology, so to speak. Why apply the term "physiology" to the description of processes and products that are in no wise physical? The fact that such interactions as conflict and competition involve something more than the action of mind on mind need not hinder us from recognizing that what the organicists call "function" or "life" in society is essentially psychical and naturally becomes the subject-matter of *social psychology.* As for social pathology, it cannot become a branch of science until we have a sure touchstone for distinguishing the normal from the abnormal in society. So long as divorce and lynching and political crime and the trust movement lend themselves to precisely opposite interpretations, there is no firm line to be drawn be-

[1] *Vide The American Journal of Sociology,* May, July and September, 1904.

tween social health and social disease. Each school of thought has its own way of diagnosing the socially morbid, and no objective tests have yet been agreed on.

On mounting from the plane of description to that of theory, it becomes possible to bisect sociology into *social statics* and *social dynamics.* This division has usually been made to hinge on the purely formal contrast of coexistence and succession. A study of cross-sections or flash-light pictures of society would show what social structures belong together—are congruous. The comparison of series of such states in many different societies would disclose regularities of succession. If this were so, the cross-section of a society in feverish transformation would be as instructive as any other, seeing that *order* can always be considered apart from *movement.* In point of fact, however, such a society would not present a system of mutually determining parts and interdependent activities, *i. e.,* an "order," but would disclose many incongruities. Statical laws cannot be discovered until an equilibrium has been reached, *i. e.,* until time has permitted the inner affinities and repugnances of institutions to work themselves out. But a society that keeps in balance is ruled by forces and activities quite different from those that dominate a highly progressive community. The distinction, therefore, between social statics and social dynamics, far from being based on mere logic, reaches down to a distinction in subject matter.

In every society are certain factors, such as *religion, government, custom, law,* and *ceremony,* which are actively static, inasmuch as they resist structural change of every sort. *Language, literature, art, industry, education,* and *opinion* are passively static—or shall I say neutral?—lending themselves indifferently to the agencies of stagnation and to those of change. In strong contrast are the dynamic factors, such as *domestication, geographical discovery, exploration, migration, acclimatization, war, conquest, race-crossing, commerce, travel, invention, scientific discovery, prophetism,* and *free thought.* The professionals of law, government, and religion are apt to hate and belittle these dynamic factors. Nor are they beloved of the masses, as are the great conservative institutions. Popular affections do not twine about them as about church and state. Race intermarriage, foreign influence, science, free thought, and prophetism have usually been looked at askance. Men always consider religion and government as infinitely more precious than discovery and invention. This division into statics and dynamics is founded, then, not simply on the distinction between order and movement, relations of coexistence and those of succession, but as well on the broad contrast between the forces and activities that make for equilibrium and those which make for change.

The point needs to be emphasized that social dynamics is concerned with *change* rather than *evolu-*

tion. The term "evolution," while very properly calling attention to the *continuity* of social change and to *resident forces* as causing change, is apt to convey the idea that the series of social changes is the mere unfolding of characters pre-formed in the very germ or bud of society. This idea is misleading and should be avoided. It is unsafe to assume that the succession of social changes is predetermined, and that accidental, extraneous, and historic events and influences do not count.

Again, it is essential not to identify social dynamics with the theory of social progress. The promotion of progress is, of course, our greatest practical concern, but the true cleavage between social statics and social dynamics turns on the distinction between *persistence* and *change.* Change means any qualitative variation, whereas progress means amelioration, perfectionment. The one is movement; the other is movement in the direction of advantage. Progress is better adaptation to given conditions. Change may be adaptation—at first, perhaps, very imperfect—to new conditions.

The biologist can assure himself whether a given variation *is* a progress by observing if it leaves the creature better able to survive. The sociologist, alas, has no such simple practical test. A society is not solidary to anything like the degree that most organisms are, and it is not so incessantly pitted against other societies. As regards the effects on its members, we find any number of institutional changes which are progress from the standpoint of

one sex, class, race, or local group, but spell regress for another sex, class, race, or local group. Nor is it easy to characterize them from the view-point of "society as a whole," for it is by no means clear what is best for "society as a whole." Each of us considers a change progressive when it advances society toward his ideal. But one man's ideal is freedom, while another's is order; one man borrows from biology the criterion of differentiation, while another imports from psychology the idea of harmony; one man's touchstone is the happiness of the many, while another's is the perfecting of the superior few. It is, therefore, hopeless as yet to look for a test of progress that shall be objective and valid for all. Since change is a matter of observation, whereas progress is a matter of judgment involving the application of a subjective standard, those who desire to see sociology a true science are justified in insisting that social dynamics deal with the factors and manner, not of *social progress* merely, but of *social change.*

In the arts we ask if the new thing is more useful than the old; in the sciences we ask if the new doctrine brings us nearer the truth. But there are other kinds of change for which there is no sure test. In Rome during most of the imperial period that progress which flows from the advance of technique and knowledge was almost unknown. Says Seeck:[1]

From Augustus to Diocletian the equipment of the

[1] "Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt," vol. I, pp. 271-2.

legionary remained the same. No improvement of tactics, no new means of warfare, was developed in the course of three centuries. . . . . Neither in agriculture nor in technique nor in administration does a single new idea of any significance come to light after the first century. Literature and art, too, are confined to a sterile imitation which becomes ever more empty and feeble. . . . . The Neo-Platonic philosophy and the development of Christian dogma are the only achievements which relieve this era from complete futility.

Yet these barren ages are full of social changes which are richly instructive as to the forces that lurk in the bosom of society. Why, after the gulf between Romans and provincials had been filled in, did a chasm open between *honestiores* and *humiliores?* Why did slaves give place to *coloni* and *adscripti glebae?* Why did the law fetter the worker to his father's occupation? Why did taxes come to be paid in kind? Why did the petty landowner voluntarily yield up his holding to some powerful proprietor in order to receive it back on a feudal tenure? Why did gladiatorial shows cease? What influence lifted the "overseer" of the early Christian community to the lofty chair of the *episcopus* or bishop? What was it that elevated the bishop of Rome to the papal throne? How can the rise of the monastic movement be explained? Surely the forces here at work should figure in a theory of social dynamics!

When a mammal thrust northward gets a heavier coat of hair, or a bird acquires the nest-building instinct with the advent of a rodent that destroys

her eggs on the ground, we have a case of *adaptation.* Now, this way of interpreting change is becoming ever more helpful to the student of society. The substitution of iron for wood is a progress if some Tubal Cain has made iron cheaper, an adaptation if deforestation has made wood dearer. A vegetarian movement may signify either that the art of preparing cereal foods is advancing, or that over-population is making land too valuable for the growing of animal food. Among herdsmen it is only the lash of poverty that makes anyone endure the drudgery of tillage and the cultivation of the soil presents itself, not as a *progress,* but as an *adaptation* to the pressure of numbers.

Movements that seem regressive are equally ambiguous. Militarism is hardly a regress when a people finds itself menaced by the aproach of an aggressive neighbor. The Asiaticization of government under Diocletian and his successors, hitherto looked upon as a sure symptom of degeneration, was a consequence of the filling up of the depopulated parts of the empire with barbarians hard to keep in order and very susceptible to pomps and ceremonies. The English viceroy is to-day modifying the government of India in the same way and for the same purpose. The magnifying of the state is a backward step if it signifies that a people has become less self-reliant and liberty-loving; it is but adaptation if the growth of monopoly has made intervention necessary in order to preserve individual initiative and free competition. The multiply-

ing of statutes is ominous if it results from the individual becoming evil-disposed or the legislator meddlesome; on the other hand, as an endeavor to meet the needs of a more complex organization of society, it presents itself in the light of a welcome adjustment. The growth of one-man power is degeneration if it is caused by a lowered citizenship; it is only adaptation if the facilities for focusing public opinion have so improved that the cruder checks on the executive have ceased to be necessary.

I conclude, then, that social dynamics ought to drop such vague and dubious conceptions as *progress* and *regress,* and address itself to the simple fact of *social change.*

Nothing exists save by the conjuncture of two or more factors. If any one of these factors be wanting, the thing does not come to pass. Yet we do not term each and all of these factors "causes." The appearance of a new situation is considered to be the effect of the *precipitating* factor. The ferment, the igniting spark, the touching of the electric button, the knocking away of the stay block, the turning of the lever, is looked upon as the cause of what ensues. The factors already present are termed the *conditions,* not the *causes,* of the change. Suppose, for example, a given phenomenon cannot occur without the conjuncture of factors *a, b,* and *c.* If *a* and *b* are present and the phenomenon occurs on the addition of *c,* then *c* is regarded as the cause, *a* and *b* as the conditions. But it is possible that either of

these may be the precipitating factor working within the framework constituted by the other two factors.

Now, this logic applies to the advent of a new social form. If a tribe continues pastoral because of ignorance, then the cause of its entrance upon the agricultural stage will be its acquiring the arts of cultivation. But our frontier communities have always tarried some time in the cattle-raising stage, and the cause of their transition to agriculture has been the growth of their population. Japan in the early days had the capital for the building of railroads, but not the knowledge. On the other hand, New Zealand possessed the knowledge, but lacked the capital. In the former case the arrival of knowledge, in the latter case the arrival of capital, is the cause of the advent of steam locomotion.

The strategic importance of the precipitating factor has a bearing on the dispute between the champions of individuals as causes of social change and the champions of collective causes — between the *innovationists* and the *adaptationists.* A useful process or a labor-saving machine is promptly adopted and begins at once to work its transforming effects. The inventor may therefore be hailed as the prime cause of the social changes that ensue. The clever men that devised the great improvements in textile machinery which appeared in the latter half of the eighteenth century indirectly broke up the guilds, brought in the factory system, created industrial cities, and riveted slavery upon our southern states. But innovations that do not make so irre-

sistible an appeal—juristic and political ideas, religious, ethical, and æsthetic ideals—are apt to be neglected till some influence brings the public mind into a receptive attitude toward them. In such cases *the influence is the cause.*

There have always been men who suggested that horse-thieves deserve hanging. If, now, certain new communities do hang their horse-thieves, the cause of the practice is not the proponent, but the peculiar situation which disposes the community to fall in with his suggestion. For ages eloquent men have fulminated against strong drink. The modern temperance movement is, then, not to be credited solely to orators like Father Mathew and Gough. The response of our age to their appeals must be attributed to the great changes in diet and in industry which have made the liquor habit more pernicious than formerly. Take the craving for divorce. Is it due to the example or advocacy of certain influential persons? Rather must we lay it to the opening of doors to a feminine career and the relaxation of old beliefs which constrained woman to bear unmurmuringly her yoke. Comte hinges a rise in the status of the slave or the woman on a change in speculative opinion. Now, however, we are apt to connect it with a change in the relation of population to land or in the industrial importance of woman. Similarly, the transformations of law and government are coming to be correlated less with the ideas and personalities that are active in achieving them than with certain hidden shiftings of economic or

social power. So there are rival explanations, the one individual, the other collective, of the anti-slavery movement, the peace movement, the reform of punishment, the rise of socialism.

The fact is, the promulgation of a new idea or ideal is like casting a bit of ferment into a plasm. The psychologists are more intent on the ferment than on the nature of the medium in which it works. The economists, on the other hand, inquire why the medium permits fermentation to arise, but ignore the necessity of casting in the ferment. Both, however, are necessary, the question of cause turning simply on whether the plasm awaits the ferment or the ferment awaits its plasm.

All parts of an organism are to a certain extent related to one another, so that when one part varies the other part varies simultaneously. If, for example, a creature's head becomes heavier, the muscles of its neck must become larger. On this same principle of correlation an important change in any sphere of social life is apt to produce sympathetic or compensatory changes in other spheres. For instance, few of the mutations in social ethics are due to novel ethical ideas; they are echoes or aftermath of changes in some of the more basic spheres, such as economic, sex, or religious life. Now, in social dynamics the sociologist may not content himself with accounting for one social change by another social change, but must follow up the causal chain link by link until he reaches either a regular social process or an extra-social factor.

He must, moreover, hold firmly in mind the distinction between the cause of a social phenomenon and the cause of a change in this phenomenon. The former is *human desire.* Desire is the steam which drives the machinery of society. It is behind all social activities, beneath all groupings and relationships. Its action is essentially statical. If it produces change, that change is incidental. The causes of social transformation are to be sought, not among desires, but in something of a different nature which changes their direction or modifies the framework within which they operate. The causes are the innovating example, the foreign influence, or the new knowledge, which engenders new wants. They are the increase of population, the accumulation of capital, the removal to a new country, or the impact of a neighboring group, by which are altered the conditions under which old wants can be gratified. This broad contrast between the social forces and the factors of social change is another justification for dividing sociology into statics and dynamics.

If we are to explain the differences in the rate or course of change between societies or between different periods in the history of the same society, it is idle to cite a trait common to all societies and to all times. When Comte and Lacombe name *ennui* as one of the causes of social progress, they confuse cause with condition. Similarly Comte's demonstration that a greater longevity would injuriously strengthen the conservative forces in society does

not warrant us in listing *the brevity of life* among the causes of social variation.

Since it is the variants, not the constants, that count here, a fixed trait, whether of race or of locality, cannot figure as cause of a social transformation. Geography, to be sure, acquaints us with the framework within which social changes occur, and by which they are moulded and limited. But the physical environment, while it may admit variative tendencies, cannot initiate them. Natural waterways and an indented coast may favor progress, but they cannot produce it. Soil and climate account for the enduring lineaments, but not for the metamorphoses of peoples. Unlikeness of surroundings may cause differences between societies, but it cannot bring about differences between successive epochs in the same society, unless in the meantime the people has migrated. Still, to the eye of the geologist, the environment is not quite stable. Elevation, subsidence, desiccation, the silting up of streams or ports, the shifting of river beds, the formation of pestilential marshes, or changes in flora and fauna, may cause disturbance in the social equilibrium, and should therefore find a place in the theory of social dynamics.

Eighteenth-century thought, regarding the forward movement of society as the direct consequence of the march of the human intellect, did not feel the need of exploring or setting forth the causes of social changes. Of late sociologists, swinging to

the other extreme, have looked upon the stationary state as the normal condition of men owing to the inertia of the human mind. Now, while in the end all causal chains carry us back to the nature of man or of his environment, I showed above[1] that the immediate reference of a social form to human nature is the mark of a crude social philosophy. We ought not to refer social variation to the progressiveness of the human intellect or social stagnation to its sluggishness. The difference noted in the response of different societies to the same stimulus is not to be explained by a universal trait like mental inertia, but by special traits and conditions. Various factors may be recognized which counteract transforming impulses. There are, therefore, *causes of social immobility* to be set forth as well as causes of social change.

Peculiarities of environment or of race may neutralize stimuli and so preserve a social form intact. Beyond a certain point in development, harsh climate, barren soil, absence of wood and minerals, and lack of natural waterways may interpose a bar which no amount of inventive genius can avail to break. Again, impassable barriers such as mountains, deserts, and seas may prevent a group finding other groups to struggle against, combine with, or borrow from. Nor are all races equally capable of ascent. Those varieties of mankind cradled in the happy climes where Nature spreads the table, having never been sifted by hunger and cold, or dis-

[1] Page 13.

ciplined to toil and forethought, lack the energy to avail themselves of the treasures civilization showers into their lap. What is stimulus to some races is no stimulus to them. They can perish, but they cannot change.

There are, moreover, social processes which accumulate products of a static tendency. Such are all those experiences which exaggerate the collective *ego* at the expense of the individual. This may take the form of an organization which ruthlessly crushes out criticism, discussion and innovation. In the course of prolonged warfare the state may acquire such a prestige and come to inspire such a loyalty that it can trample on the rights of the individual and break the spirit of question and initiative. In a prolonged struggle to curb and civilize barbarians a priesthood may attain such an authority that it is allowed to destroy the bolder spirits and to terrorize innovators. Often, however, a society becomes immobile from collective suggestion rather than from the violences of state and church. China and India have become ossified by public opinion rather than by the persecutor. Vast ocean-like collections of humanity, inhabiting a relatively uniform environment, become stagnant because the individual succumbs to the mere volume of suggestion and the mass is too great to be stirred by one man. Little groups, moreover, are held together by instinct or interest. It is the advent of vast groups with a considerable culture, held together by collective customs and beliefs, that makes variation difficult.

The group's instinct of self-preservation establishes a traditionalist educational system which is intended to hypnotize the individual before he has begun to think. This collective resistance to innovation is most marked in oppressed peoples (Jews, Poles, Armenians) with whom the inherited culture is at once a badge of ancient glories, a bond of union, and a defiance to their oppressors. Again, the patriarchal régime gives rise to ancestor-worship which, by bringing the living under the control of the dead, preserves the *status quo*. The inheritance of places and functions, since it puts age in possession of all the vantage points in society, tends to arrest development. An exploitation of the mass by the minority strains social order, and hence causes regulative institutions, such as government, law, religion, and ceremony to be elaborated to the highest degree. These work better as they become hallowed by age, and therefore the aggrandizement of these agencies of control reinforces the conservative tendencies in society.

Passing now to the positive branch of social dynamics, we find two schools contending for mastery—the *development* school and the *stimulus* school.

The former regards social change as a *becoming*. Progress and regress, ascent and descent, present smooth flowing curves like the development of an embryo. The continuity is due to the fact that change is brought about by the operation of resident forces. The causes of the transformations of so-

ciety are to be sought among the recurrent experiences and activities of its members. There is no standing still, save when development is arrested by some obstacle. Each social state in the fullness of time ushers in its successor. One phase carries the germs of the next. The present is pregnant with the future. In the succession of its phases society, like an organism, follows a path predetermined and predictable.

The new school, on the other hand, emphasizes discontinuity. Far from being a smooth upward slope, the way of progress is a ladder with rungs at very unequal intervals. Group-life tends toward an equilibrium. Forms petrify rather than pass into something else. An impulse spends itself, and society, with no new push, comes to rest. The causes of change are to be sought, then, not in society, but in impinging sub-social or extra-social forces — *stimuli,* so to speak. Conquest, the intrusion of an alien race, migration to a new seat, are apt to play havoc with the curves plotted by the development theorist. If the disturbing factor does not intrude from without, it pushes up from below. The genius is not a social but a vital phenomenon. Inventions and discoveries break in from what Professor James terms "the physiological cycle." Social destiny pivots on the advent of a brain that can invent gunpowder, the watermill, the compass, the printing-press, the locomotive — in a word, on *individual causes.* At every instant a people has a number of paths open to it, and which one it will follow depends

on those physiological variations which produce genius. The only paths the sociologist may plot are those by which an invention radiates from the inventor and becomes generalized. The only dynamic laws are laws of imitations, interferences, and adaptations.

Now, each of these views, the old and the new, reveals a part of the truth, and, in the judgment of the writer, the time has come to broaden social dynamics until it includes them both. Let us first consider just how society may be modified by the operation of resident forces.

Among the causes of social change may be distinguished two sorts of alteration—qualitative and quantitative. A mechanical invention, a scientific discovery, a new conception of life, a crossing of races, exemplifies the former. An increase or decrease of resources, or capital, or of some component of the population, exemplifies the latter. Thus the softening of slavery into serfdom may follow the promulgation of a new dogma or a growing scarcity of slaves. A new theory of races may make a slave code harsher, but, as the history of the Southern Colonies amply proves, an increase in the proportion of slave population has the same effect. Now, a people so conservative as to surround itself with a Chinese wall, banish its innovators, stone its prophets, make the ancient writings the staple of its instruction, and draw its leaders from the ranks of its *literati,* may effectually seal the sources of qualitative change. Yet it cannot by any contrivance elude

quantitative changes which may react upon and modify its institutions.

Most of the "functions" of society have no tendency to disturb the *status quo*. The round of love, marriage, and reproduction, so long as births and deaths balance; production, so far as it is balanced by consumption; exchange, so long as the argosies of commerce carry goods, but not ideas; education, so far as it passes on the traditional culture—these, together with recreation, social intercourse, worship, social control, government, and the administration of justice, are essentially statical. They might conceivably go on forever without producing change.

This is, in fact, what we should expect; for human activities are instigated by desire, and the result they aim at is a transitory one, viz., the satisfaction of desire. Anything that whets desire multiplies activities, but does not necessarily change their form. Like the rotating wheel, the striving millions exhibit motion without movement. In view of the fact that the hard-working peoples are the most conservative, society might be likened to a gyroscope, in that the greater its motion, the greater is its resistance to change of position. If, then, these recurrent activities have any dynamic result, it will be *an incidental or side effect.*

Now, there are certain regular processes which leave behind them as by-product a permanent effect, and in time these effects must accumulate until they strain and warp social structures. Hunting, by selective elimination of the less cautious creatures,

eventually makes the game scarcer and shyer, and so renders the chase a more precarious mode of livelihood. In the pastoral stage the continual escape of wilder animals from the herd, and the consequent breeding from the more tractable tends to complete domestication, and so paves the way to agriculture. Dynamic, also, are such operations as modify the physical environment. In explaining the varying destinies of a people, says Metchnikoff,[1]

> one can neglect the slow geological and climatic changes; on the other hand, the modifications that human industry, the accumulated labor of successive generations, produce in the nature of the country have a very great importance. . . . Thus the prehistoric settlers in the Nile valley handed over to their descendants of the Memphite epoch an environment very different from the one they had received from the hands of nature. . . . . Later, important works, such as the reservoir of Fayoum, modify considerably the physical conditions confronting the Egyptians of the Theban period.

Dykes, levees, canals, drains, causeways, and roads alter the economic plane on which society rests. In China and about the Mediterranean deforestation has produced momentous changes. Mining, clearing, "breaking," reclaiming, inclosing, improving, as well as the destruction of pests, have a dynamic effect, seeing they lessen the material they have to work upon. The digging of the precious metals renders them in time so plentiful that the money economy supplants the natural economy and society is profoundly transformed. The casual acclimatiza-

[1] "La civilisation et les grands fleuves," p. 225.

tion of alien economic plants and animals in a region may prevent social standstill.

Certain modifications of the human breed come about as accumulated incidental effects. As the ax devours the forest and the plow the prairie, the hunting and nomad types starve and man is tamed. Trade in time eliminates the impulsive type and fills the earth with calculators. The migration of the energetic in quest of better opportunities, by bringing them into flourishing communities where they have larger families than the stay-at-homes, builds up an energetic breed.[1] With the lapse of generations, an institution like monasticism or sacerdotal celibacy by its unnoticed selective working alters the bench-mark of race-fiber to which all social structures conform. A bloody penal system, besides intimidating the evil-disposed, incidentally extirpates the criminal type, and so paves the way for a milder code. Monogyny, child-marriage, primogeniture, indiscriminate almsgiving, religious persecution, and militarism all accumulate unsuspected but far-reaching results.

History furnishes striking instances of large changes brought about by processes which left behind them *a little more or less* of something. The destruction of the middle class, the *curiales,* in later Roman society was brought about by the prolonged operation of an iniquitous tax system which ground them slowly to powder.[2] In the Dark Ages the

[1] See the last paper in this book.

[2] Dill, "Roman Society," Bk. III, ch. II. Seeck, *op. cit.,*

short-sighted practice of rewarding military services with estates, which, at first granted for life, later became inheritable, eventually dissipated the resources of the crown and led to the decentralization seen in the feudal system.[1] In the course of centuries the death-bed gifts of the rich to religious corporations accumulated a fifth of the soil of Europe in the "dead hand," and thus profoundly modified the position of the Church. The oppressive exercise of jurisdiction by the great proprietors of mediæval Germany pressed down the peasants one after another into a servile condition, until at last free cultivators ceased to exist. The similar practice of certain Southern justices of to-day in imposing on negroes excessive fines and binding them to work for the planter who pays the fine, will, if unchecked, gradually remand the colored race into slavery.

Even the progress of the arts and sciences, usually so prolific in social changes, is not always due to irruptions from the individual brain. The right form of a tool may come from an ingenious mind, or from trying every possible form and noting which one works best. The dressing of skins or the fashioning of pots may improve by the mere comparing of the results of different treatments. A fisher-folk may arrive at the correct lines for the boat by observing the behavior of craft variously shaped according to accident or individual caprice. The

vol. II. Fustel de Coulanges, "Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France," vol. I, Bk. II, ch. VI.

[1] Kowalewsky, "Oekonomische Entwickelung Europas," vol. II, chs. I and II.

emergence of a standard pattern of bow, or pot, or snow-shoe, or hut is sometimes *development* rather than *invention*—a precipitate from collective experience rather than the happy thought of some clever wight. Fin and flipper and leg and wing were built by the blind accumulation of fortuitous variations, and it is likely that some of man's achievements have come by the method of trial and error continued through generations.

Science, too, although supposed to rise by strokes of genius alone, has something of the inevitable in its ascent, owing to the accumulation of facts recorded by generations of observers. The early priesthoods scanned the heavens till periods and orbits stared at them out of their own records. Think of the long collective labor by which the Toltecs ascertained the length of the solar year as 365¼ days and instituted a cycle of fifty-two years at the end of which the calendar was rectified by intercalation! Proverbs are the slow deposit of collective experience. Even the gods are evolved rather than invented. The nature gods, at least, pass through a period of probation, and only those are finally adopted by the tribe which have established a long and brilliant record as success-bringers.[1]

Next to the *statico-dynamic processes* come *transmutations.* These are changes of an involuntary character due to the difficulty one generation has in accurately reproducing the copy set by its predeces-

[1] Payne, "History of America," vol. I, pp. 439-440.

sor. The speech of parents being imperfectly imitated by their children, there results that accumulation of minute unnoticed changes which is described by the Law of Transmutation of vowels and consonants. Refracted through successive scribes, pictographs drift into conventional ideographic characters. Natural gestures and actions become fossilized into meaningless forms. Metaphors cease, after a few generations, to call up images of objects or actions. Coins cast at first as miniature spades or knives drift into unrecognizable shapes.[1] An epithet of a deity comes finally to designate a new deity distinct from the old.[2] The unconscious logic of the mind metamorphoses a god of the soil, first into a god of rain, and then into a god of thunder and lightning.[3]

Institutions and relations likewise glide insensibly into forms that would not consciously be assumed. Presents freely given to a chief pass into presents expected and finally demanded, while volunteered help passes into exacted service. Among the Greeks there was "a gradual transition from the primitive idea of a personal goddess, Themis, attached to Zeus, first to his sentences or orders called Themistes, and next by a still farther remove to various established customs which these sentences were believed to sanctify." The most common and convenient article of wealth gradually establishes itself as a medium of

[1] Simcox, "Primitive Civilization," vol. II, pp. 58, 59.
[2] Barton, "A Sketch of Semitic Origins," pp. 187, 190.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

exchange. Bank-notes, issued as certificates of deposit of coin and redeemable on demand, come at last to be looked upon as real money, and circulate long after the tradition of the old right of redemption has been lost and the original deposit dissipated.[1] Often it is by an imperceptible process that lordship ripens into property. In India minor officers, courtiers, and servants "were provided for by being allowed to take, in individual villages, the whole or part of the Raja's grain."[2] "In time these claims always develop into a landlord right over the village."[3] "The change from revenue-manager to landlord was accomplished in about a century."[4] An ethical religion tends to become external and perfunctory, owing to the fact that its spirit is more quickly altered in transmission than its form. The force of gravity which makes even the glacier flow has its analogue in human indolence, which will unwittingly deform the most sacred commands and the most authoritative ideals, if they run counter to natural inclination and have not been fixed in writing.

Passing now from *statico-dynamic processes* and *transmutations* as factors of social change to *stimuli,* we have first to remark that the quest for these is made difficult by the fact that a brusque revolution

[1] Dunbar, "Theory and Practice of Banking," ch. VIII.
[2] Baden-Powell, "The Land Systems of British India," vol. II, p. 224.
[3] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 131.
[4] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 186.

in the conditions of life or thought produces not sudden but gradual changes in society. Removal to a new environment, the change from peace to war or *vice versa,* contact with an alien culture, the introduction of a new agent of production — any one of these may suddenly shift the plane of existence for a people, and necessitate extensive social readjustments. Yet, owing to mental inertia and the selfish resistance of interested classes, such readjustments are apt to be spread over a considerable period. The shock received within a twelvemonth may echo and reverberate for a whole generation. It is because a given stimulus does not cause a prompt and equally vigorous pulsation in social life, but brings in a long train of adaptations, some of them at several removes from the original center of disturbance, that it is so difficult to connect social transformations with their primary causes. Moreover, a succession of dissimilar and unrelated stimuli from different quarters may yield a continuity of social change which will foster the false impression that the transformations of society occur in a fixed order, each state drawing after it the succeeding state, according to some necessary order of "development."

With this caution let us now take up, one after another, the chief extra-social or sub-social factors of social change, and ascertain the characteristic workings of each.

I. *The Growth of Population.* — This phenomenon presents two cases. In the one case the rate

of increase is practically the same for all parts of the population; in the other case the various classes and sections multiply at diverse rates. The former case will be considered first.

A uniform increase of numbers throughout society, while it does not directly disturb the relations of the parts, changes the relation of population to land, and thus intensifies the exertions needed to procure subsistence. This stress incites to new ways of exploiting the environment, which in turn bring individuals into new relations to one another, and so cause modification of the social structure. The advance from the hunting to the pastoral stage did not follow promptly the domestication of animals, but often awaited the pressure of population. Man seems first to have tamed animals for amusement. In Africa we find the Ovambo "very rich in cattle and fond of animal diet, yet their beasts would seem to be kept for show rather than for food."[1] Says Bücher: "Generally speaking, the possession of cattle is for the negro peoples merely 'a representation of wealth and the object of an almost extravagant veneration'—merely a matter of fancy."[2] An Indian village in the interior of Brazil "resembles a great menagerie . . . . ; but none of the many animals are raised because of the meat or for other economic purpose."[2] "On the whole, then, no importance can be attached to cattle-raising in the produc-

[1] Quoted by Ely, "Evolution of Industrial Society," p. 39.
[2] "Industrial Evolution," p. 51.

tion of the food supplies of primitive peoples."[1] The motor, then, that urges a primitive people on into the pastoral state is either the growing scarcity of game (a "cumulative effect"), or the increase of numbers.

The same driving force caused man to pass from herdmanship to tillage. Of the Navajos we read:[2] "Indian corn . . . . was known to them apparently from the earliest times, but while they remained a mere hunting tribe, they detested the labor of planting. But as their numbers increased, the game, more regularly hunted, became scarce, and to maintain themselves in food, necessity forced them to a more general cultivation of corn, and the regular practice of planting became established among them." Says Baden-Powell:[3] "Necessity has forced Rajputs and others to take to agriculture." Wallace writes:[4] "The prospect of starvation is, in fact, the cause of the transition [to agriculture] probably in all cases, and certainly in the case of the Bashkirs." Von Middendorf says:[5] "Only the poorest Kirghises, driven by want, engage in tillage." An ancient chronicle, alluding to the passage from pasturage to agriculture in seventh-century Ireland, says: "Because of the abundance of the households, in their period, therefore

[1] "Industrial Evolution," p. 52.
[2] Stephen, "The Navajo," *American Anthropologist,* vol. VI, p. 347.
[3] "The Land Systems of British India," vol. I, p. 135.
[4] "Russia," vol. II, p. 46.
[5] "Einblick in das Ferghana-Thal," p. 187.

it is that they [the sons of Æd Slane] introduced boundaries in Ireland."[1] Jenks tells us that the earliest cultivators of the soil were "strangers attached to the tribe upon whom the rough work of the community fell, and who would be the first to suffer from scarcity of food."[2] Elsewhere we are told: "When hemmed in by impassable barriers or invincible enemies, pastoral tribes under the pressure of increasing population slowly become agricultural."[3] To the same force is due the change from extensive and shifting cultivation, where after a crop or two the cultivator makes a fresh clearing, to intensive agriculture, where by an alternation of crops and fallow the same land is used in perpetuity.

Now, by causing these economic changes the movement of population becomes a primary cause of the changes in social organization to which they give rise. The adoption of pastoral pursuits converts the savage pack into the tribe, institutes property, establishes male kinship, develops patriarchal authority, favors polygyny and wife-purchase, makes woman a chattel, causes captives to be enslaved instead of eaten, and substitutes the *wergeld* for the blood-feud. The adoption of agriculture changes the nature of the social bond. Says Maine:[4] "From the moment a tribal community settles down finally upon a definite space of land, the land begins

[1] Quoted, Jenks, "History of Politics," p. 46.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 58.
[3] E. V. Robinson, "War and Economics," *Pol. Science Quarterly*, vol. XV, p. 584.
[4] "Early History of Institutions," p. 72.

to be the basis of society in place of kinship." It breaks up the tribe into clans which become village communities. The back-breaking toil induces a resort to systematic slavery and the slave trade. Where settlement has already occurred, the passage from simple collection to tillage causes a passage from the large patriarchal household to the simple family, and from family property in land to individual property with the right of bequest.[1]

After agriculture is adopted, the increase of population does not cease to be a dynamic factor. The land is progressively occupied, until at last the laborer has no longer a direct access to natural resources, but must offer his services for wages. When this point is reached, slavery and serfdom begin to disappear, for coercion is no longer necessary to secure a sufficient supply of laborers. The expansion of population compels a resort to inferior soils. This, by enhancing the value of the better tracts and increasing the landowner's share of the produce, engenders an agricultural aristocracy, which, in proportion as it withdraws itself from labor and centers its attention on war and politics, becomes master of the community.[2]

Again, the enlargement of demand in consequence of the increase of numbers enables an exchange economy to take the place of domestic husbandry, perhaps causes a foreign trade to spring up. The growth of potential exchange, in consequence of

[1] Demolins, "Les Francais d'aujourd'hui."
[2] Guiraud, "La propriété foncière en Grèce," pp. 128-130.

the greater local surpluses to be disposed of and the greater local deficits to be supplied from outside sources, makes it worth while to create avenues of communication, and these, in turn, promote the territorial division of labor. The growth of numbers in a region cannot but strain its natural resources in certain respects and compel the local population to supply their lack of certain commodities from the larger resources of some other locality, sending out in return those products of their own region which are to be had in the greatest abundance. Besides thus calling into being merchants, markets, and movements of goods, the expansion of population causes local groups of craftsmen to spring up for the supplying of articles formerly demanded in quantities too small to set up currents of trade. In place of the transitory assemblages at fairs, there now appear town populations regularly exchanging their wares with the country.

The growing prominence of exchange brings men into unwonted relations, which presently call forth an expansion of law on the commercial side. The appearance of routes traversing many jurisdictions, and the need of a more perfect security for goods *en route* or in a market, create a demand for royal protection and cement that alliance of the nascent merchant-artisan groups with the king which is so potent in humbling the feudal lords. In his struggle with the barons the monarch, finding his surest support in the burgher population, picks from them his agents and servants, and the choicest of these, en-

nobled by royal patent, take their places alongside the old territorial aristocracy.

The towns which arose in the Middle Ages to meet the economic needs of an expanding population became the starting-point of social and political developments quite tangential to the institutions of the time. The feudal manor was a type of constrained association; the town, a form of free association. "City air makes free." Outside the town the industrial classes were servile, and a stigma attached to labor; inside, labor was honored, and the workman felt joy and pride in his work. Outside, fighting and working were distinct professions; inside, the burgher labored or fought as occasion required. Outside was rigid hereditary caste; inside, men came into numerous and fluid relationships. The town, in fact, contained the germ of a distinct social growth. How pregnant is the overflow of population into towns appears from the fact that town life develops a mentality of its own, more impressionable and plastic than that of the country. Here outworn traditions and narrow local sentiments and obstinate prejudices meet and cancel one another. Races fuse and intermarry. There appear new combinations of hereditary factors. Variation is more common. The shutters of the intellect are taken down. The mind becomes alert and supple. Freed from the hampering net of kin and class ties, the *individual* appears. The town is, therefore, a hotbed, where seed-ideas quickly germinate. Its progressive population soon places itself at the head of

the social procession and sets the pace for the slower country-dwellers.

The city, less traditional than the country, values men according to some present fact—their efficiency or their wealth, rather than their family. It is democratic or plutocratic in temper, whereas the country is the natural support of aristocracy. In the city people consume, as it were, in one another's presence, and hence their expenditure conforms more to the canon of Conspicuous Waste than does that of countrymen. The multiplication of merely conventional wants arouses energy, intensifies competition, whets egoism, and restricts the size of the family.

The increase of social mass has various effects upon regulative institutions. A lateral extension of society, by causing distinctions to arise between local chiefs and the head chief, between local priests and the high priest, favors the formation of hierarchies. The growth of the aggregate causes a differentiation between sacred and secular functionaries, between military and civil heads, and between judicial, legislative, and executive offices. The heavier burden of business compels the ruler to surround himself with helpers, who in turn require other helpers, until government structure becomes complex. Power is deputed and re-deputed. Control comes into the hands of the leisured or the trained. The exclusion of the poorer classes from the government of the Roman republic in its later period was due to its expansion. "Now that Rome had ceased to be a

purely Italian state, and had adopted Hellenic culture, it was no longer possible to take a small farmer from the plow and set him at the head of the community."[1] Eventually, owing to the overflow of population into the great burgess-colonies, and the diffusion of the Romans throughout the peninsula, the absolute centralization in the one focus of Rome was given up, and a municipal system was instituted for Italy which permitted the formation of smaller civic communities within the Roman community.[2] "Under Chlodovech and his immediate successors," we read,[3] "the People, assembled in arms, had a real participation in the resolutions of the king. But with the increasing size of the kingdom, the meeting of the entire people became impossible." In New England, after the local community reaches a certain size, the annual town-meeting is replaced by the government of mayor and council.

There is, furthermore, reason to believe that the formation of large, dense, complex bodies of population is favorable to the growth of a belief in the rights of man as man and to the spread of ideas of human equality, *i. e.*, of the habits of thought that underlie individualism and democracy.

So far, the growth of population has been assumed to proceed at an equal rate throughout society. If, now, it be assumed that the rate of increase is sensibly unequal, a new set of consequences appears.

[1] Mommsen, "History of Rome," vol. II, p. 384.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 451-453.
[3] Richter, "Annalen der deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter," pp. 119-120.

The resulting inequality of pressure—providing the distribution of life-opportunities remains the same—will cause people to pass from class to class and from place to place. City dwellers never keep abreast of country dwellers in reproduction, and hence the city has constantly to be fed with the overflow from the farms. One consequence is that the city never becomes traditional and static, as it might well do if it grew from its own loins. Another result is the gradual depletion of the eugenic capital of the rural population—*e. g.*, the increasing brachycephaly of France within historic times—owing to the continual drain of its best elements to the cities. As the towns draw from the fields, so the fertile valleys, sterilized by their very prosperity, draw from the barren uplands streams of migrants representing the peoples beaten in ancient conquests.

It may happen that the distinct types in the population—the martial and the industrial, the imaginative and the calculating, the "ideo-motor" and the "critical-intellectual" — come under diverse influences which make their rates of reproduction unequal, and so change their numerical proportions. Every such shifting of the predominant type is marked by important vicissitudes in society.

The unequal increase of population on the opposite sides of a frontier finally sets up a current of migration which replaces one race, language, or civilization by another, thereby entailing changes in society. If the frontier is a political one, the movement is likely to take the form of an armed invasion,

and the society must sustain the shock of war. It is now understood that the assaults of the Germans upon the Roman Empire were prompted by overpopulation, and the eventual failure to withstand them was due to the fact that infecundity had reduced the Empire to a hollow shell.

II. *The Accumulation of Wealth.*—The progress of wealth, and the expansion of income which attends the control of a growing mass of capital, have a transforming effect on society. Even a general movement of prosperity shared in by all is a dynamic factor. The enlarged production shows itself, not along the entire line of commodities, but chiefly in the higher grades of goods, and in comforts and luxuries. These qualitative changes in production cannot but result in the transfer of labor and capital from certain occupations to others, from extractive to elaborative industries, from the production of goods to the supplying of services, from certain centers and regions to other centers and regions. Manufactures and foreign trade will be stimulated. Redistributions of population will take place between country and city, between districts producing necessaries and districts that produce luxuries. The preponderating importance of capital enhances the sacredness of property in law and in morals, strengthens government as a property-protecting agency, and exalts the virtues of frugality and thrift.

At the same time, the enlarged consumption of goods tends to bring about social changes. Crime

becomes less serious than vice, so that moral injunctions aim less to restrain men from aggression than to fortify them against the temptations to over-indulgence. Human depravity is doubted, and belief in future retribution dies out. The God of Fear yields to the God of Love. In worship, praise gains at the expense of prayer. To guide men, amid the greater variety of consumables, toward certain harmonious groupings of goods, numerous standards of consumption are erected.

It is hardly to be expected, however, that in the accumulation of capital all portions of society will participate to the same degree. Some will distance others, and those who thus become differentiated from the rest in respect to possessions will eventually segregate into a distinct social class. For capital is not merely economic power; *it is latent social power.* Those of superabundant wealth in time convert portions of it into political power, legal privileges, and invidious social preferences and exemptions, all serving to mark them off from the rest of the community. In other words, an aristocracy may originate, quite apart from conquest, quite apart from royal grace, in the mere fact of superior riches. "The heroes of the Homeric poems," says Maine,[1] "are not only valiant, but wealthy; the warriors of the *Nibelungen Lied* are not only noble, but rich. In the later Greek literature we find pride of birth identified with pride in seven wealthy ancestors." Among the ancient Irish the nobles are in

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

seven grades, distinguished chiefly by wealth. At the bottom of the scale is the Aire-desa and "the Brehon law provides that when the Bo-Aire has acquired twice the wealth of an Aire-desa and has held it for a certain number of generations, he becomes an Aire-desa himself."[1] The possession of resources sufficient to enable one to fight on horseback rather than on foot has become the germ of knighthood the world over. Out of it grew the Greek *hippeis,* the Roman Equestrian Order, the Gaulish *equites,* and the mediæval knighthoods.

The appearance of a body of wealthy persons overthrows that primitive political equality of citizens based upon their like capacity to bear arms in defense of the commonwealth. Clients and retainers multiply, and these natural partisans of the rich undermine the burgess class. Not only is the possession of great wealth generally felt to afford a presumption of superiority, but the position of the poorer citizens is weakened by their economic dependence. "It is by taking stock that the free Irish tribesman becomes the Ceile or Kyle, the vassal or man of his chief, owing him not only rent, but service and homage."[2] Meanwhile, the proprietors, freed from labor, devote themselves to war and politics, and, since they are well accoutred and expert in weapons, they finally prove themselves more than a match for the *plebs.*

Besides political inequality, the differentiation by

[1] Maine, *op. cit.,* p. 136.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 158.

possessions entails various other secondary forms of differentiation. Service in the Roman cavalry, originally obligatory upon all who could furnish two horses, became after a time a badge of superiority. Men of standing remained in the cavalry after they had become incapacitated by age. "Young men of rank more and more withdrew from serving in the infantry, and the legionary cavalry became a close aristocratic corps."[1] By the time of Sulla the dying out of the sturdy farmer class and the formation of an urban rabble had converted the Roman army "from a burgess force into a set of mercenaries who showed no fidelity to the state at all, and proved faithful to the officer only when he had the skill personally to gain their attachment."[2] Finally the rich come to feel that wealth ought to buy its possessor clear of every onerous duty. In Cæsar's time "in the soldiery not a trace of the better classes could any longer be discovered. In law the general obligation to bear arms still subsisted; but the levy took place in the most irregular and unfair manner. Numerous persons liable to serve were wholly passed over. . . . . The Roman burgess cavalry now merely vegetated as a sort of mounted noble guard, whose perfumed cavaliers and exquisite high-bred horses only played a part in the festivals of the capital; the so-called burgess infantry was a troop of mercenaries, swept together

[1] Mommsen, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 379.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 455.

from the lowest ranks of the burgess population."[1]

Other differentiations are connected with certain ideas which naturally strike root in a society marked by great pecuniary inequality. One is the notion that *it is disgraceful to take money for work.* The effect of this is to raise a wall of partition between the laborer or artisan and the respectable landlord or manufacturer, between the private and the officer, between the clerk and the magistrate. Akin to this is the idea that *labor is not respectable.* Springing up among the wealthy after they have withdrawn from all public duties and become a leisure class pure and simple, this notion, descending through society by deferential imitation, aggregates the discontent and envy of the poor, and causes work to be shunned as much on account of its stigma as on account of its irksomeness. Finally comes the notion that *human worth is measured, not by achievements or personal qualities, but by the scale of consumption.* This exalts pecuniary emulation above all other forms of rivalry, and engenders a host of purely factitious wants which call into being an insensate luxury at the top of society; then, percolating down through the social strata, these wants divert a serious proportion of income from the service of real human needs. The joint operation of these principles eventually raises the craving for wealth to an extravagant pitch and depresses the worth of everything else. These effects appeared most nakedly in the Rome of the last age of the republic,

[1] Mommsen, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 581.

where the slave economy had completely wiped out the middle class. Says Mommsen: "To be poor was not merely the sorest disgrace and the worst crime, but the only disgrace and the only crime; for money the statesman sold the state and the burgess sold his freedom; the post of the officer and the vote of the juryman were to be had for money; for money the lady of quality surrendered her person as well as the common courtesan; the falsifying of documents and perjuries had become so common that in a popular poet of this age an oath is called 'the plaster for debts.' Men had forgotten what honesty was; a person who refused a bribe was regarded, not as an upright man, but as a personal foe."[1] There was "nothing to bridge over or soften the fatal contrast between the world of the beggars and the world of the rich."[2] "The wider the chasm by which the two worlds were externally divided, the more completely they coincided in the like annihilation of family life . . . . in the like laziness and luxury, the like unsubstantial economy, the like unmanly dependence, the like corruption differing only in its scale, the like criminal demoralization, the like longing to begin the war with property."[2]

The misery of the multitude was such that free men not infrequently sold themselves to the contractors for board and wages as gladiatorial slaves. The obsequious deference of legal canons to economic realities appears from the fact that the juris-

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 616.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 621.

consults of the period pronounced lawful and actionable the contract of such a gladiatorial slave "to let himself be chained, scourged, burned, or killed, without opposition, if the laws of the institution should so require."

Changes in taste, the growth and redistribution of population, the shifting of trade routes, mechanical inventions, discovery of natural deposits, or increase in local security, cause wealth to well up at new spots or to come into new hands. If it is true that capital is a kind of crude power which may be refined, transmuted and differentiated into nearly all forms of the Desirable, then New Wealth will be pregnant with social change. Such, indeed, is the fact. The first full-fledged aristocracy is based on agricultural profits, for among the sources of early revenue land alone possesses that stability which is necessary in order that the merely rich may ripen into a true nobility. If, however, by the side of the blue-blooded territorial aristocracy there forms a considerable body of plebeian rich, the social structure is at once subject to a strain which sooner or later will modify it. It matters not whether the source of these fortunes be piracy, commerce, manufacture, colonial exploitation, tax-farming, or finance; money is power and ultimately contrives to register itself in super-economic forms. The fall of the Greek aristocracies was due to the fortunes made in commerce, navigation and manufacture. The Eupatrids, absorbed in war and politics and content to leave the working of their land to

serfs, were confronted by new men who, by clearing and inclosure, sometimes by marriage, had become owners of landed estates. The assault of these upstarts on the political monopoly of the old territorial nobility began the movement which ended at last in democracy. Thucydides declares that the increase in the number of people of means brought about an irresistible demand for a larger participation in government, and that this triumph of property over birth occurred usually in states where property was most diffused, and where maritime commerce, industry, and financial speculation were most developed. Caius Graccus carried his reforms and broke down the governing aristocracy of Rome by turning over to the rich speculator and merchant class, that had grown up outside the old senatorial nobility, the farming of all the Asiatic provinces and the control of the jury courts.

In the Middle Ages flourishing commercial or mining towns bought of their lords the grant of special rights and immunities, and thus virtually ransomed themselves out of the feudal system. In France the first extra-feudal fortunes originated in the farming of taxes. Later, commerce and manufacturing created a wealthy class upon which the monarch constantly leaned when extending his authority at the expense of the feudal *seigneurs*. About the beginning of the seventeenth century the proud Duke of Sully laments[1] that "at this day . . . when everything is rated by the money which it

[1] "Memoirs," vol. II, p. 222.

brings, this generous body of nobility is brought into comparison with the managers of the revenue, the officers of justice, and the drudges of business." Finally, can anyone doubt that the strong tendency in the new extra-European societies toward popular government and the democratic spirit finds at least one of its ultimate roots in the diffusion of opportunities to accumulate property brought about by the presence of free land?

III. *Migration to a New Environment.*—Here again we have two cases: (*a*) when the new (physical) environment is similar to the old; (*b*) when it is essentially different. The first is exemplified when colonies are established on the same parallel or, better yet, on the same isotherm with the mother-country. Here the chief cause why the new society varies from the old is the fact that in the colony the proportion between people and land is totally different from that in the home country. Coming from an old, highly diversified and differentiated society, the colonists, owing to the abundance of their land, find themselves thrown back into the stage of extensive agriculture, or even of herdsmanship. Moreover, being more favorable to production than to consumption, the colony attracts the active, but contains few persons living on incomes derived exclusively from ownership. For these reasons the new society by no means reproduces all the characteristics of the mother-society. Labor is honored. Achievement rather than enjoyment is its ideal of life. Vigor and efficiency are more esteemed than

graces and refinements. The lack of cities, of intercourse, and of leisure is unfavorable to the cultivation of the sciences or the fine arts. The scarcity of labor is apt to lead to the enslavement of weaker races. The community being little differentiated economically or socially, manhood rather than property controls the commonwealth, the temper is individualistic and liberty-loving, and popular institutions take root. Equality before the law is insisted on. Primogeniture is renounced. The state has little power to withstand public opinion. The spell of tradition is broken and the hereditary principle is weak. The spirit of society is either humanitarian or plutocratic, but not aristocratic.

Owing to the growth of numbers, however, such a society will in time approximate the mother-society, unless its early spirit becomes so crystallized in ideals and institutions as to control its later development. If, on the other hand, migration takes place to an unlike physical environment—as when northerners occupy a tropical island, mountaineers descend to the seacoast, or a maritime people removes to an inland plateau—the new social development may be quite tangent to the old. Here the chief transforming factor is not Climate or Aspect of Nature working directly on people, but radical change of occupation, working first on habits and ideas, and then on social relationships and institutions. What the direction of variation will be it is, of course, impossible to predict, unless the nature of the new environment is specified.

IV. *The Innovating Individual.* — While the growth of numbers or the accumulation of wealth seems to move all societies through the same series of stages, their dependence on inventions forbids us to look for a single route of development traversed by all peoples. For, since inventions have no fixed order of appearance, the succession of social changes, so far as it is controlled by them, is not law-abiding, and cannot be predicted.

The innovating individual, as a factor of social change, needs to be clearly distinguished from the Great Man who in the pre-scientific days held the center of the stage. We are coming to recognize that most of the important achievements from the plow and the loom to the steam engine and the telegraph may be resolved into a long series of very short steps which were taken one after another, frequently by different individuals, separated perhaps by wide intervals of time and space. To make Tubal-Cain stand for the working of metals, Gutenberg for printing, and Watts for the steam engine is like attributing the Pentateuch to Moses, the Psalms to David, and the *Iliad* to Homer. The popular mind spares itself effort by crediting the house to the man who lays the last tile and allowing his coworkers to drop out of view. History, however, far from gratifying these hero-worshiping propensities, shows that nearly every truth or mechanism is the fusion of a large number of original ideas proceeding from numerous collaborators, most of whom have been forgotten. The resolving of human

achievement into the contributions of tens of thousands of innovating individuals has, therefore, little in common with the theory of progress that gives the glory to a few Great Men.

Nor can it be granted, as some insist, that every social variation comes about by the generalizing of some individual's invention. To be sure, the fire drill, the gun, or the printing press existed as a thought before it existed as a fact. Each of the little inventive exploits which fuse into an achievement like articulate speech, or the art of building, or the sewing machine, can be traced to an individual mind. It originates in a unique thought, not a *more* or *less* of something. It is not a chance outcome of the activities of several individuals. On the other hand, a social custom, relationship, institution, or grouping need not be conceived in thought before it exists in reality. It may be an unconscious development, the casual resultant of diverse factors. It may come about because the sum of the *plus* forces has come to exceed the sum of the *minus* forces. Aristotle feels justified in distinguishing monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and in regarding the passage from one form to another as social change. Yet the basis for his classification of governments is purely quantitative difference—whether power is in the hands of the One, the Few, or the Many. The town is a distinct social formation, yet it arises without forethought by man after man leaving his clod and going where Opportunity beckons. Spontaneous, likewise, is the origin of the division of labor

between districts and between crafts. After tillage is begun, the blood-bond *grows* into the place-bond; but who would think of saying that the hollow log *grows* into the canoe, or the candle *grows* into the arc light? The economist sharply contrasts *custom* and *competition,* yet the transition from the one to the other never comes about through an individual's initiative. Polygamy and monogamy were not invented, nor did divorce begin with some bold spirit, as did tracheotomy and the use of ether. No one now believes that slavery came or went with a shifting of speculative ideas. The proverbial impotency of preaching shows that the standards which fix the moral plane of a people do not ordinarily spread abroad from some ethical innovator, but spring naturally from the life-situation in which the majority find themselves.

Again, it is an error to suppose that the series of transforming innovations are as many and as distinct as are the orders of social phenomena. This assumption overlooks the *consensus* that binds together the spheres of social life. Religion is changed not only by distinctively religious innovations, but also by the influence of transformations wrought by mechanical inventions. A readjustment of the family relations may be brought about by the state, which has become powerful enough to intervene in domestic matters because an invention like gunpowder, which gives the Attack an advantage over the Defense, makes for political integration. Sometimes the long chain of social causes reminds

one of the way cats favor stock-raising. The cats keep down the mice which destroy the nests of the bumblebees which fertilize the blossoms of the clover that fattens the cattle.

Between the orders of social phenomena the causal currents run every way, but it is likely that by far the greater number radiate from two primary centers, viz., the series of conceptual changes—the religio-scientific innovations—and the series of practical changes—the industrial-military inventions. Here originate the chief determining influences which reverberate throughout society. The ultimate cause of ethical change is rarely a new ideal of conduct. Few political changes are wrought by the promulgation of a new principle or the invention of a new expedient. Artistic progress is usually referable to new knowledge or to new wealth. Most of the transforming impulses that have their origin in culture appear to radiate from (*a*) the invention of labor-saving devices, (*b*) the improvement of the means of transport and communication, (*c*) new conceptions of the Unseen, and (*d*) the discovery of scientific truth.

The key to the paradox that the strictly *social* changes originate less in political, ethical, and æsthetic innovations than in industrial inventions, geographical discoveries, and scientific or speculative ideas, is the fact that the latter are *condition-making.* Since there is no herdsmanship without the taming of animals, no agriculture without the domestication of plants, no water communication without the boat,

no sea commerce without the compass, invention has much to do with that expansion of population or of wealth which, as above shown, is so pregnant with social change. The modes of production, moreover, act directly upon the size and structure of the family and the working group. The inventions pertaining to warfare have been fateful for the replacement of the less ingenious races by the more ingenious and for the development of all forms of subordination and race-parasitism. Every martial invention, according as it has favored the Attack or the Defense, has disturbed the balance between great states and small states, between central government and local groups, between exploiters and exploited. Next in rank are the inventions that have facilitated transportation and communication — wheeled vehicle, boat, sail, compass, rail, steam. Besides their obvious economic effects, these have called into being that center of radiation, the city, promoted far-reaching diffusions and rapid assimilations, hastened blendings of blood and crossings of cultures, abolished frontiers, widened the areas of peace, favored the formation of vast political units, and superseded local association by national and international association. More than this, they necessarily accelerate progress by merging the peoples into a great human ocean that promptly transmits to all parts all the progressive impulses arising in each of the parts. Thus, at last, every section of mankind is served, not only by its own inventive spirits, but by all the productive geniuses of the whole human race. Finally

come the condition-making inventions embodied in languages, sciences, and speculations. Languages support the inter-mental activities by which large groups of like-minded are formed. The building of physical concepts and generalizations is indispensable to the progress of mechanical invention. Speculations regarding the Unseen have been of utmost moment, because they determine to what extent institutions and groupings shall be bound up with the gods. After a certain stage of conceptual thought is reached, the revolutions in ideas wrought by prophets and founders of religion become almost as striking in their social effects as the revolutions in the mode of production wrought by mechanical inventors.

Not always, however, are the social transformations wrought by innovators, unintended by-products of their thinking. In some cases a new institution, relation, or grouping springs directly from the individual mind. The Hebrew prophets who originated worship without sacrifice, and the Reformers who proclaimed "justification by faith," consciously severed the tie that binds layman to priest. With his principle that the ties of kinship should be wholly subordinated to the ties of belief, Mahomet gave a new basis to Arab society. Cæsar was a social inventor when he established the principle that insolvency shall not cost the debtor his freedom. So was St. Paul when he conceived that the gospel was for Gentiles as well as for Jews. So was St. Benedict when he devised the "Rule" that gave form to the

innumerable monastic communities of Western Europe. So was Hildebrand when he imposed sacerdotal celibacy upon the church. If we may believe Maine, the strong feeling among the Latin peoples in favor of portioning daughters is "descended by a long chain of succession from the obligatory provisions of the marriage laws of the emperor Augustus." Whoever conceived this *Lex Julia et Papia Poppæa* was in reality a social Edison. Pythagoras, St. Francis, and Loyola originated new types of religious con-fraternity. Henry IV instituted the invalid soldiers' home. Grotius modified the relations of nations. Robert Raikes invented the Sunday school, Toynbee the social settlement, Le Claire the profit-sharing group, Raffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch the coöperative credit association. Pinel and Tuke invented the modern insane hospital, Marbeau, the *crèche,* Howard and his successors, the reformatory.

We know, moreover, that the evolution of *law* is determined, not only by the development of social needs, but also by the original conceptions and ideas of individuals. Deuteronomy is a reformers' code embodying their ideals of law. Roman law was developed by the jurisconsults, the commentators, and the prætors. Mohammedan law has been built up by the Muftis, or doctors of law versed in the Koran. English law owes much to the decisions conceived by innovating judges or suggested by ingenious lawyers. The *Code Napoléon* is virtually a codification of Pothier's commentaries on the Civil Law. Fur-

thermore, the juridical speculations of Kant and Bentham have had far-reaching practical effects.

V. *The Contact and Cross-fertilization of Cultures.*—A society may be swerved from its natural orbit by borrowing institutions which have originated—whether by innovation or by adaptation—in some other society. We have only to recall how the Christian Church, Roman law, the feudal tenure, parliamentary government, the jury system, and the federal principle spread by imitation far beyond their original habitat. The Servian constitution of the Romans, which laid the duty of military service upon the possessors of land instead of upon the burgesses alone, was evidently, says Mommsen, "produced under Greek influence." Marcus Aurelius borrowed from the Germans the status of serfs or *liti.* The centralized government of Louis XIV. found imitators all over Europe. The spectacle of free institutions across the Channel was fatal to the old régime in France. The abolition of slavery, as now the woman's movement and social legislation, spread largely by national example. A true social evolution obeying resident forces has nearly disappeared from the face of the earth, seeing that to-day the germs of every new social arrangement are blown throughout the world, and peoples at the most diverse stages of culture are discarding their native institutions and eagerly adopting the jurisprudence, the laws, and the organization of the most advanced societies.

Such open-mindedness is, however, a rather re-

cent phenomenon. Usually the peoples have rejected alien *institutions,* but borrowed alien *elements of culture,* which, nevertheless, in time are likely to work social transformations. When a backward people is in contact with a highly cultured one, there occurs simple borrowing, but when the peoples are nearly abreast on different lines of development, one fructifies the other and a higher culture results. Just as the crossing of two strains may yield a creature superior to either, so the crossing of two cultures in the minds of an *élite* may initiate a superior civilization. One reason is that contact with a culture not too unlike one's own produces that open-mindedness so essential to progress. Another is that by retaining what is best in its own culture and replacing its poorer elements with superior elements from an alien culture, a people may create a blend surpassing both civilizations. Finally, the meeting in originative minds of dissimilar ideas or ideals may fecundate thought and produce a flood of inventions. It is thus that the meeting of Orient and Occident engendered neo-Platonism, and the mutual fertilization of Christian tradition and classic culture by the Revival of Learning produced the Renaissance.

The story of Israel strikingly illustrates the moulding of social destiny by the repeated interplay of foreign influence and native endowment. The nomadic Beni-Israel learned from the Canaanites what they knew of the raising of grain, the culture of the vine, the arts of the smith and the potter.

Other great waves of foreign influence came in as a consequence of Solomon's alliances.

> The horse took the place of the ass; metal weapons and tools supplanted the rude ones of flint and wood; walled cities arose on the sites of the primitive towns with their mud and stone hovels.[1]

The customs, institutions, and gods of Egypt, Tyre, and Damascus were also imported When Ahab sealed his alliance with Tyre,

> new ambitions filled the minds of the rude shepherds and farmers as they came into contact with foreign life and civilization. With Phœnician wares and customs came, inevitably, Phœnician religion.[2]

This influx precipitated a conflict between the rich and voluptuous Baal worship of Tyre, and the simple nomadic worship of Yahweh. In the heat and stress of this long struggle, the genius of the great literary prophets differentiated Yahweh, not only from the Syrian Baals, but also from his own original nature. The tribe-god became the God of the whole world, just and righteous Himself, and demanding justice and righteousness in His followers.

Although this burst of development evoked by conscious opposition to an alien culture followed its own lines, the Hebrew religion was not fixed until certain foreign strands had been woven into it. During the captivity of the Jews

> the literary habits, and above all the intense religious zeal of their conquerors, the Babylonians, undoubtedly influenced them. The dazzling spectacle of lordly temples and of a

[1] Kent, "History of the Hebrew People," vol. I, p. 180.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 48.

wealthy influential priesthood also could not have failed, indirectly at least, to foster the tendency towards ritualism.[1]

From the Persian religion Judaism received the idea of a resurrection with rewards and punishments, the idea of a hierarchy of messengers (angels) between God and man, the figure of Satan (Ahriman), and possibly the practice of meeting for prayer, singing, and reading from the sacred books.

Another great cross-fertilization occurred after Alexander's conquests and colonizations in Southwestern Asia and in Egypt had brought into closest contact the two great currents of ancient thought and culture. Much of the progress of civilization during the succeeding centuries records the conflicts and final fusion of the permanent elements in each.

Roman law owed much to the conjugation of diverse culture-elements. Says Mr. Bryce:[2]

> The contact with the Greek republics of Southern Italy in the century before the Punic Wars must have affected the Roman mind and contributed to the ideas which took shape in the *jus gentium*. . . . . The extension of the sway of Rome over many subject peoples had accustomed the Romans to other legal systems than their own and had led them to create bodies of law in which three elements were blent—the purely Roman, the provincial, and those general rules and maxims of common-sense justice and utility which were deemed universally applicable.

Our modern culture owes much to successive fermentations resulting from the contact of diverse elements. While Western Christendom was passing

[1] Kent, "History of the Jewish People," vol. I, p. 240.

[2] "Studies in History and Jurisprudence," vol. II, pp. 350-351.

through its darkest ages, the Mohammedans took up the Greek science with very great enthusiasm and earnestness, added to it whatever results of a similar sort they could find among any of the other peoples with whom they came in contact, and incorporated fresh developments of their own. The treasures of Arabic skill and science, communicated to Christendom through contact with the Moors, resulted in the burst of intellectual activity in the thirteenth century which recorded itself in Scholasticism. Two centuries later began that fertilization of the European mind through direct contact with Greek culture, which has fixed the methods and ideals of the thought and science of the modern world.

Nor has the process at the eastern focal point of human culture differed essentially from that at the western. Says Metchnikoff:[1]

> Whatever these heterogeneous tribes have of civilized life, Kalmucks of the Russian steppes and Annamites of Tonkin, Tunguses of Siberia, Manchus of the Amur and the Ussuri, mariners of Fokien and Canton, emanates from one and the same center of civilization, the "Land of the Hundred Families." . . . . Nor can one doubt that if Japan had not had the good fortune to light her torch at the fire of the Celestial Empire, she would perhaps have remained like the Philippines with their Tagals and their Visayas.

VI. *The Interaction of Societies.* — The actions and reactions among the parts of a society tend either to assimilate or to differentiate. Whether it takes the form of trade, of intellectual commerce, or

[1] "La civilisation et les grands fleuves," p. 321.

of social intercourse, interaction ordinarily brings about a mutual modification of ideas and feelings in the direction of greater agreement, which results in a more perfect solidarity. Trade, however, by leading to a territorial division of labor, may pave the way for local differentiation, and it is furthermore possible that social intercourse by disclosing unsuspected elements of friction may inspire antagonism rather than harmony.

Far more momentous, however, are the interactions between a society and other groups and masses in its environment. These interactions take the form of interchanges of goods or of men, and of conflict.

The springing up of commerce between societies hitherto self-sufficing makes them dependent on one another for certain articles and so constitutes them an enlarged economic unit. Meanwhile the balance of occupations within each group is overthrown, and the restoration of equilibrium may not occur without some institutional changes. Her trade with Europe is costing India her famous native arts and threatens those of Japan. In the fifteenth century the demand on the continent for English wool resulted in the conversion of fields into sheep pastures, the inclosure of much common land, the raising of rents, the eviction of customary tenants, a plethora of labor, and a freeing of the villeins from their ancient bondage. Cunningham tells us:[1]

[1] "Growth of English Industry and Commerce," vol. I, p. 403.

The slow agricultural revolution, which rendered their services less useful to the manorial lords, gradually set the villeins free by removing the interest their masters had in retaining their hold upon them.

Again, it is the rise of a foreign commerce that permits slavery to expand to wholesale proportions. Negro slavery would never have developed to such a scale and gotten such a hold upon our South had not Europe stood ready to absorb immense quantities of the plantation staple, cotton, and to supply those manufactures which slave labor is so unfitted to produce. Furthermore, if two societies that begin to exchange are unequally supplied with the money metal and are therefore on different price levels, the value of money will be altered in both, and the equilibrium between borrowers and lenders, capitalists and producers, may be temporarily ruptured.

The access of persons to a society may disturb the balance of power between classes and leave a mark on institutions. Maine points out[1] that the afflux of fugitives and broken men, *fuidhuirs,* enabled the Irish chief to fill the waste lands of his tribe with dependents who, being tenants-at-will and rack-rentable, seriously and permanently altered for the worse the position of the tribesmen who held stock of the chief and paid him rent. Likewise in Orissa:

So long as the land on an estate continued to be twice as much as the hereditary peasantry could till, the resident husbandmen were of too much importance to be bullied or squeezed into discontent. But once a large body of immi-

[1] "Early History of Institutions," p. 176.

grant cultivators had grown up, this primitive check on the landlord's exactions was removed.[2]

The immense nineteenth-century outflow of Western Europeans—of whom more than twenty millions came to the United States alone in eighty years—has had a great share in the recent transformations of European societies. The settling of vast fertile tracts coupled with the introduction of steam transportation developed an over-sea competition which has depressed agricultural profits in the Old World and diminished the landlord's share of the produce. The wages and status of the laborer have been raised, partly by the migration of his competitors, partly by cheaper food supplies and the springing up of manufacturing industries to supply the needs of the over-sea populations. The rent receiver has prospered less than the laborer and the capitalist, with the consequence that the political and social domination of the land-owning class is becoming a thing of the past, and the laws are written in the statute-book by the capitalist with some prompting from the laborer. Here is one cause at least of that seeming inevitableness of democracy which has mystified those philosophers who imagine that social destinies are settled solely by conflicts of ideas.

On the other hand, if enlarged interchanges of goods and migration of men should cause the cogs of Orient and Occident to engage until they form one economic system, there would ensue a redistribution of power among the classes in Occidental soci-

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 177. Quoted from Hunter.

ety that would aggravate rather than mitigate existing inequalities.

Still more momentous than the changes introduced by trade and migration are those resulting from the hostilities of societies. One of these effects is the strengthening of group-cohesion. It is now generally believed that the spread of feudal relations during the Dark Ages was due to the fact that "a little society compactly united under a feudal lord was greatly stronger for defense or attack than any body of kinsmen or co-villagers and than any assemblage of voluntary confederates,"[1] and that the insecurity following the break-up of the Roman Empire and the letting loose, first of the barbarians and later of the Northmen, drove men to the formation of such groups.

The Beni-Israel, who, after their settlement in Canaan, seemed fated to disintegrate into local communities, were welded into a nation by their wars with adjacent peoples. The Greek confederacies came into being in consequence of the struggle with Persia. Under the hammer of war the Germans, who presented themselves to Cæsar only in tribal relations, had by the fifth century become compacted into confederations of tribes, which later became homogeneous peoples. During her Hundred Years' War with England, France "acquired possession and consciousness of her life, her instincts, her genius, and her heart. She had been but a kingdom; she

[1] Maine, *op. cit.*, p. 155. See Fustel de Coulanges, "Les transformations de la royauté," pp. 575-6, 586-7, 676-682.

was now a nation. The idea of fatherland had become disengaged in her soul." The Netherlands were compacted by their war of liberation. In our own history we have but to recall the union of the New England colonies brought about by King Philip's War and the Confederation of thirteen colonies formed to make armed resistance to Great Britain.

Religious unity also is promoted by war. So long as they were undisturbed in the home they had won for themselves in Canaan, the Beni-Israel were apt to succumb to the seductions of the local Baal cults. But whenever stress and danger united them against a common foe, their loyalty to Yahweh, the god of their nomad life, was revived. The waves of foreign invasion that repeatedly broke upon them prevented their assimilation to the Canaanites and the consequent failure of their religious career.

War, moreover, creates headships, which, in case hostilities are prolonged, tend to become permanent and political. The Hebrew monarchy owed its origin to war. During peace Saul returned to his own estate and lived there with a few followers. As yet the people felt hardly any other obligation to their king than to rally about him in time of danger. David's conquests and successes, however, hardened the monarchy and gave it that solidity which enabled his son Solomon to supplant the tribal with the civil organization, lay taxes, levy *corvées,* conscript troops, establish a court, and create a new nobility. Centuries later the patriotic struggle against Anti-

ochus established the Asmonean dynasty. The Germanic invasions united the kingship with the leadership of the army, which had become permanent. "The military subordination under the king-leader furthered political subordination under the king." The Crusades, which were preached under the auspices of the popes, tended to aggrandize the papal authority within the church.

The grinding of people on people not only merges the civil with the military power, but may unite the secular power with the ecclesiastical. Buckle shows how the prolonged struggle of the Spaniards with the Moors identified the national creed with the national cause and produced that exaggeration of orthodoxy and loyalty which was so fatal to the intellectual freedom of the Spanish people. The long struggles of the East-European peoples with the heathen worked a like result. Says Sigel:[1]

> The wars of Byzantium, waged against the avowed enemies of the Orthodox Church, demonstrated the necessity of a close union of the State and the Church. . . . . The defense of itself and its faith against the avowed foes of Orthodoxy led Russian society to the necessity of subordinating all its powers to the State.

In various ways militant activities disturb the balance of power between social classes. For one thing the old nobility by blood is depressed in favor of the official nobility of the state.

> The noble by blood is to be found among the Frisians, the Saxons, the Anglo-Saxons, the Thuringians, the Bavarians.

[1] "Lectures on Slavonic Law," pp. 11, 13.

He is not to be found among the Franks, the Burgundians, the Goths, and the Lombards, who have had a hard struggle to establish themselves within the Empire. In the course of that struggle the new military institution, the State, has become strong; it has replaced the old nobility of blood with a new nobility of service.[1]

In England, similarly, "the Thanes deriving dignity and authority from the King absorb the older nobility of Earls."

Prolonged and unremunerative warfare conducted by levies of freeholders ruins the middle class. The exhausting duel between Israel and Damascus produced that evil state of affairs which roused the prophets Amos and Hosea. The small proprietors, who do most of the fighting but get least of the spoil, lost their lands during their absence in the field, and on their return debt brought them into slavery. The poor became dependent on the rich. Great estates took the place of small holdings. Palaces arose, and luxury, violence, and injustice filled the land. Likewise in early Rome

The burdensome and partly unfortunate wars, and the exorbitant taxes and task-works to which these gave rise, filled up the measure of calamity; so as either to deprive the possessor directly of his farm and to make him the bondman, if not the slave, of his creditor lord, or to reduce him through encumbrances practically to the condition of a temporary lessee of his creditor.[2]

In the France of Napoleon the fortunes of war may be read in the changing position of classes. The

[1] Jenks, "Law and Politics in the Middle Ages," p. 252.
[2] Mommsen, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 349.

victories of Jena and of Friedland "were followed by fresh attacks on the revolutionary manners and institutions." Austerlitz led Napoleon to the system of territorial privileges. Entail and primogeniture were restored in favor of noble families. Arbitrary restitutions of forests were illegally made to the *émigrés,* and thus were reconstructed the fortunes of the old families.

Sometimes a defensive struggle elevates an oppressed class. In consequence of the necessity, imposed by a dangerous war, of releasing insolvent debtors in order to fill the ranks of the army with sturdy husbandmen, the Roman *plebs* were enabled to extort from the ruling class the institution of two tribunes to protect the rights of the plebeians. Frequently a military exigency has given arms and freedom to slaves or wiped out old inequalities of civil status between the ethnic components of a population. Remote military enterprises may waste and weaken the ruling caste. The Crusades, appealing to the military-religious type, rid Europe of many turbulent nobles whose presence made order and industry well-nigh impossible. "The continued absence of the petty baronage in the East and its perpetual decimation under the pressure of debt and travel, battle and disease, helped to concentrate authority in the hands of the royal officers."[1] The establishment of order under a strong central authority made for commerce and the rise of towns. Taking advantage of the Crusader's need of cash.

[1] Archer and Kingsford, "The Crusades," p. 426.

the towns bought immunities of him, and the ecclesiastical corporations took a mortgage on his estate.

So far the reactions of conflict have been considered without reference to military success or failure. But it is now in order to point out that prosperous warfare yields economic results in the way of booty, captives, land, and tribute, and that the disposal of these is fateful for the victorious society. Maine notes "how uniformly, when our knowledge of the ancient world commences, we find plebeian classes deeply indebted to aristocratic orders." He suggests that the capital which Greek eupatrids, Roman patricians, and Gaulish *equites* lent to commoners at such usurious rates of interest as to degrade the borrowers and lead to violent movements for release, may have originated in the absorption by the noble classes of the lion's share of the spoils of war.[1] It is certain that the wealth in cattle which made the Irish chief richer than all his tribesmen originated in the perquisites of his position as military leader of the tribe. The disposition of the land won by the sword has important social results. The welfare of early Roman society depended greatly on whether the *ager publicus* was let in large parcels at a nominal rent to the aristocrats, or was allotted as homesteads to the commoners. The former policy fortified the patricians, the latter the plebeians in their two centuries of conflict. More decisive for Roman society than even the state lands was the glutting of the labor market with captives swept together by the

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 167-169.

incessant conquests of the state. Says Mommsen of the second century B. C.:

> Capital waged war on labor no longer in the unseemly fashion which converted the free man on account of debt into a slave, but, on the contrary, with slaves, regularly bought and paid for. . . . . The ultimate result was in both cases the same—the depreciation of the Italian farms; the supplanting of the petty husbandry, first in a part of the provinces, and then in Italy, by the farming of large estates; the prevailing tendency to devote the latter in Italy to the rearing of cattle, and the culture of the olive and the vine; finally, the replacing of the free laborers in the provinces as in Italy by slaves.[1]

Elsewhere he says emphatically:

> It was ancient social evils—at the bottom of all the ruin of the middle class by the slave proletariat—that brought destruction on the Roman commonwealth.[2]

To realize how parasitism may draw a society out of its true orbit, one has but to consider what would happen to us if the Occidentals should contrive to exploit the toiling yellow millions of the Orient. For one thing, such a colossal parasitic exploit would sharply arrest the rise of our working classes and block the path of democracy with a centralized bureaucratic machine. Says Mr. Hobson:[3]

> The greater part of western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the south of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland —little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 99.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 473.
[3] "Imperialism," p. 335.

and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen, and a large body of personal servants and workers in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa.

VII. *The Conjugation of Societies.*—There is no change of destiny more abrupt than that which occurs when two hitherto distinct societies yield up their identity in the formation of a single society. Of such conjugation there are two primary types, *juxtaposition* and *superposition.*

The merging of juxtaposed groups may come about either through alliance or through conquest. In the former case the train of consequences is about as follows: In some crisis neighboring peoples ally themselves, each, however, retaining its own customs and institutions. Thenceforth they have the same name and flag, are involved in a common enmity or friendship with other states, experience in common certain hopes and discouragements. In time union becomes a habit, and is kept up even if external pressure is removed. The memory of the old separateness fades and each people becomes less jealous of its political individuality. From generation to generation there is an increase in the number of matters with which the confederation is permitted to deal. A written instrument can retard, but cannot arrest, the decay of local institutions in favor of common institutions. After a civil war or two the confederation becomes a true nation within which

the process of assimilation may proceed until the old local groupings and feelings have quite disappeared.

If merging comes through conquest, the process is by no means the same. In this case the bond is not community of interest, but coercion, and hence feelings are aroused which interrupt the assimilation that naturally takes place between societies in peaceful contact. If the mass and culture of one society is not clearly superior to that of the other, the two dissimilar streams of social life may for a long time flow side by side without mingling, the conquerors unyielding from disdain, the conquered from resentment. Still, however prudently the former may refrain from disturbing the customs and institutions of the latter, the coercive union of two societies inevitably modifies the structure of both. In general, the constrained society is deformed by pressure upon the apex. The upper classes are crushed down toward the lower and sometimes, following out the principle of *Parcere subjectis, debellare superbos,* the lower are deliberately exalted above their quondam superiors in order to create an interest loyal to the dominant society. Moreover, new groupings may be formed, intended to dissolve the spirit and usages of the ancient social order. Thus in Gaul "the Romans systematically suppressed the old divisions into peoples, tribes, or nations, and replaced them by the distribution of the country into urban districts."

In the constraining society, on the other hand,

the structural alterations are in the direction of greater inequality. Says Mommsen:[1]

> The new provincial system necessitated the appointment of governors whose position was absolutely incompatible . . . . with the Roman Constitution. . . . . It was not practicable for any length of time to be at once republican and king. Playing the part of governors demoralized the Roman ruling class with fearful rapidity. . . . . The man, moreover, who had just conducted a legalized military tyranny abroad could with difficulty find his way back to the common civic level. Even the government felt that their two fundamental principles—equality within the aristocracy and the subordination of the power of the magistrates to the senatorial college—began in this instance to give way in their hands

Venice, after enjoying popular government for ten centuries, was brought under an oligarchy in consequence of expanded conquests and incessant wars. Nor are the reactions of the Britannic dominion upon English politics of a different kind. Says Mr. Hobson:[2]

> As the despotic portion of our Empire has grown in area, a larger and larger number of men trained in the temper and methods of autocracy as soldiers and civil officials in our Crown colonies, protectorates, and Indian Empire, reinforced by numbers of merchants, planters, engineers, and overseers, whose lives have been those of a superior caste . . . . have returned to this country bringing back the characters, sentiments, and ideas imposed by this foreign environment. . . . . Everywhere they stand for coercion and resistance to reform.

Even if clamped together by force, two societies,

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 398, 399, 403.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-9.

nevertheless, gradually assimilate and—provided their racial differencees be not too great—a process of equalization sets in which causes the original social individualities to disappear in a higher synthesis. It was the irresistible demand for this social equilibration that set aside the old oligarchic Roman republic in favor of the empire. By Cæsar's statemanship

> Italy was converted from the mistress of the subject peoples into the mother of the renovated Italo-Hellenic nation. The Cisalpine province completely equalized with the mother-country was a promise and a guarantee that . . . . every Latinized district might expect to be placed on an equal footing by the side of its elder sisters and of the mother herself. On the threshold of full national and political equalization with Italy stood the adjoining lands, the Greek Sicily and the south of Gaul, which was rapidly becoming Latinized. In a more remote stage of preparation stood the other provinces of the empire in which . . . . the great maritime cities . . . . now became Italian or Helleno-Italian communities, the centers of an Italian civilization even in the Greek East, the fundamental pillars of the future national and political equalization of the empire.[1]

The conjugation of two peoples by conquest and *superposition* gives rise to still other social transformations inasmuch as the parasitic nexus established between lords and subjects calls into being peculiar relations, structures, and institutions. The interesting train of effects which leads from custom to law, from the gentile to the civil organization, from the minor to the larger social division of labor, resulting in the formation of a new people

[1] Mommsen, vol. IV. p. 657.

on a much higher plane of social evolution, has been so admirably worked out by Gumplowicz,[1] Ratzenhofer,[2] and Ward[3] that it is unnecessary to set it forth here.

VIII. *Alteration in the Environment.*—Upborne by vegetable and animal life, human societies are exposed to disturbances arising from changes in the worlds of *flora* and *fauna.* Plant encroaches upon or drives out plant, animal presses back or exterminates animal. Fishing communities are profoundly affected by mysterious vicissitudes in the run of food-fishes. Hunters and agriculturists have trying experiences which show how unstable is the medium on which they float. Consider how in our own day the phylloxera, the rinderpest, the foot-and-mouth disease, and the boll-weevil cause economic crises which may be reflected in institutions. Those migrations of micro-organisms which gave rise to the Black Death, the Asiatic cholera, and the bubonic plague have been more fateful perhaps than the invasions of Huns or Tartars. The fearful pest which under the Antonines wiped out half the population of the Roman Empire made it a shell easy for the barbarians to smash into. The Black Death of 1349, by making laborers scarce and dear, gave rise to the long series of Statutes of Laborers aiming to re-attach the cultivators to the soil. A permanent extension of the administration of the state

[1] "Rassenkampf," pp. 218-63.
[2] "Sociologische Erkenntniss," pp. 156-64.
[3] "Pure Sociology," pp. 205-15.

has often dated from a sudden calamity—a pestilence, a famine, a murrain, a flood, or a tempest—which, paralyzing private efforts, has caused application for state aid. The vast machinery of the Public Health Department in England has rapidly grown up in consequence of the cholera visitations in the middle of the last century. How many lines of influence, from the abolition of the Corn Laws to the Hibernian conquest of American cities, radiate from the Irish famine of 1845-46!

To sum up the results of this excursion in Social Dynamics:

The causes or factors of social change are *statico-dynamic processes, transmutations,* and *stimuli. Statico-dynamic processes* are those ordinary functional activities which leave behind them as by-products cumulative effects capable of causing social change. *Transmutations* are those gradual unconscious alterations which occur in consequence of the inability of human beings to reproduce accurately the copy their fathers set them. *Stimuli,* however, which are those factors of change lying outside of the strictly social sphere, furnish most of the impulses toward social transformation. The principal orders of stimuli are the growth of population, the accumulation of wealth, migration, innovation, the cross-fertilization of cultures, the interaction of groups, the conjugation of societies, and alteration of the environment.

Those modifications of society which are brought

about by the social will, equipped with adequate knowledge, using appropriate means, and striving toward an intelligently conceived goal, do not come within the purview of the social theorist, but belong to that branch known as practical sociology.

IX

RECENT TENDENCIES IN SOCIOLOGY[1]

I. The Processes of Socialization[2]

To attribute the unity of the social group to socializing processes, in which individual ideas and aims are moulded by social contacts and relations.

Our science inherited from the eighteenth century an extremely individualistic theory of mind. In the psychology of that time, men are like billiard balls, which touch, but never interpenetrate. They can be united in harmonious association only by coincidence of interests or by some external pressure, some binding institution, such as law, religion, or authoritative instruction.

With the rise of the evolutionary hypothesis the view prevailed that the human species is undergoing incessant development, and that natural selection is constantly moulding the natures of men into har-

[1] This paper is the outgrowth of certain lectures—delivered at Harvard University in April, 1902—which aimed to survey and evaluate the principal tendencies in the sociological writing of (approximately) the last decade. The paper appeared in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Aug. and Nov., 1902, May, 1903. Originally six tendencies were formulated, but the section dealing with Economic Determinism was omitted in view of the able presentation by Professor Seligman in his "Economic Interpretation of History."

[2] See appended bibliography, I.

mony with the requirements of social life. Spencer represents this stage in the solution of the problem. He is struck by the mounting of specific social instincts which are slowly pressing back the ape and tiger in us. An ameliorative drift like this is, however, too leisurely to account for the improvements in social cohesion we see going on about us. Before our eyes societies are forming, expanding, solidifying. What we need is a means of accounting for the groupings and regroupings we find crowded into the brief span of perhaps two or three generations.

Spencer somewhere acknowledges sadly that he has perforce abandoned his original conviction that man is a reasonable being. Others were abandoning the belief at the same time; and the way was first paved for a social psychology when the evolutionists dilated on the rôle of the instincts and passions in the ordering of human life. Other philosophers, like Von Hartmann, showed how much of the soul is unillumined, and argued that the world is ruled by the unconscious. When, finally, the psychologists brought to book the phenomena of hypnotic suggestion, the time was ripe for a new theory of social cohesion.

No sociologist has yielded more to these German ideas than Gustave Le Bon. With him the cohesion of men in society is largely spontaneous, and is seen in its simplest form in the crowd. The crowd is a psychological unity which puts the persons composing it "in possession of a sort of collective mind,

which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual would feel, think, and act, were he isolated." This is due to the fact that in the crowd men lose their acquired characters and individualities, and revert to their instincts. They renounce that which distinguishes one from the other,—the deposits of education and reflection,—and meet on that substratum of unconscious life which is common to all of them. There is, furthermore, the fact that the sub-conscious self is highly susceptible to mental contagion. The self that rises to the surface in an excited crowd is the self that is laid bare when the hypnotist puts to sleep the higher controlling centers of the subject. In both cases the individual is as clay in the hands of the potter. In the crowd, then, one is, for the time being, socialized. He forgets those private interests of his which suffer by the crowd's line of action. He blindly follows his leader, and is self-abnegating, even heroic, in furthering the common purposes. He is much more disinterested and sentimental than he is when isolated. The credulity of crowds, moreover, disposes men to accept, in the heat of enthusiasm, ideas which later may constitute an important social bond. These uncritical moments favor the implanting of beneficent illusions. Such convictions inspire in the crowd that blind submission, fierce intolerance, and proselyting zeal we associate with religious beliefs; for all popular convictions evince an imperious, dominating energy.

It is, then, the emotionalism and vast credulity of crowds which permit the fixation of unifying beliefs, illusions, and ideals. Were we always self-possessed and critical, the interferences of our interests would renew the struggle for existence in its harsher forms. "Without a doubt," says Le Bon, "human reason would not have availed to spur humanity along the path of civilization with the ardor and hardihood its illusions have done." "General beliefs are the indispensable pillars of civilization." "They alone are capable of inspiring faith and creating a sense of duty." Upon this crowd psychology, Le Bon founds his theory of social development. When the curtain of history rises, the stage is filled with unstable swarms of barbarians swept together by circumstances. In time an identical environment and the necessities of life in common bring about a blending of the unlike. Great leaders impress unifying beliefs, and the people acquires an ideal. Under the stimulus of this ideal a new civilization, with all its institutions, beliefs, and arts, is born. But in time a calculating individualism undermines the ideal. For a while, indeed, men are held together by their traditions and institutions. Nevertheless, the ideal finally perishes; and we have again a mere swarm of individuals which returns to the simple unity of its original state,—that of the crowd. The populace rules, barbarism mounts, and the cycle of civilization is complete.

This theory of the genesis of groups cannot be taken as more than a brilliant assault on the prob-

lem. Le Bon, while he skillfully lays bare the soul of the crowd, errs greatly in exalting this immediate ascendency of the collective mind over individual minds to be the all-in-all of social unity. Mob-madness is an infrequent, temporary thing; and many of us have never experienced it. We do little of our thinking or acting in a crowd, and what we think or do there leaves but few traces. Society, unlike the mob, is organized and acts deliberately; whereas the mob acts quickly and under excitement. In it *truths* and *inventions* have more vitality than mere *suggestions.* There are plenty of theatrical persons who can *suggest* in a striking way; but society gives such scope to reason that, in the long run, its leader may be the shrinking investigator or the scholarly recluse rather than the orator or the prophet.

Tarde, although he makes suggestion-imitation the corner-stone of his sociology, does not start from an abnormal phenomenon, like the mob mood. Impressed no less than Le Bon by the marvels of suggestion as brought to light by the hypnotist, he, nevertheless, inquires how our choices are shaped, not in the press of the mob, but in our cool private moments. Recognizing that whatever translates men from conflict to coöperation facilitates social groupings, Tarde identifies the socializing process with the growing resemblance brought about by imitation. In the spread of examples from the hero, the nobility, the city, or the capital, in the superseding of neighborhood or provincial culture by a na-

tional culture, in the spread of beliefs and practices from the higher civilization to the lower, in the resulting assimilation of nationalities and convergence of peoples, he detects the beginning of every higher human synthesis. The guarantee of peace lies in agreement as to the ground plan of life,—in community of religion, morals, and tastes. Let men approach the same plane of beliefs and desires, and they will beat their swords into ploughshares, no matter how their interests clash. Society is that circle in which the struggle for existence has become bloodless; and this occurs only where there is resemblance in ideas, standards, costumes, manners.

Within the historic period there has been a progressive enlargement of political society; *i. e.*, of the circle of peace. Thus he says[1]: "From a countless number of very small but exceedingly bitter wars between petty clans, we pass to a smaller number of somewhat larger and less rancorous wars: first between small cities, then between large cities, then between nations that are continually growing greater; till finally we arrive at an era of very infrequent but most impressive conflicts, quite devoid of hatred, between colossal nations, whose very greatness makes them inclined to peace." This irenic progress keeps step with the historic march of civilization. Conquest, migration, intercourse, commerce, intermarriage, have destroyed countless petty languages, religions, local customs, systems of laws, and moral ideals; have fused little cultures

[1] "Social Laws," p. 110.

into national and cosmopolitan cultures; have spread accents, wares, ideas, and cravings; and have brought humanity into ever-enlarging basins of civilization,—first a mountain valley, then a river plain, then an inland sea. And civilization, which both in the Orient and in the Occident has become oceanic, will, no doubt, in the twenty-second century be planetary.

This process of assimilation—the laws of which have recently been ably formulated by Miss Simons on the basis of wide historical researches—will always be thought of in connection with Tarde's studies in imitation. When he came on the field, sociologists were so much impressed with the social division of labor that they saw in social evolution nothing but differentiation. Spencer averred that the great process in society is the passing from the like to the unlike. Tarde, on the other hand, thinks it is the heterogeneous that is "unstable." Differentiation holds true of men as producers: as consumers, the drift is the other way. The formula is, growing unlikeness as workers, growing likeness as livers and enjoyers. The specialization of trades and professions is merely an economic fact. The socializing process is that growth in the closeness and extent of similarity which multiplies sympathies, promotes coöperations, and makes for harmony among men.

This notion of the socializing process is held by Gumplowicz, although he ignores the assimilation that goes on between societies, and assumes that

mental approach can take place between peoples only after they have been clamped together by conquest. With him the specific bond of the innumerable groups that are linked together in a national society is the consciousness of resemblance, whether physical or mental. The cause of resemblance may be either intermarriage or social intercourse.

Professor Giddings agrees that assimilation is the socializing process *par excellence,* but he finds at the bottom of all groupings what he happily terms "the consciousness of kind." This may be inspired, not alone by the resemblance brought about by imitation, but as well by original similarity in body or temperament, or by resemblance arising from the influence of the same environment, occupation, or experiences. This state of mind is the true and only cement among men, and upon its range and intensity Giddings makes depend the size and intimacy of all groups whatsoever.

To do full justice to the sentimental side of association, we need, however, a term even wider than consciousness of kind. We must explain the clashing of groups as well as their merging, men's oppositions as well as their unions. Our behavior towards others is not determined simply by a perception of resemblance shading off to zero, inspiring a sympathy graduated down to indifference. There is as well a perception of difference, awakening a positive antipathy. We hate people whose ways are utterly different from ours, and wage upon them a "holy war." Both factors—the repul-

sion as well as the attraction—must be taken into account, in order to predict into what groups a given population will fall.

Granting that awareness of resemblances and differences determines the attitudes of persons toward one another, what is the relative importance of the various elements in which people may resemble or differ? As regards physique, the thorough mix-up of cephalic races suggests that head-form is insignificant. Color, on the other hand, is an outstanding trait, and color-contrast is almost always a hindrance to social feeling and a bar to intermarriage. In ancient India, as in our South, color seems to have been the foundation of caste. The shock which a human being experiences on beholding a face of an unfamiliar hue is accentuated as soon as color-contrast becomes indelibly associated with mental, moral, and social differences. Each race, moreover, works out its ideal of personal beauty on the basis of its distinctive traits, and the individuals of another race are apt to strike it as ugly and repulsive.

Some light on the problem is got by noting what points of difference are emphasized when men are coining insulting epithets to hurl at their enemies. With the ruder man personal appearance and habits count for much. One thinks of his foes as "niggers," "greasers," "roundheads," "fuzzy-wuzzies," "red-necks," "palefaces," "red-haired devils," "brown monkeys," "redskins," "uncircumcised," "dagoes," "frog-eaters," "rat-eaters," etc. Some-

what higher is the type that thinks of his enemy as a "parley-voo," "goddam," "mick," "heathen," "infidel," "heretic," or "Papist." Difference in speech is a serious bar to sympathy, for at first another's speech always sounds to us like the gibberish of a chattering ape. The higher type of man is struck by cultural differences only, and detests those who are "savage," "barbarous," or "benighted."

In seeking the causes of the persistence of groups, Professor Simmel has developed the consciousness-of-kind theory by showing just what points of resemblance have the most cohesive worth. These appear to be:—

1. A common valued possession, such as landed property, a national territory, or public buildings. Those who have an undivided ownership of the same possession tend to behave as a unit.

2. A common and prized symbol, such as a flag, a regimental standard, a palladium, grail, or temple. Those who value the same symbol are drawn together.

3. Love of, or obedience to, the same chief or dynasty. Fellow-subjects of the same prince, disciples of the same prophet, form naturally a sympathetic group.

4. Consciousness of a group "honor," which is in the custody of all, and which is damaged if one fails to reach a certain standard. This means simply that the world thinks of them as one body, so that the glory or shame of one becomes the glory or shame of all. The fusion of members in the

thought of the public creates a group "honor," which reacts integratingly upon the group.

The rise, then, of a common possession, symbol, leader, or "honor," socializes the persons involved with reference to one another.

Professor Baldwin approaches the problem as a genetic psychologist fresh from the study of the child mind. From his observations of the growth of personality he is led to attach less importance than do Tarde and Giddings to agreement in the contents of the mind, and dwells rather on the fact that the thought of the other person is built into the very foundations of the thought of one's self. At the dawn of its mental life the child has selfish instincts, but it has no notion of self. This idea it can only slowly build up out of its sensations and out of elements that, by imitation, it has taken from those about it. But this wholesale appropriation of what was "other" makes it easy to impute this enriched self-notion to "other." The child interprets persons in terms of its own subjective experiences, because it has no other means of interpreting them. I use the same notion of personality now in thinking of *ego,* now in thinking of *alter.* Hence I read into the other person the same desires and interests I feel in myself. What I want and claim I must by the very same thought allow others to want and claim. Whatever I fancy, hope, fear, desire for self, in general remains the same, whether afterwards I do qualify it by the word "my" or the word "your." So, whenever my interests are entangled with those

of another, I am moved to give equal weight to the claims of self and the claims of other. And this solution is justice.

What fits us for association, then, is not so much resemblance in this trait or that, as identity in mental constitution. However far apart we may be in creeds or standards, the social relation is possible so long as the same self-thought will interpret both *ego* and *alter*. What Baldwin has found the root of is not clannishness, but sociality; not what unites men of the same stripe, but what draws together all sorts and conditions. The bi-polar self, or *socius*, that normally grows up in the budding years, serves just as well as a social instinct. As beings that think, yearn, strive, or suffer, we are all potential associates. There is a primary bond among all human beings able to get in touch; and to this is added, as Gumplowicz, Tarde, and Giddings rightly insist, a new strand for every fresh resemblance that is perceived.

Baldwin shrewdly detects, besides these sympathetic bonds, a purely impersonal sense of oughtness, or sense of being under law, which he traces to the child's experience of being made to obey. The habit formed in the family of acting under parental law prepares one for later voluntary obedience to an abstract rule of right, and constitutes a very important element in socialization. In thus recognizing the moulding value of external pressure and sanction, he admits a new factor,—the great factor of *control*.

Rival to the *resemblance* theory is the view that groups are built by *community of interests,* that it is chiefly the experience of finding others to be helpful to one's life ends that engenders sympathies. On the one principle, men cleave to their kind, and shun opposites; on the other principle, they seek complements, and shun competitors. The former postulates *sentiments,* the latter *practical motives,* as the first ground of union. Simmel holds to the latter explanation, and cites as crucial instance, "Common antagonism against a third party tends under all circumstances to consolidate the combining groups, and with much greater certainty than friendly relationships towards a third party."

Durkheim, too, leans strongly to this utilitarian interpretation of society. For social life he distinguishes two sources,—similarity of minds and the social division of labor. In the former case one is socialized because, being only slightly individualized, he identifies himself with his kind; in the latter case, because the very individuality and function which mark him off from others make him the more dependent on others. Societies pass from the primitive organic solidarity that arises from likeness to the later organic solidarity that arises out of interdependence. It is not conclusive, however, for Durkheim to point out that the social division of labor has never yet broken up society into selfish guilds. If growing specialization has not relaxed the bonds of sympathy, it is, perhaps, because the communion of ideas and tastes has meanwhile proceeded even

more rapidly. Our specialism, Tarde might well reply, is tempered by Herculean educational endeavors, which aim to join us by common standards of decency, ideas of right, or interest in learning, faster than we are being sundered by vocation. Reading the same journals, following the same styles, coöperating in the same church, party, or lodge, we assimilate even faster than we differentiate; and, if eight hours a day we are moulded to diverse tasks, eight other hours a day, including holidays, we are steeped in and saturated with the same civilization.

The debate between the social psychologists, who deem assimilation the socializing process, and the economists, who identify it with the growing together of interests, appears to be a drawn battle. Each side can overwhelm the other with facts, and the spectator concludes that the two group-building forces divide the world between them. It is a query, however, if the latter has not the greater future before it. Does not that progress in character which weakens the sway of blind, intense feelings, and fortifies self-control and rationality, favor those groups with a distinctive interest and sphere of action at the expense of groups that are held together by a consciousness of kind? Will not that antipathy inspired by unlikeness of color, speech, religion, nationality, or civilization, be more and more condemned as a "prejudice" that one is to "rise above," whereas conflict of interest will continue to be regarded as necessarily divisive?

So much for the optimists, the thinkers who are so impressed with the knitting together of men by their contacts and interactions that for them the problem of socialization is solved. In their eyes, union is easy, order natural, tranquillity spontaneous, and the struggle for existence a conflict with nature, and not with our fellowmen. But some there are who do not share this view. Is, then, the primitive struggle so easily put aside, the give-and-take spirit proper to social life so easily come by? Fellowship craving may draw together ten or a hundred; but does it unite ten thousand or ten million? Love may create households and coteries and churches; but is it the architect of towns, cities, and states? "Pleasure in companionship," "pleasure in coöperation," are luxuries; and, if men have formed groups under the stress of conflict, it is likely that fear, hunger, or greed rather than sociability have brought them to it.

The stern necessity of winning or defending a food share or a feeding ground hurry men into association ere they are ripe for it. Not the attraction of like for like, but war or the dread of war has instigated that unceasing agglomeration of communities revealed in history. Groups arise too soon, form before the natural socializing forces have done their work. Central organs appear while yet the premature society, owing to social unfitness of its members, is torn by violence. Will not these organs seek to check this waste and cure these ills by setting up artificial processes of sociali-

zation, to eke out the tardy work of natural socialization? In a word, must not *social control* be counted a factor, if not in instituting, at least in improving society? How otherwise account for massive institutions, like police, church, school? Wherefore laws, courts, hangmen? Why the yoke of codes, the burden of ceremonial, the shackles of creed, the gyves of common opinion, the moral corsets laced upon our minds by the schoolmaster? Is social order a matter of silken cords and rose-water, or is it a matter of "iron and blood"?

These considerations raise up opponents of the optimistic school in the very heyday of its success. Men of juristic training like Von Ihering and Post and Vaccaro show that the mutual adaptation of men has been difficult, and dwell upon the worth of law, custom, religion, and the moral code in creating harmony and order. But even they overlook many of the means and devices of social control. Preoccupied with *institutions*, they overlook those *conventions*, which float freely in the social mind without visible source or seat. The study of these shows that to collective suggestions, personal ideals, authorized illusions, and social valuations is due no little of that harmony which has been credited to the "dialectic of personal growth," the "consciousness of kind," or the "solidarity of interests,"

II. The Group-to-Group Struggle Within Society.[1]

To look upon society as a theatre of struggle between classes, corporations, and parties for the advancement of their respective interests.

The old ontological concept of society—that it is a real integral being—closed our eyes to the series of minor groups that lie between the individual and the whole, competing with it for his allegiance. The organic concept likewise misled us by focusing attention on the functional groups. In a living body the organs by means of their functions minister to the welfare of the whole, and there is no sign of any contention of part with part. If the organs and members are unequally nourished, it is because the nervous system, the unquestioned master of the rest of the body, apportions the blood on the communistic principle,—To each according to his needs.

Now, if society is a being of this kind, we must suppose that the operative groups accept submissively the nutritive elements that come to them under the established system, and that the regulating apparatus—the political bodies, for example—acts with sole reference to the welfare of the entire society. The capture of this apparatus by a scheming class, in order to promote its own interests at the expense of the rest, would be a derangement, a dementia as of a person obsessed by an *idée fixe*.

But why, after all, should we view our facts

[1] See appended bibliography, II.

through this golden haze of beneficent adaptation? Why assume that in society all struggle will take the form of man-to-man competition? Will not those of kindred interests find one another out, band together, and organize themselves, the more effectively to assert their claims against similar organized bands supporting rival claims? Indeed, is not groupwise conflict inevitable the moment society differentiates into categories of men with distinctive and incompatible interests? The organicists linger over the *functional groups* or "organs," composed of persons who coördinate their efforts in some producing, distributing, or regulating activity. Of this sort is a factory staff, a clearing-house, a police force, an administrative department. But there are at least three other kinds of groups in society.

1. *Local* or *regional groups,* termed by some "component societies," or "segments," and composed of neighbors exposed to the same physical environment and united by certain special interests. In barbarian society these are the chief struggle units; but in modern society they are fast losing their special interests, and consequently their identity.

2. *Likeness groups,* characterized by special cohesion, seeing that the sympathy and pleasurable companionship of their members with one another is greater than with outsiders. Those of the same group associate freely and have a more or less vivid consciousness of kind; but between members of different groups there is relative indifference, some-

times even suspicion and dislike. These groups are based on resemblance partly *cultural*—similarity in opinions, ideals, and tastes—and partly *economic*,—similarity in pecuniary condition and mode of life. Although these groups do not clash, they are relatively non-fraternizing, and mark sometimes a real "solution of continuity" in the social substance.

3. *Interest groups.* These arise from the rallying of persons about a common *interest,* in order to support it and advance it even at the expense of other interests. The incorporating of an interest in this way compels others to do likewise, and so intensifies the struggle between them. The rise of such groupings sharpens opposition of which people were only vaguely conscious, and builds up minor solidarities at the cost of the general solidarity. Any great national society, however seamless it may appear at a distance, will be found at close hand to be a patchwork,—a web in which various patterns have been broidered. It is the theatre not only of man-to-man competition, but also of a constant though ordered struggle between guilds, corporations, sects, and classes that impair the general cohesion just in proportion as they perfect their own cohesion.

Professor Durkheim, after exploring the foundations of law and morals, concludes that the early solidarity, based on the likeness of all the members of the community, afforded no such support to morality as does the present solidarity, based on division of labor. The bond knit by the dependence of part on part is closer and stronger. To promote

social unity, therefore, we have only to keep on in this path. Let us extend and perfect incorporation on the basis of function. Let each profession and interest become a *collegium* with an internal order of its own, yet operating smoothly within the larger corporation we call society.

This proposal to deepen the convolutions in the social substance will enchant the organicists with their robust faith in the division of labor. Is it not likely, however, that the functional group, if encouraged, will develop the teeth and claws of the interest group? Did the formation of a General Managers' Association and an American Railway Union prove a pledge of peace in 1894? Tarde is right in insisting that it is not what men have apart, but what they have in common that unites them. Trade and professional unions, codes, and journals would split up society, were it not for the tide of common ideas and sentiments that rises even faster than do these partitions.

Probably the hierarchy of interest groups—from those asserting the interest of a neighborhood or a logging gang to those that stand for a great region or a world-wide class—would never have been so ignored by theorists, had it not been for the national society. During the era of exaggerated nationalism, this stood so huge, so sharply defined by language, so centralized by administration, so knit together by its special sentiment, patriotism, that sociologists, overawed, exclaimed, "Behold Society!"

War is waged between states, and war had so so-

lidified the war-waging corporation that it appeared to overrule and hush the antagonisms in the interior of the political society. The organ asserting the national interest by violence utterly overshadowed the narrower struggle groups, asserting minor interests by legal means. But "the canker of a long peace," with the fading of national antipathies, the mellowing of patriotism, and the liberalizing of the state, in its train, breaks the political spell, and brings to light at last the unsuspected natural organization of men for success in the struggle for existence.

It is significant that Italian sociologists, living among a people that has never been cast all of a piece in the iron mould of warfare, have scouted the organic theory of society. In the eastern part of Europe, moreover, where the fusion of shattered nationalities in the crucible of new empires is still far from complete, the intellectual and political contest for mastery is far more striking than in the better-welded societies of the west. Where equality before the law is not conceded to all, where feudal society has not yet been dissolved by industrialism, and where government is the instrument of a class rather than the organ of the general will, the infra-social struggle is too naked and obtrusive to be hidden by a decent drapery of words.

Naturally, it has not been the hand of a Spencer or a Tarde that has lifted the lid off the seething caldron. To Italians like Loria and Vaccaro, to the German Ratzenhofer, to the Austrian Pole Gumplowicz, and to the Russian Novicow belongs the

credit of first setting forth the forms, phases, and laws of the struggles that persist in the interior of societies.

In France, England, and the United States, on the other hand, the social harmony is so considerable that the *Klassenkampf* theses of Gumplowicz or Loria strike us as exaggerated. We are far from ready to confess that the "social organism" is a myth, and that "society" is a free fight of interest groups, with the state as keeper of the lists. We love to think that with few exceptions each is concerned only for the public weal, and that the whole people thrills with the same wrath, pride, pity, or passion for justice. Professor Giddings, who in his first volume seemed somewhat taken with the ideas of Novicow, has in his last book all but ignored conflict, and agrees with Spencer and Tarde that society constantly approaches a harmony of sentiments and desires.

According to Gumplowicz, the Nestor of the Darwinian sociologists, the chief factors that make struggle groups are propinquity, habitual association, blood kinship, rank, possessions, occupation, and such moral facts as language, religion, science, and art. The cohesive strength of a combination depends on the number of group-making factors that knit together its members. The smaller group has the more ties; and hence the group that embraces the rich and influential, since it makes up in cohesion, organization, and brains what it lacks in numbers, has the most power under normal condi-

tions. But in times of revolution numerical strength counts; and the masses that ordinarily lack organization because of their bulk and their engrossing tasks, may become formidable.

Each group faces other groups on behalf of its own interests solely, and knows no standard of conduct but success. The aim of the struggle is to establish appropriate institutions for safeguarding or increasing the power or means of the group. The clergy want immunity from secular supervision, manufacturers want a protective tariff, bankers, free issuance of notes, slaveholders, a guarantee of their property wherever their flag flies, capitalists, the right to import cheap labor, laborers, the right to boycott.

Each group has its favorite weapons of combat. The priests may refuse to perform religious rites, laborers strike, employers shut down, bankers precipitate a panic, the noble or rich withhold social recognition. Each group, too, has its own organs for conducting the struggle. The priests have their hierarchies and synods, the business men their chambers of commerce, the laborers their walking delegates, the farmers their granges; while the rich have polite society. The ruling class has in addition the machinery of government. The state fixes legal forms for the relations of classes, and so a contest rages for the possession of this valuable organization. The successive coming to consciousness of lower and wider layers of the people results in a series of struggles for emancipation, and in the

sharing of political power among several classes. But in the meantime an unsocial compound has taken the place of society, and the age of despotic force recurs.

Loria, developing and exaggerating Karl Marx, carries the theory of class selfishness so far as virtually to resolve the evolution of a society into a series of parallel class evolutions. He sees no institutions conserving the collective welfare, but only institutions that reflect the egoism of groups. In his view religion, ethics, law, politics, and finance express alike the interest of the dominant class, and change as it changes. The supernatural morality of savages is devised to keep the women in subjection to the men. Christianity won the powerful because its promise of heaven disposed the poor to resignation. Even public opinion is no moral reflex, but the exponent of selfish property-owners.

The state, he thinks, is an arena of incessant combat. Rent receivers form one class, owners of productive capital another, those interested in banking or loan capital a third class. The unproductive laborers maintained out of these incomes—clerics, officials, soldiers, journalists, professional men—constitute a fourth class. As for the productive laborers, Loria insists they do not count at all in the state. Political changes are due to economic conditions which disturb the balance of power among these four classes or alter their groupings. Political parties represent such groupings; for banking

capital is apt to become the ally of rent, while the unproductive laborers usually befriend capital.

Convinced that property underlies politics, Loria ventures to neglect men entirely, since they but reflect their pecuniary interests. So he omits party names, and puts forward income as the active agent in politics. We read of profits "triumphing," rent "meeting its Waterloo," land "uniting itself" to banking capital, small holdings "engaging in a fierce struggle" with great estates. In the mediæval quarrel between Church and State he sees only a struggle between ecclesiastical and secular property.

Surely, such simplification masks the real complexity of social phenomena! Loria, indeed, throws light on law, politics, and finance, but he fails lamentably in interpreting religious and ethical systems; for unquestionably these are, to a great extent, of folk or universal origin, and by no means mere class products.

Taking for his theme *conflict,* whether between societies or within society, Novicow has worked out a scheme representing all its gradations and attenuations, from the wars of cannibals to the debates of scientists. The struggle for existence he declares to be universal; but in it he detects an ameliorative principle, whereby the stronger finds it his interest to abandon brutal oppression. Hence massacre tends to pass over into robbery, robbery into exploitation, exploitation into monopoly, monopoly into privilege, privilege into competition, competi-

tion into discussion. Though groups are animated by self-interest, the stronger will find it more to their advantage to enslave the weaker than to eat them, to trade with them than to enslave them, to assimilate them than to oppress them, and to assimilate them by mild methods than by coercive measures. With this amelioration he finds pity or philanthropy or religion has had absolutely nothing to do. It is all credited to the enlightenment of the stronger.

Vaccaro, in a work less vivacious but more scientific than Novicow's, undertakes to explain the dying away of conflict,—the "adaptation" that comes to pass between societies and within societies. While his survey of external struggle and of the causes that attenuate it constitutes an admirable *résumé* of the evolution of war, Vaccaro puts his best effort upon the phases and limits of the internal struggle and the means of ameliorating it.

Unlike Gumplowicz, who insists that the state originates only with the superposition of tribes by conquest, Vaccaro finds that even in a simple militant society a coercive organization springs up about the war chief. He grants, of course, that the composite society where the undisguised parasitic relation prevails between peoples is the scene of the most momentous deadlock of interests. Even here, however, there comes in time a "let up" on the part of conquerors, because in this way they economize coercion and supervision and profit more than by a policy of violence. Hope being a greater stimulus

than fear, the masters find it to their advantage to concede the exploited a measure of security and freedom. The struggle among the conquerors themselves results usually in the successive domination of the warrior, priestly, aristocratic, and popular classes; and, as this implies the exercise of power by larger numbers and more heterogeneous elements, there ensues a gradual conciliation of interests and mitigation of the societary struggle.

For the progress of infra-social adaptation there are several causes. Warfare leads to the survival of the best-knit societies. As food outruns population, the "interests" for which classes contend cease to be matters of life or death. A body of belief is formed, which, transmitted as custom, morality, and law, hastens the mutual adaptation of men. Selection weeds out the unsocial and favors the survival of the friendly. Thus the adaptive process marches irresistibly on; and, however harsh the régime established by the sword, power comes in time to be shared, legal rights are generalized, the state ceases to be the tool of parasites, and interclass exploitation becomes mild and inobvious. Time, that leveller that tumbles the earthwork into the trench and fills the moat with the ruins of the castle wall, wears down the sharp oppugnances of races, and turns the cliffs and chasms of the conquest régime into the gentle declivities of the competitive society.

Ratzenhofer takes not the "social aggregate," but the "social formation," as his point of departure.

The national group we are apt to call "society" is simply one of the wider unions in the ascending series of forms. As some of the firmest, most highly individualized social formations are non-territorial, —*i. e.,* have horizontal rather than vertical boundaries,—it is idle to identify "society" with any local or regional group. The state, indeed, has a defined area; but the state is not the bottom fact of social science. For the sociologist the primary element is a definite cluster of persons conscious of a joint interest and facing other groups as a unit.

Between such a group and an organism there is a real analogy. Like a living body, it has the power of self-movement, its course being determined by the unifying interests of the members and by their ideas and feelings respecting the forces in their environment. It grows through the attraction of new members up to the limit that defines its natural sphere of usefulness. Further growth resembles fatty degeneration, and is hurtful; for the adhesion of persons less and less sympathetic with the original spirit of the group brings dissension. The group then throws off seceding groups, the offspring varying more or less from the parent. If the parent group is unable to recover its original ideal, it disintegrates, and its members enter other combinations.

The interest group also resembles a *person* in that it elaborates a *group-will,* which differs from and reacts upon the *individual will* of its members. This will is the resultant of the wishes of its members, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the impulses

given by rival or dominant groups in its environment. If, in striking the balance, the leaders give too much weight to the crude demands of adherents, the group projects shatter on the opposition they arouse. If too little weight is given, the adherents become lukewarm and fall away. The group-will dominates most when founded on *common* interests, so that each may hope for something for himself from every victory of his group. Nevertheless, group success requires the *renouncing* of some private aims, and hence implies *limitation* upon the individual will.

Interest groups vary in degree of individualization. If the animating purposes and guiding ideas of such a group are vague, it will show no definite boundary and no strongly marked character. It will readily split up or unite with other groups. But, the more distinct its aim from rival aims in its environment, the more it will feel itself apart in origin and destiny. If evoked by an imperious need, it will exact the undivided allegiance of its members, and it will be loath to admit persons that are not wholly devoted to its aims.

Every group tends to form an *authority* constituted by a few, to which the rest are subject. When this is exaggerated, when the group individualizes too much, becoming, as it were, too absolute an *ego*, there comes from without a socializing impulse, a waft of freedom, which relaxes outgrown authority. In the history of every group there is alternation of

hardening and loosening, of compulsion and emancipation.

The social process is, in fact, double. The energy of opposition a group encounters gives it consistency and unity, accentuates its specific and distinctive character. On the other hand, multiplying points of agreement between its members and outsiders tone down the peculiarities of the group, weaken its organization, level the barriers it has raised against rivals. Thus individualization and socialization work incessantly in a people. Whoever seeks refuge from the inclement struggle for existence betakes himself to the shelter of his group. Whoever is galled by the yoke of his group seeks support elsewhere.

There is no question that the recognition of the infra-social struggle is bound to leave a deep impress on sociology. Though psychologists scout the old doctrine that society is a balance of personal egoisms, we are not thereby debarred from regarding it as a balance of class egoisms, seeing that groups are demonstrably more self-centered than the persons composing them.[1] Nevertheless, the new doctrine needs to be shorn of certain East-European exaggerations, and coördinated with established sociological principles.

The notion that associations founded on interest are absolute units, and know no limits to their selfish aggressions, contradicts the law that *sympathy is*

[1] See the author's *Social Control*, pp. 71-76.

strong in proportion to the degree of resemblance recognized. The Freemason or the friar, the capitalist or the union laborer, keeps a bit of his personality, even if he has cast in his lot with an aggressive association. When the demands of his group reach a certain pitch of exorbitance, he remembers he is, after all, a man and a citizen. Thus group-to-group struggle is moderated by the consciousnes of a common nationality and culture. A perfect group unity can arise only from an absolute enmity, and this will be found only between distinct races. In the United States all the worst lawless societies—Molly Maguires, Mafia, Ku-Klux Klan, Clan-na-gael—have had their roots in the opposition of races rather than the clash of interests.

The idea that every struggle group exerts always its utmost power, and goes the full length of its tether, is at variance with the principle that *the will to resist is greater than the will to aggress.*[2] Our American experience shows that those classes engaged in industrial pursuits—farmers, miners, artisans—are more ready in defence than in aggression; whereas those engaged in pecuniary employments—merchants, manufacturers, bankers, railroad men—are nearly as vigorous in aggression as in defence. In the progress of a victorious group composed of industrials there is a point at which the feeling spreads that further advantages at the expense of other classes would be "unfair," and beyond this point the vigor and unity of action decline.

[2] *Social Control,* p. 38.

Because of these "dead points" in the will to self-aggrandizement, it is possible to set up a political system in which the tension and struggle of classes is happily brought to a minimum.

Again, it is indubitable that the individuality of a struggle group varies inversely with the individuality of the containing society; and this in its turn varies directly with the amount of opposition the society has to encounter. For it is a universal law that *the bonds of any group, be it great or small, tighten with danger and relax with security.* Just as the *ego* attains self-consciousness—so we are told—through the *non-ego,* a nation "finds" herself through her awareness of other nations. "Iron sharpeneth iron," and the clash with oppressors or foes hardens a folk and hushes the strife of factions. No nation, for example, has been so conscious of other nations as rivals or critics as modern Japan; and no people has shown a fainter sense of divisive interests than the Japanese. Complacent, self-centered China, on the other hand, cankered by clan and class selfishness, needs, it is said, but a vivid sense of other nations to fight or emulate, to close up her ranks and develop a patriotic spirit. A people engrossed in private aims tends invariably to fall into struggle groups; yet, if a national aim presents itself,—say a defensive war,—the socializing process is set up and the rifts close.

Finally, the cohesion of groups and their ability to face and fight one another as units implies a reluctance of their members to compete among them-

selves. But this reluctance, while partly due to consciousness of kind, is certainly due in part to the difficulty of one's getting on by individual efforts. In a thoroughly competitive society that knows no legal or social barriers to the ascensional energy of the individual, class groups are apt to be loose in texture and vague of outline. With competition free and fair, the more vigorous prefer to struggle and triumph as individuals rather than as myrmidons. Since they infect the rest with this tonic spirit of self-reliance, the law holds, *the more universal the man-to-man struggle, the less pronounced is the group-to-group struggle.*

Besides these four limiting principles, there are several circumstances that affect the degree of intestinal strife in a society undergoing economic differentiation. The alienation of classes is limited by systems of regulative ideas of a universal character,—a common religion, moral ideal, or political faith,—developed before the rise of classes. Perfect freedom to agitate and discuss often makes it possible to reach, even on a matter affecting interests, a truly public opinion, overruling and superseding the jarring opinions prompted by class bias. Again, when a society is at once competitive and dynamic, so that individuals constantly mount to a higher or sink to a lower plane, a sense of class interest is slow to form. The secret hope of rising prompts many a man to identify himself in imagination with the class he hopes to belong to rather than the class he actually belongs to. The conflicts that, in view

of their clear oppositions of interest, one would expect to break out between commoners and nobles, between peasants and *bourgeoisie,* between workingmen and employers, are frequently averted because the natural leaders and moulders of opinion among the workingmen hope to become capitalists, the peasants expect to see their sons in the professions, the rich commoners trust to work themselevs or their families into the peerage. Furthermore, so far as the *personnel* of the social strata is fluid and changing, their conflicts of interest are not aggravated by the inbred antipathies that spring up between hereditary classes. Free education, too, since it facilitates the upward movement of brains, hinders the crystallization of class feeling.

Moreover, the pulse of national life responds to the ebb and flow of prosperity. Sectional or class antagonisms evoked by special stress die away with the conditions that gave them birth. In hard times suffering classes, becoming irritable, spit and claw at one another; but in good times they lap contentedly at the same saucer of milk. The free expansion of national energies makes for social peace, while a pent-up people tends to split up into jarring groups. The two-party system presupposes a low intensity of class opposition, and it seems to prevail only among people that enjoy wide outlets for their energies.

On the whole, however, it is the popularizing of government that has done most to quiet the infra-social struggle. Almost everywhere the state be-

gan, not as organ of society, but as engine of an exploiting class. If through most of the Occident it no longer bears this grim look, it is because class after class has come to consciousness, and fought its way to participation. As each lower and wider layer of the people learns to cohere effectively about its vital interests, the state becomes more socialized, —a compromise between classes, perhaps, but no longer the monopoly of one class. Slipping from the grasp of the few into the hands of the many, government becomes impartial and tolerant, the warfare of interests becomes in consequence less virulent, and the struggle groups cease to be close of grain and firm of outline.

But it would be rash to conclude that the societary struggle is presently to die out. In an advanced economy divisive interests will continue to marshal men into different camps. Under the popular state the embattled groups, conscious of a fair field, may renounce envenomed weapons and foul play, the collision may leave behind it no inveterate hatreds; but men will not cease to struggle groupwise until they cease to have closer relations or greater community of interests with *some* of their fellow-citizens than with *all.*

III. Original Differences in Population.[1]

To account for certain groupings, oppositions, and interactions by original differences in persons.

The earlier sociologists were handicapped by their

[1] See appended bibliography, III.

ignorance of the qualitative differences in a population. Comte ignores them entirely. Schäffle confesses: "The classification of population according to intellectual, æsthetic, and moral traits is difficult. These traits have not yet been sufficiently observed. We have, therefore, to leave at this point an unfillable gap." Spencer develops quite fully the differences—physical, emotional, and intellectual—between primitive men and the culture races; but a modern social population presents itself to him as relatively homogeneous. The differences he makes use of are not qualitative, but quantitative; *i. e.*, differences in degree of strength or ability or enlightenment. Even here he has not gone far enough to please all, and Mr. Mallock has formally impeached him for greatly undervaluing and understating the rôle of the exceptional man in social evolution.

Now, the moment the sociologist undertakes "to explain social phenomena," he is staggered by the variety of reaction, the unlikeness of response to like stimulus, exhibited in a given group. Here are contrasts of devout with undevout, of back-lookers (traditionalists) with forelookers, of forth-faring with barnacles, of spenders with savers, of risk-lovers with risk-shunners, of sporting with Puritanic. Have these all been differentiated out of a homogeneous population by environment, circumstance, or training? Do men draw apart into conservatives and radicals solely from personal or class interest? Can we explain such oppositions as Cavalier and Roundhead, conformist and dissenter, stal-

wart and mugwump, in terms of surroundings? Are Salvationists and Presbyterians merely different forms of the same human material? Is it addiction to unlike activities that explains the contrast of bellicose and peace-loving?

This wealth of contrast the sociologist can lay to the differences of place and function in society only so long as he sticks to the panoramic. The moment he condescends to the details of the Here and Now he finds the method too simple. It is like undertaking to copy an elaborate picture in mosaic, with bits of stone of different sizes, but all of the same color and shape.

It is easy to show that variety in the elements of a population enriches social life. Of all communities a mining settlement is, perhaps, the least interesting to a sociologist, because its characteristics reflect so faithfully the characteristics of its members. Now, into this assemblage of men introduce an equal number of women. Soon we have new conventions —modesty, chivalry—and new institutions—marriage, law of domestic relations, the home. With the advent of children fresh complications arise,—age of consent, laws of inheritance, educational ideals and activities. Let there be added to the gold-seeking type the religious, artistic, and intellectual types in the form of evangelists, poets, painters, philosophers and scientists. At once you have a circle of new activities, interests, and interactions. If now you pile all this fabric on another and lower race,—say negroes or Chinese,—you have a fresh

growth of conventions and institutions governing the relations of the upper and lower castes.

With every step in this process the whole takes on character of its own, and is less and less to be conceived as an average or a resultant of its parts. A social physiognomy appears, which derives not from the qualities of the population, but from the relations and interactions arising out of the contrasts of sex, age, type, and race it contains. The conventions and institutions generated by the sex difference or the race difference will be much the same, whether the persons are A's and B's in England or X's and Y's in Yucatan. To just this variety of materials in a society is due, perhaps, that profusion of forms which makes a social life rich and interesting.

Since social phenomena betray the interaction of unlike elements, it behooves us to examine the persistent differences in the individuals that compose a society. Population may look gray from a distance; but from near by it is seen to be made up of multicolored particles, which, when grouped like with like, give rise to all manner of contrasts and effects. It is careful inspection and analysis of population that alone can enable the sociologist to cope with social reality.

The influence of certain sex contrasts upon early social development has been clearly set forth by Professor Thomas. He points out that females store up energy, while males expend energy. Hence the one sex is passive, the other active; physiolog-

ically the one is conservative, the other variative. From this fundamental contrast flow interesting consequences. The association that men develop has reference to food supply; and its features—such as mutual aid, division of labor, exchange, commerce—are but a veiled struggle making for toleration, but not for social sentiment. The latter originates in reproductive activities. The first group is not the family, but the mother and her children; and the first tribe is an aggregation of those related by blood to a group of females. Humanitarian sentiments have developed upon maternal affection, and political organization upon the association of kindred. Since man's activity disposed him to exploit and violence while woman's passivity disposed her to a stationary life, the primitive division of labor lay between the sexes, man taking to war and the chase, woman to agriculture and the house industries. This is why, as Professor Mason has shown, the development of the early arts and industries has been due to woman.

Male restlessness leads to exogamy, from which practice it results that a man must mate only with a woman of another group, who stays in her own group and receives her husband as a guest. The children remain with the mother group, and thus arises the metronymic system of kinship and the metronymic clan. Patient research has uncovered traces of these in the culture of every civilized people.

While the maternal system veils male force with-

out annulling it, it certainly procures for woman a higher status than the patriarchal system that succeeds. By blood brotherhood, secret societies, tribal marks, and religious dedications, men associate and seek to escape from the tyranny of the maternal system. But it is chronic warfare, which finally develops a strong organization of males, completely shatters the political influence of the female, and reduces her to a position of subjection until other factors than violence come to shape the relations of classes and sexes.

While *sex* is taking on a new significance for sociologists, there is also a tendency to connect social phenomena with *race*. Ferrero has sought to base important moral, industrial, and political contrasts between the societies of northern Europe and those of southern Europe on a difference between the fair and the dark peoples in point of sensuality. Going further, Ammon, Lapouge, Closson and Ripley, from extensive observations on head form, have distinguished three leading races in Europe, with unlike psychic characteristics attesting themselves in unlike social traits. At the moment the social psychologists are announcing, *"The nature of the unit derives from the characteristics of the whole,"* these "anthropo-sociologists" are declaring, *"The nature of the whole derives from the characteristics of its units."* In a way both theses are true. Custom and convention are the lords of most individual lives, but race and environment are the lords of collective life. Even if long-headed blond communities are bound

to be Protestant, it is still safe to say of the average Norwegian that he is a Protestant because he was reared in Norway and not in Portugal.

The anthropo-sociologists insist that communities of the long-headed blond race are more progressive, more prosperous, more migrant, and more individualistic than communities of the broad-headed brunets. Furthermore, in communities made up from both races the differentiation in respect to wealth and education, the stratification into classes, and the contrast between city and country will be more pronounced than in communities of either race.

Criminal sociology owes much to the labors of the anthropologists. A couple of centuries ago crime was charged up to personal deviltry. When the subjection of the human will to social conditions and influences began to be realized, thinkers went so far as to deem crime a purely social phenomenon. Criminals are "our failures." "Every society has the criminals it deserves." Lombroso and his school, by discovering among criminals a distinct human variety of an atavistic character, have caused the pendulum to swing back again. A good part of crime and pauperism we now lay to the presence of well-marked types that can be sorted out of the population by mere anthropometry. The effort of Lombroso to show that the genius differs from other men not so much in degree as in kind and the endeavor of his pupil Nordau to lay certain contemporary æsthetic tendencies at the door of an abnor-

mal human variety, the "degenerates," have been frowned upon by most of their scientific brethren.

Side by side with the anthropologist, busy with his distinctions of *sex, race,* and *anthropological* type, has worked the sociologist, clumsily endeavoring to do for himself what the psychologist ought to do for him; namely, to break up population into *psychological types.*

Thus Mr. Brooks Adams has sought to explain the course of European history by postulating different types of men needing different conditions for success. In the earlier stages of social evolution the energies of men are directed by Fear, which, stimulating the imagination, leads to supernatural religion and the rise of a priesthood. In this epoch of vivid imagination the dominant types are the religious, the military, and the artistic. As evolution proceeds Fear dies away and Greed becomes the animating spirit in society. This throws into the seats of power the economic type of man, who prevails by money as the priest by incantations and the warrior by arms.

The Barbarians that overran the Roman Empire were ignorant; and, when their imaginations were quickened by Christian supernaturalism, the religious-ecstatic type seized their chance and founded the theocracy, that is to say, the papacy. From the time of Hildebrand the clergy gained upon the laity, the religious upon the secular, and ecclesiastical property upon lay property. The early Crusades and the founding of the great military-re-

ligious orders mark the zenith of the emotional type. But in thriving commercial cities, like Venice and Genoa, there was growing up an economic type of man, sceptic and materialist, animated by Greed rather than by Fear, and putting his trust in money rather than in the promises of the priest. After the Crusades, the rise of the towns, the spread of banking, the rapid accumulation of wealth, and the appearance of centralized administrations supported by the florins of the towns-people, bring this kind of man to the fore. In the conduct of affairs the burgher displaces the religious and the martial types, and the civil state rises out of the decaying feudal system.

Adams regards the Reformation as an attempt of the economic type to get rid of all fees to middlemen, whether priests or saints, by becoming their own intercessors with the Deity. They substituted the Scriptures for an expensive priesthood, and to the "power of the Keys" asserted by the Church they opposed the doctrine of justification by faith. Thus he strides down the centuries, showing the growing prevalence of the economic type and the increasing mastery of capital over the course of events. "The salient characteristic of our age is the ascendency of the economic type of man." "Since the Crusades the imagination has slowly faded, until after the last great acceleration marked by the locomotive and electricity it has fallen into contempt." "The spark of faith has flickered so low that capital will no longer hire it, even as the

Stuarts hired it, as an agent of police." "The artist has become the creature of a commercial market." Prose has completely supplanted poetry, "while the economic intellect has grown less tolerant of any departure from those representations of nature which have appealed to the most highly gifted of the moneyed type among successive generations. Hence the imperiousness of modern realism." Greek and Gothic architecture represented imaginative ideals, but since the Reformation "wealth is the form in which energy seeks expression; therefore since the close of the fifteenth century architecture has reflected money."

Piquant as this is, Adams has neglected to provide for his succession of types a well-thought-out basis. He does not make clear whether it takes place because the economic type survives while the emotional type starves or because commerce and industry transform men of one type into another type, or because the forces of the age elevate to the control of affairs at one time imaginative men and at another time calculating, economic men. In this state of vagueness, Adams's theory cannot be taken as more than a brilliant suggestion.

Professor Patten paves the way for his interpretation of English history by resolving population into four types. The *clingers* are strongly attached to their birthplace, faithful to the customs of their fathers, and loth to migrate. They are born conservatives, never willing to relinquish what they have in order to grasp at a better. Cautious and

dependent, they worship the great and swell the admiring retinue of those powerful enough to grant them protection. The *sensualists* are persons whose strong passions prompt them to break away from cramping local conditions in quest of a few dominant pleasures. Reared in a poor environment and insatiable in desire, they make their way into fertile, settled regions as conquerors and exploiters. In a composite society they are the risk-takers and adventurers. From their ranks are recruited soldiers, explorers, prospectors, pioneers, and emigrants. They settle new lands, open routes of trade, and organize new industries, pressing ever to the perilous edge where great prizes glitter above great risks.

In a more advanced society appears an offshoot of the sensualists termed the *stalwarts,* from their fidelity to abstract principles. In religion the stalwart makes a fetich of creed, and prides himself on his orthodoxy. His morality is ascetic, a series of "thou shalt not"s. In politics he is democratic and utopian. In industry he is thrifty but not adventurous. The stalwart is a missionary for the cause he believes in, and, if able, crushes whom he cannot convert. He is independent and dislikes middlemen, whether in trade, in politics, or in religion. He is zealous for the Bible, the Constitution, the moral law, but reads into them his own ideals. The Puritans, the Presbyterians, the Quakers, and later the liberals and the democrats exemplify the stalwart type.

Finally there develop among the leisured, salaried,

and professional classes, who, unlike the masses, are shielded from the bitter struggle with external conditions, the *mugwumps*. These ruthlessly dissect and criticise the dogmas and ideals of the multitude, and hence, though few in numbers, exert at times a great influence. They are, in fact, stronger in criticism than in action; for they are too opinionated to act together and carry out a policy of their own. The mugwump is rationalist in opinion and cosmopolitan in sympathies. He dislikes ideals, dogmas, and utopias, and loves to expose sham and cant.

Of these types the first two are original and the last two evidently of later growth. Social history is made by the struggle of these types to impress their respective ideals upon national character. The outcome from age to age changes with the changing conditions of survival. Being an ultra-Darwinist, Patten watches narrowly the vicissitudes in the food, clothing, housing, and habits of a people, in order to see what kind of man is surviving and what kind dying out. The beginnings of plenty in the Middle Ages decimated the sensualists, and the abstemious Puritan drew to the front by reason of his steady habits. But the indoor Puritans were too ascetic to look after their comfort, and consumption thinned them to the vanishing point. Their impress, however, remained. England adopted their domestic ideal, adding to it outdoor exercise and the bath-tub. "An unbathed Englishman is a sensualist. A bath turns him into a gentle optimist."

Patten has analyzed population as a shrewd and observant field economist rather than as a psychologist of the schools. His classification may not be scientific, but it is practical; and for a first attempt it lights up matters wonderfully. No student of social theory can afford to neglect it.

Professor Giddings posits four types of character, —the *forceful,* the *convivial,* the *austere,* and the *rationally conscientious.* The *forceful* are fearless, adventure-loving, and fond of athletic exploits, feats of arms, and dangerous occupations. Their amusements are drinking, wrestling, fencing, gambling, dancing, etc. Men of this type take to seafaring, fishery, mining, ranching, and the railroad, fire, and police services. The *convivial* man takes to safe, commonplace, profitable occupations. His pleasures are of the sensory and emotional kind. He is a good liver, gambles, frequents races, prize fights, and theatres, but does not care to engage in active sports. The *austere* type is represented by the Puritan and the reformer. Finally, we have the *rationally conscientious* man, who enjoys all pleasures temperately, and has intellectual and scientific tastes. His avocations are literature, art, science, and citizenship.

This classification follows that of Patten save that the clingers are very properly merged with other types and the sensualists are broken up into the forceful and the convivial. Professor Giddings goes on to distinguish four types of intellect and four types of disposition. Uniting these, he under-

takes to split up population into four types of mind, —the Ideo-motor, the Ideo-emotional, the Dogmatic-emotional, and the Critical-intellectual.

The lowest is forceful in character and instinctive in its activities. It has few ideas, and these are reached by perception and conjecture. The Ideo-emotional man is convivial, emotional, and suggestible. His intellect is imaginative, he gets his beliefs by suggestion, and he habitually reasons from superficial analogy. The Dogmatic-emotional type is Patten's stalwart. He is austere, domineering, and has fixed beliefs determined not from without, but by his emotions and temperament. He reasons deductively from premises he has accepted on trust. The highest type, the Critical-intellectual, is marked by breadth and balance, clear perceptions, sound judgment, careful reasoning, and critical thinking. The disposition is creative, and the character rationally conscientious.

Giddings has ventured to distribute the population of the United States among these classes, and finds that three per cent. are of the lowest type, and one and a half per cent. of the highest. The Ideo-emotional people are much over a quarter, the Dogmatic-emotional people a fifth, and a third of the population falls between the classes. He even locates the types of character. The forceful congregate about seaboard and lakeboard, in all the mountain regions, and on the great plains. The convivial predominate in the South. The austere are thickest in a broad belt reaching from New England to

Iowa and Kansas. The rationally conscientious are found here and there in cities.

In all the foregoing Giddings has simply raised psychology a story higher. But he goes on to exploit the meaning of it for sociology; and in so doing he has made, I think, a first-class contribution to the science. For he finds that the chief stages in social development answer to the predominance of one or another of these types. When people are mainly of the Ideo-emotional sort, their coöperation will be effected through sympathy and will be mobbish. Once mass action of this kind took the form of crusades, insurrections, and revolts. To-day it manifests itself in booms, panics, crazes, political landslides, sympathetic strikes, and revivals. Control of the individual by spontaneous collective action, such as common ridicule, boycotting, mobbing, and lynching, marks the sympathetic stage of social union.

When the Dogmatic-emotional folk abound, people act in concert not from sympathy, but in consequence of having the same beliefs. When a body of transmitted beliefs is deeply stamped upon the minds of the young by means of authoritative instruction, we get a conservative society unified and held together by tradition. But it is always possible that new and enthralling dogmas, emanating from superior men and propagated by the zealous, may seize upon the vigorous dogmatic part of the population and draw it into a course of radical action. The prevalence of the dogmatic type in a community is

attested by reform agitations of a fanatical sort, by strong partisanship, by deference to tradition and authority, and by reliance upon prohibitory legislation to regulate private conduct. Characteristic of the dogmatic stage of like-mindedness are definite legal rights, formal courts of justice, and political organization.

When the Critical-intellectual element becomes influential, concerted action rests upon deliberate agreement attained through criticism, argument, discussion, and constructive reasoning based upon inductive research. A constant amalgamation of critical judgments with tradition results in unifying tastes, faiths, creeds, standards, ideals, and values. The evidences of this stage are free criticism applied to religion, the development of inductive science, the existence of a scientific political economy, the reliance upon objective evidence in legal procedure, and the habit of free political discussion.

Giddings has given us a spectrum of population as it is, not as it was born. For his schedules are elastic. Some people can and do pass upwards on the scale. Under the electrifying action of enlightenment the human ox is acquiring nerves, the flabby emotionalist is becoming vertebrate, the hide-bound dogmatist is limbering up. The higher schedules are filling from the lower, and back of it all lies the ascent of the intellect. The stages in the evolution of the social mind depend on the mental make-up of the population; and this in turn depends on those influences—such as leisure, converse, instruction, dis-

covery—which develop individual minds. Giddings, then, agrees with Buckle that the tap-root of social progress is intellectual progress. He holds with Comte against Marx, and his "four modes of like-mindedness" is a good substitute for Comte's "three stages" of theological, metaphysical and scientific thinking. At a time when his brethren are precipitately striking their colors to the economic materialists, he sturdily flies the flag of intellectualism. Rightly, too; for there is a movement of the human intellect which has nothing to do with economic facts. The increase of knowledge and the alteration of economic conditions are independent causes of social change. Let intellectualism and economism be the Urim and Thummim of the sociologist. Both are needed, if our science is to move on an even keel.

Ratzenhofer heeds nothing but congenital differences, notes only the clay of human beings, and ignores the form this clay has taken on. This may commend his classification to anthropologists; but to us it means less, seeing that social phenomena depend on people as they are, and not on people as God made them.

Distinguishing in respect to *individuality, vitality, sociality,* and *physical constitution,* he forms nine classes. The first class comprises individuals of superior vigor, intellect, and morality. They are masterful, self-assertive, ambitious, optimistic people, eager to cope with difficulties and carve out a place for themselves. They cherish the family ideal, and

are good parents. From this class issue intellectual leaders and captains of industry. The second class comprises the multitude of narrow, practical-minded people, animated by their private interest, but still able to coöperate with their fellows. What they can do depends on how they are led. Under superior guidance they are capable of great things; but if badly led they soon fall into confusion. The third class embraces the strong, noble, and self-sacrificing, the abler of whom are the moral leaders so long as society is in a healthy condition. They have largeness of soul, and naturally champion the collective interest. The social welfare depends upon the number and influence of these public-spirited men.

So much for the normal people. The fourth class is composed of persons abnormally egoistic and actuated by greed, ambition, vanity, and malice. They are forceful persons, hard to influence, and dead to moral considerations. Tyrants and demagogues as well as the *élite* among criminals proceed from this class. From the fifth class, characterized by weakness of individuality and vitality, such men recruit their followers. Its members are selfish, unstable, and weak to resist temptation. Ordinarily, they are held in balance by the better element; but in troublous times they may furnish a dangerous support to the demagogue. A sixth class embraces men of strong individuality and impersonal aims, but lacking in vitality, poise, and common sense. Saints, martyrs, fanatics, ascetics, and other unpractical

persons who offer themselves up for an idea represent this type.

The remaining classes comprise the various types of defectives and degenerates.

All manner of momentous social changes flow from changes in the relative size of these classes and from circumstances that give the upper hand now to the constructive and now to the subversive classes. Alternations of stagnation and progress, of vigor and feebleness, of order and anarchy, or of degeneration and regeneration, are the work neither of institutions nor of extraordinary individuals. They are due to the shifting balance between the normal and abnormal elements in the population. For the key to social vicissitudes we must seek among those obscure physiological factors which cause one kind of men to flourish and multiply while another kind perishes.

In view of the leadership of American thinkers in the classifying of population one may wonder if our society does not offer a rare opportunity for such study. In central and eastern Europe it is not easy for the sociologist to read typal traits, obliterated as they often are by class traits and nationality traits. The individual is a palimpsest of which the earlier writing is undecipherable. In France provincial traits are obtrusive, and one distinguishes local rather than psychological types. But in the United States local types are slow to form. The class stamp is not yet deep. There are millions of individuals bearing the brand of no particular herd.

Moreover, great bodies of immigrants are being denationalized. Here, then, if anywhere, is a chance to classify people by traits that antedate social influences and root in mental constitution and temperament.

IV. Derivative Differences in Population[1]

To show how well-marked types are created by place, work, social environment and institutions.

While social conditions can be shown to flow partly from differences in the population, it is also true, though in a less degree, that diversities in the population can be shown to flow from social conditions, especially those of a fundamental character. Besides original contrasts in type there are derived differences, and recently there is a marked tendency to isolate and explain these derived differences. Spencer, in accounting for the moral contrast between the members of a militant society and those of industrial society by the contrast of their predominant activities, took a line that is now eagerly followed in the hope of throwing light on the baffling diversity of type and class.

More and more the time-honored appeal to race is looked upon as the resource of ignorance or indolence. To the scholar the attributing of the mental and moral traits of a population to heredity is a confession of defeat, not to be thought of until he has wrung from every factor of life its last drop of ex-

[1] See appended bibliography, IV.

planation. "Blood" is not a solvent of every problem in national psychology, and "race" is no longer a juggler's hat from which to draw explanations for all manner of moral contrasts and peculiarities. Nowadays no one charges to inborn differences the characteristic contrasts between Englishmen and Russians, between Jews and Christians, between Javanese and Japanese. The marvelous transformation, to-day of Japan, to-morrow, perhaps, of China and Siam and the Philippines, makes one doubt if even the impassive Oriental is held fast in the net of race. Perhaps the soul-markings of Anglo-Saxons or Slavs or Orientals are of societal origin, due to the capitalization of centuries of experience in unlike situations, and to the injection and saturation of individual minds with these transmitted products by means of social circumpressure. When the Apache youth returned from Hampton, the Hindoo back from Eton, or the Chinaman home from Yale reverts to ancestral ways, everybody cries "Race!" But why ignore the force of early impressions? If we had caught them as sucklings instead of as adolescents, perhaps there would be no reversion. Why should we expect a few years of schooling to bleach those who have been steeped until their 'teens in a special environment and culture?

To Vignes and other sociologists of the Le Play school we owe a new way of accounting for local types. The appearance of local and provincial types in a once homogeneous population has always been credited to the environment. But the operation of

the physical environment on character is no longer conceived to be so simple and direct as Guyot, Draper, and Buckle assumed. We do not take continents as unit areas of characterization. Religions are not traced to impressions from natural phenomena. The aspect of Nature plays no such rôle as Buckle assigns it. The newer view is that Nature determines Work and Reward. Work in turn fixes habits of life and prescribes the form of land tenure, domicile, family, inheritance, community. These fundamental institutions, acting in conjunction with the two primary factors, create distinctive aptitudes, modes of thinking, customs, prejudices, standards,—in a word, a type of character. The causal series, then, is longer than Montesquieu and Buckle thought, and more like a net of links than a simple chain. No doubt environment is lord of life; but Work, Reward, and Tradition are his viziers.

Nor does one venture nowadays to connect the traits of a vast people with its present physical surroundings. It is only little peoples that can have a special and uniform environment. In the same nation there are a number of distinct regions, each sculpturing the soul of its denizens in its own way. These create local types, but national types can be connected with Nature only by the mediation of such unifying and generalizing factors as tradition, assimilation, national culture, religion, law, or history. The larger and more diversified the area in which a certain set of traits prevails, the more our

explanation must lean on race or tradition instead of physical environment.

France, highly diversified geographically and long inhabited by an extremely stable population, abounds in strongly marked local types. On these Demolins, the brightest intellect of the Le Play school, has written a book as charming as Dumas and as convincing as Euclid. Much as his descriptive "social geography" delights Frenchmen, its interest for us is in his method of accounting for local diversities,—in a word, his social causation.

Take the Auvergnat. Auvergne being a mountainous region, more suited to grazing than to farming, its inhabitants are occupied with stock-raising, especially the raising of fine beeves. The sale of his stock at the local fairs develops in the Auvergnat that peculiar skill in deceiving and bluffing we find in our "horse-trader." This shrewdness in getting the best of a bargain fits him to succeed in town, and stimulates a very lively migration from pastoral Auvergne to the centres of trade. These migrants take to peddling "old clothes" and all branches of the second-hand business, because in this petty commerce their Yankee-like "smartness" finds full scope. For that larger commerce that renounces the special bargain with each customer they have no talent; their peasant cunning does not avail them here. Even when the Auvergnat enters the higher walks, the practical spirit of a bargaining folk shows itself. The great men Auvergne has given to France have

been lawyers, soldiers, statesmen, never writers, artists, or orators.

The tap-root of the Provençal type immortalized in Daudet's *Tartarin* is the cultivation of fruit-trees. In sunny Provence nature works almost unaided, and the farmer reduces to a gatherer of olives and almonds. Exempt from the heavy labors of the tiller of the soil, he becomes indolent and easy-going, a lover of leisure and siesta and converse. As the products of his orchards are important articles of export, we find improved ways, developed markets, and a taste for commerce. In fact, horticulture and commerce occupy the population.

Fruit-growing demands personal care, rather than large capital and routine labor under skilled direction. It makes for small holdings and a diffused ownership. Hence the Provençals have never been feudalized, have never developed the social hierarchy that has moulded the Norman or Engiish soul. It is their love of equality that has been the mainspring of French republicanism.

Where conditions demand hard work, the energetic refuse to be unequally yoked with the lazy in a communal household. But, in Provence, life is easy; and so the family remains large and patriarchal. Leisure and communal life foster the gregarious spirit and favor habits of social intercourse. The Provençal is, therefore, sociable to the core; and the presence of others intoxicates him. He talks all the time, talks in a high voice in order to get a hearing, and habitually draws the long bow

that he may attract the attention of his talkative fellows.

Petty horticulture permits agglomeration into towns, and so leads to an extraordinary development of public life. The lively municipal assemblies and agitations of Provence school the Provençals for success in French politics and administration just as the Celtic clan has trained the Irish for the capture of our city governments. A frothy, emotional eloquence, a capacity for prompt cohesion about a leader for the conquest of political spoils, and a belief in the omnipotence of the state,—all these Provençal aptitudes are traced to a mode of livelihood that exempts from hard work.

In Demolins's melting-pot that picturesque type, the Corsican, is resolved into a few simple elements. He is explained by two facts. His Work is Simple Collection,—*i. e.,* grazing and horticulture,—and his Place is neither mountain nor plain, but mountain penetrating and dominating the plain. Like all who live by tending and gathering, the Corsican disdains intense labor, and leaves tillage to immigrating Italians. When he leaves his isle, he passes by domestic service, agriculture, industry, and commerce to edge his way into the army, the police, or the administration. Since life is not hard, the family community has not been disrupted into simple families; and the Corsican remains very sensitive to the ties of blood.

Shaggy mountains, rising abruptly from settled valleys, furnish an ideal refuge to law breakers,

who "take to the brush," and from there prey upon and terrorize the population. Brigandage in turn develops the clan, and the quarrels of individuals become the vendettas of clans. Loyalty and clannishness and constancy in hatred as in friendship thus become the salient features of Corsican character.

The opportunity to practice violence with impunity and the habit of domination,—for the bandits provide chiefs to the clans—develop a spirit which impels Corsicans to press into army, church, police, politics—any profession, in short, that grants them a morsel of authority. Since the clan organization exalts personal obligations at the expense of civic obligations, political struggle is, among Corsicans, a form of civil strife, and party success a form of brigandage. In Corsica as in Provence politics is a fine art, but here the leader is conspirator rather than demagogue. He leads by personal ascendency rather than by genial good-fellowship and, like the American "boss," relies on "deals" rather than on eloquence to achieve his purpose.

Flushed by the flattering reception of his work, Demolins has recently broken off his survey of French types to take up the more ambitious task of explaining, by the same method, the historical peoples. He aims at nothing less than dispensing with original human varieties, and deriving the attributes of each people, as well as the features of its social life, from the *route* it has followed. A volume on the *routes* of the ancient peoples has ap-

peared, and we are promised another dealing with modern societies.

In his new reading of human evolution the word "race" hardly occurs. This biological notion is replaced by a sociological notion, the "type." For each *route*—that is to say, the physical environment which leaves its stamp upon a nascent folk,—there is a type. The steppe, the tundra, the forest, the desert, the valley, the seaport, the highland, each creates its type. Instead of "Mongol race" our author would say "the type of the steppe." The Lapps are "the type of the tundras," the Pelasgians "the type of the valley," the Dorians "the type of the mountain." An historical people is sometimes a type—the Chinese—or a particular combination of types—the Greeks.

Demolins does not expatiate on the influence of climate or the aspect of nature. Mental and moral characteristics are derived, not immediately from the physical environment, but from Work and from Domestic and Social Organization, which, in the main, is shaped by Work. They are consequences, not causes, of social conditions. To connect the social type with the natural environment, Demolins has carefully analyzed the early forms of economic life. Acting on Le Play's maxim, that mode of livelihood is the key to social science, he has unearthed a multitude of humble but significant facts bearing on the way men live. No man, however, does well to take the globe itself as his field. On the nomads of the steppe and the desert and on certain Med-

iterranean peoples, Demolins is well informed and delightful; but where his facts are meagre, he is more ingenious than convincing.

We realize the merits of his method, however, when we turn to the similar attempt of Matteuzi to exalt environment at the expense of race. The Italian champions a telluric determinism, whereas that of the Frenchman is economic. He would account for a people by the influences of its historic seat, while Demolins seeks out the *route* that formed the people in its plastic period. Believing in the inheritance of acquired characters, he attributes to the physical environment a cumulative influence. It is a graving tool that cuts a little deeper each generation. Demolins, on the other hand, steers clear of physiological assumptions. The only fixation of traits he will recognize is that which occurs by means of social structure and tradition. When we add that Matteuzi, ignoring the rôle of the individual genius, would gather into the net of his formula even the religious, speculative, and artistic products of a ripe civilization, the appraisal of his work is no longer difficult.

The importance of race in social philosophy has been discussed by Profesor Ripley, and his adverse decision is the more weighty because he believes in race as a physical fact. He goes with the craniologist, in finding three races in the present population of western Europe; but he is not so ready as Lapouge, Sergi, or Bertillon, to connect psychic traits with physical traits. If comparison of head form,

tint, and stature shows that two populations—say highlanders and lowlanders or North Italians and South Italians—are of different races, the "anthropo-sociologist" is apt to hinge on this fact all their moral and social diversities. Where Demolins applies geography as the key to local diversities, Lapouge applies anthropology. Ripley, on the other hand, is chary of ethnic explanations of differences between districts in respect to domestic gregariousness, political conservatism, or frequency of suicide or divorce. He concludes: "Most of the social phenomena we have noted as peculiar to the areas occupied by the Alpine type are the necessary outcome, not of racial proclivities, but rather of a geographical and social isolation characteristic of the habitat of this race. The ethnic type is still pure, for the very same reason that social phenomena are primitive. Wooden ploughs pointed with stone, blood revenge, an undiminished birth-rate and relative purity of physical type are all alike derivative from a common cause,—isolation directly physical and coincidently social. We discover, primarily, an influence of environment where others perceive phenomena of ethnic inheritance."

On this matter of social isolation some very beautiful work has been done in the course of the last ten years. A. Leroy-Beaulieu set the pace by his brilliant success in using isolation as the key to the Jewish enigma. The vulgar persist in regarding the traits of the Jew as a race endowment. They stigmatize this or that propensity of his as "Oriental"

or "Semitic," and therewith consider the matter ended. The Frenchman perceived that the Jews are not a race, but a people, and set himself to explain how their characteristics have risen naturally from Work and Surroundings.

The Jewish type formed behind the double chain of barriers that for centuries separated the orthodox Jews from the European community; the restrictions of the mediæval Christians which penned them up in the Ghetto, and the Mosaic law which separated them from the Gentiles by a fence of rite and ceremonial observance. The traits of the type developed under these two exclusions,—one offensive, the other defensive,—express for the most part the stress of social conditions. The Jew has an incomparable value sense because for generations he was forced into trade and money changing. He esteems learning because the distinction of the scholar was open to him, but not that of the warrior or statesman. He clings to his religion as all dispossessed peoples cling to the rock of ancestral tradition amid the devouring waves of assimilation. He has his passions and impulses under prudent control, as happens always with unwarlike people long schooled in trade, city life, and money dealings. He lacks in sense of honor because the impulses radiating from chivalry had no access to him. He takes to ruse and hypocrisy because so long treated as a social pariah. If he has a double code of ethics, it is because persecution has developed in him an intense tribal consciousness and a vivid sense of dif-

ference from Christians. He has the domestic virtues because family life has been his refuge from the injustices and insults of social life. The Jew is, then, a product; and many of the peculiarities charged to his Semitic blood will disappear with the complete disappearance of the conditions that produced them.

To Miss Schreiner, also, we owe some golden pages on the genesis of a type in isolation. Throughout the world the half-breeds of juxtaposed higher and lower races have been proverbial for viciousness. The universal popular verdict is that the mongrel is born with a tendency to be deceitful, cowardly, licentious, and without self-respect. This double tincture of evil is commonly laid to crossing, on the assumption that heredity in such case transmits to the offspring the vices of both parents and the virtues of neither. It was left to Miss Schreiner to light up this enigma, and to show that the depravity of the half-caste is a problem for the sociologist rather than the physiologist.

The secret is that the half-caste issues from an irregular union and is without family or people. Morally he is a derelict, drifting forlornly between two societies but belonging to neither. Scorned by the whites and despising the blacks, there is no social place for him; and so he lacks the steadying influence of his kind. The pure black "is in a society which has its own stern social standards and ideals, by living up to which he may still become an object of admiration and respect to his fellows, and above

all to himself." "His tribe may be broken up, but he still feels himself an integral part of a great people, up to whose standards he is bound to live, and in whose eyes as in his own he is one of the goodliest and completest creatures on God's earth." These race standards which the sheer pressure of common opinion forces into the soul of the individual do not reach the half-caste. The Kaffir has the honor of a Kaffir, the white man the honor of a white; but there is no half-caste honor because no self-conscious race of half-castes generating the ideals and public opinion that support a social line of conduct. The half-caste is simply a fine clinical case of social isolation. What more striking proof could there be that morality, for the most part, takes its rise in human relations!

How far does Work create diversity of character? On this topic no one has been more ingenious than Professon Veblen. He accounts for the alienation of workingmen from the Church on the ground that the members of the artisan class "are in an especial degree exposed to the characteristic intellectual and spiritual stress of modern organized industry, which requires a constant recognition of the undisguised phenomena of impersonal matter-of-fact sequence and an unreserved conformity to the law of cause and effect." Such experiences tend to derange animistic habits of thought.

The great gulf between business men and workingmen in type of thinking he ascribes to the different discipline involved in pecuniary as contrasted

with industrial employments. The differentiation of these has proceeded so far that nowadays in many branches large bodies of workers have but an incidental contact with the business side of the enterprise, while a minority have little other concern with the enterprise than its pecuniary management. Now, in the pecuniary occupations, men work within the lines and under the guidance of the great institution of ownership, with its ramifications of custom and legal right; while, in the industrial occupations, men are in their work attentive to natural law, and relatively free from the constraint of conventional norms of truth and validity. The latter fact explains the thriftlessness and lack of money wisdom among workingmen, even the high-priced experts. To it, also, is due the spread of socialism, —a movement which, quite unlike agrarian and like manifestations of class discontent, does not aim to affect the distribution of property, but to do away with private ownership altogether. On the other hand, the activities of the business man, having more to do with competing, bargaining, and the getting, holding, and protecting of property, tend to conserve predatory habits and aptitudes, to root them in the creed of property, to train them to believe in competition rather than coöperation, to kill any artistic interest in industrial operations, and to dispose them to appraise every process and product at its money worth.

From occupation it is but a step to economic relations as a cause of differentiation.

The fundamental thesis of Veblen's remarkable book is that the possession of means sufficient to exempt from productive labor moulds so subtly the notions of utility, of fitness, of right, and of beauty that in the course of time the wealthy become spiritually a distinct type, so recognized by all the world. His consummate analysis shows that in every age and society the "gentleman," although he may be—quite incidentally—an epitome of human excellences, is, in point of origin, the finished product of the views, canons, and standards that develop inevitably, albeit unconsciously, in a leisure class by sheer virtue of its pecuniary independence.

Why is this class conservative? "Wisdom," say its friends. "Self-interest," say its critics. But to Veblen men are not so rational. The wealthy leisure class is conservative in temper because it is sheltered from the stress of those economic exigencies which continually play on other classes and mould their habits of thought to new conditions. There is nothing to develop in its members that degree of uneasiness with the existing order which alone can induce any body of men to give up habitual views and modes of life.

In like vein Mrs. Stetson, who has written a book to show that many of the proverbial feminine traits, far from being marks of sex, are simply outgrowths of the economic dependence of women on men. The exclusion of woman from working on her own account makes her a kind of parasite, and develops in her the parasite's tenacity and power of absorp-

tion. Seeing that her economic fate depends on her being able to win and hold man, she invests too much of her personality in sex attraction, and becomes "oversexed." Because she is shut away from the active world within the four walls of the home, she is limited in her information, her ideas, her thought processes, and her judgment. Because she throws her whole being into the highly personal "home" relations, woman magnifies the personal and ignores the general, is unwilling to "stand in line" or "take turn," is deficient in sense of justice and belated in commercial or civic morality, is exaggerated in her devotion to her own and in ministration to their personal needs, but weak in devotion to the corporate welfare. In fact, the sexuo-economic relation, if unmitigated, arrests woman's moral development at the stage of primitive virtues—and vices. The fact that in her marital tutelage she is always being praised or blamed for her conduct develops in her a hair-trigger conscience; but she is apt to be purblind to law, justice, desert. She lives in a forcing bed of sensitiveness to distinctions of right and wrong, but lacks the broad judgment that alone can guide and govern this sensitiveness.

What a broad clearing in the jungle! Hitherto we have assumed that men and women are played upon by the same influences, and so their differences in character must be laid to sex. But "sex," like "race," is the recourse of the lazy. By putting her finger on economic dependence rather than on "love," Mrs. Stetson has closed a new circuit.

Woman, as Schopenhauer saw her, has something in common with slaves, courtiers, onhangers generally. Any human being that must depend not on labor but on closeness of attachment to some other human being, will develop many "feminine" traits. "Woman" is by no means synonymous with "human female." Certain proclivities supposed to reach the bed-rock of sex are found to root in the surface soil of modifiable social conditions. After Lester F. Ward, no one has done more than Mrs. Stetson to show that the woman question is for the sociologist as well as the biologist.

Another example of the power of economic relations to generate a mental type is furnished by Professor Turner in his study of Western influence. The reason why we have produced an Americanism tangent to European thought is that our national character has formed in the presence of a West. By "West" is meant not an area, but a condition. It is the region where the institutions and ideas of an older society are being transformed by the influence of free land. "A new environment is suddenly entered, freedom of opportunity is opened, the cake of custom is broken, and new activities, new lines of growth, new institutions, and new ideals are brought into existence." Although this primitive society develops, differentiates, becomes "East," the early impress abides; and moreover a new West springs up further on to emit fresh impulses of equality and individualism. "Decade after decade, West after West, this rebirth of American society has gone on,

has left its traces behind it, and has reacted on the East."

If the democratic temper pervades a community because opportunity is open, manhood at a premium, birth and inherited station at a discount, and earning power fairly uniform, then we ought to conclude that colonies owe their democracy, not to their newness, but to their free land. Not escape from traditions of subserviency, but the high economic potential of the common man, is the cause of their political and social democracy. If this be so, everything depends on the relations of the people to the land. By princely grants to the few it is possible to root feudalism even in the wilderness. The strong Tory, aristocratic spirit that showed itself in the American proprietary colonies was the result of great estates. In the South, aristocracy flourished with the plantation system and languished in the regions where small holdings prevail.

California, when the gold-seekers reached it, was a young country; yet Spanish grants had permitted a semi-feudal society to arise. Spanish-America, in fact, unlike our quarter-sectioned West, never started right and never proved a nursery of democratic ideals. The Spaniards, moreover, grazed their West; and pastoralism, from the huge stock-raising farms of the old Narragansett planters to the wide cattle ranches of Argentina and the vast "sheep runs" of New South Wales, tends to build up a territorial aristocracy for the same reason probably that prehistoric pastoralism developed the patriarchate.

It is agricultural or mining communities with widely diffused ownership that tend towards economic independence and equality, and are the natural foundations of American, Canadian, and Australian democracy. We shall see if a like indigenous democracy develops in Siberia, the only virgin region in the temperate zone now coming under the plough of the white man.

V. Social Selections[1]

To recognize that institutions and policies work selectively upon a people, and may profoundly modify its destiny.[2]

Darwin showed that a species is not stationary, but insensibly drifts in consequence of the fact that those individuals with a certain favorable quality or variation fare better than other individuals in the struggle for existence. The species, like the glacier, moves, but so slowly as to escape the common observation. This process of modifying a species Darwin called "natural selection," and showed that it applies to man as well as to the lower species. But soon the thought arose, Does not *society* impose decisive conditions as well as *nature?* Alongside of *natural selections* are there not—to use the phrase coined by Broca in 1872 — *social selections?* The blood of a people determines its social history. Does

[1] See appended bibliography, V.

[2] Owing to the recency of this manner of thinking, the writer will not confine himself to the literature solely of the last decade.

not the social history of a people, in turn, determine its blood?

To Galton belongs the honor of being the pioneer in the study of the reactions of society upon the race. In his *Hereditary Genius* he charges the institution of religious celibacy with brutalizing the breed of Europeans. In the Middle Ages the gentlest natures sterilized themselves by taking refuge in the bosom of childless priesthoods and religious orders. The Church "acted precisely as if she had aimed at selecting the rudest portion of the community to be the parents of future generations. She practised the arts which breeders would use who aimed at creating ferocious, currish, and stupid natures." But worse followed. "The Church, having first captured all the gentle natures and condemned them to celibacy, made another sweep of her huge nets, this time fishing in stirring waters, to catch those who were the most fearless, truth-seeking, and intelligent in their modes of thought, and therefore the most suitable parents of a high civilization," and by persecution "put a strong check, if not a direct stop, to their progeny." But the servile, the indifferent, and the stupid bred on.

Again, England, by extending a welcome to desirable types that in vast number sought refuge with her from the brutal, bigoted persecutions of the Continent, has undoubtedly raised her average of energy and character. Likewise the rapid rise of new colonies and the decay of old civilizations is mainly due, in Galton's estimation, to the social

agencies which in the one case promote and in the other case retard the marriage of the more suitable breeds. In the colony the men marry early; and, on account of the fewness of women, the inferior men find no mates.

Darwin points out that the red hand of war uproots the wheat and leaves the tares, and that standing armies give those rejected by the recruiting officer an economic and matrimonial lead over those selected to serve their time. He observes that the transmission of large property shelters the children of the rich from selective stress, and confesses that the inheritance of wealth is of social rather than of racial benefit. Primogeniture is still worse, for worthless eldest sons with entailed estates cannot even squander their wealth.

A high standard of comfort and a lofty ideal of family life delay marriage in the finer strains of the population, and cause them to increase more slowly than the squalid and reckless. This handicap is only in part neutralized by the higher death-rate among the wives and children of the lower classes. The amazing progress of new countries has undoubtedly social causes; but it is also partly due to the fact that colonists are above the average in native energy, courage, and initiative.

From natural selection De Candolle distinguishes artificial selection proceeding from the conscious will of man, but he has not isolated that intermediate form exercised by institutions. Nevertheless, through his studies of selection at different levels—

savagism, barbarism, and civilization—are scattered some observations on social selections.

He points out that among barbarians the strong and successful man, because he is allowed to mate with several handsome and healthy women, distances the mediocre at a rate he could never attain, were he held down to one wife. Moreover, this mating, as it obeys physical attraction, is peculiarly favorable to the perfecting of physique. The monogamy of civilized societies, on the other hand, exalts female choice, and by giving freer play to sexual selection favors a perpetuation of good moral and intellectual qualities, albeit at the expense of good looks. In many persons, however, monogamy even now goes against the grain; and hence, unhappily, it calls into being the illicit polygamy of prostitution, which condemns to sterility a contingent of women above the average in good looks and physique.

From the notorious fact that the poorer classes multiply faster than the well-to-do, De Candolle infers that an institution like religion, which is handed down in the family, will triumph sooner if preached among the poor than if it is launched among the rich. He cites Christianity, which won its first following among the humble but fertile classes of the Roman Empire, and Catholicism, which daily gains ground in the United States by the sheer fecundity of the Irish immigrants.

A European reverberation has been wakened by Nietzsche's furious assault on the reigning ideals. According to this ultra-Darwinist, Christianity, the

apotheosis of pity, the "religion of the suffering," is a drug for paralyzing the arm of the strong. Our democratic neighbor-morality is consecrated on behalf of timid, gregarious humans, dreading the trampling self-assertion of the superior men. Under the broad shield of these restraints pullulate and degenerate multitudes of sickly and ill-constituted, who ought now, as in the olden time, to be harried into fewness by the well-born and powerful.

A régime of peace and law does, indeed, slow up elimination among men, just as perpetual June would check it among insects. But when Nietzsche, going further, imagines that order and equality before the law somehow hinder the finest men from marrying the finest women, and begetting the "beyond man" as promptly as nature will let them, he parts company with the sane.

A perplexing problem for the selectionist is offered by the migrants that in all civilized lands stream incessantly from country to city. This cityward drift is very marked in Germany; and to three Germans, Hansen, Ammon, and Kuczynski, we owe what light has been shed in the matter. Hansen propounds the thesis that the population of cities tends constantly to die out, and that it is and must be replenished from the overflowing rural population. Against the common opinion that the upper, middle, and lower classes are independent streams flowing side by side, he insists that the social classes are the stages of development of one current of human beings flowing from the country. In the city these immigrants are

gradually sorted and segregated into classes. In the higher of these classes, families tend to die out rapidly owing to celibacy, lateness of marriage, and the influence of social considerations in matrimonial choice. The city is, then, a devourer of men, and cannot endure without a steady supply of fresh human material from the farms.

Ammon, building further, elaborates a complete account of the urban apparatus for the selection and promotion of the fittest. The city is a seething cauldron where the healthy overflow from the country is by competition stimulated, tested, and differentiated. Some individuals sink, some vegetate, some achieve a higher social position. The existence of stratified, non-intermarrying social classes insures that this economic grading shall not be without physiological results. The promoted capables not only render efficient service to society, but they mate within their class and beget offspring of more than ordinary ability. These climb higher, wed with their kind, and beget a progeny still richer in talent and genius. But in these forcing houses the human crop, though choice, is light. In the course of three or four generations of over-nutrition and one-sided cerebral stress the superior stocks vanish, and make room for sturdy newcomers swarming up in just the same way from the lower rungs of the social ladder.

The social classes, narrowing upwards, constitute, then, a succession of filter tanks, or—shall we say—a series of paddocks for grading up capables, bring-

ing them to their utmost individual development and causing them to mate with their equals. By this means is society provided with leadership. But the thoroughbred stocks finally die out, so there is no lasting improvement in the human breed. Indeed, the current that filters through this selective apparatus drains country districts of their best elements as well as their worst. To this urban consumption, perhaps, is due the fact that within the historic period Central Europe has been impoverished of its long-skull Teutonic element, and shows increasing brachycephaly.

Kuczynski subjects to a destructive, critical analysis the statistics adduced by Hansen and Ammon in support of their main contention. He insists that the evidence does not show that the city population is incapable of renewing itself indefinitely from its own loins. The fatal division of labor by which the country produces human beings for the city to consume does not obtain, now that modern sanitation has made city life almost as conducive to health and longevity as country life. The city is, indeed, an economic phenomenon of the first magnitude, sorting and grading the little differentiated stream of human beings attracted to it by its wealth of opportunities. But, anthropologically, it is by no means the crucible, the Bessemer converter, Ammon assumes it to be.

"Social Evolution" is a warning to those over eager to spell out in flaming letters the message of science before the returns have been verified. Hav-

ing ever before his eyes the fear of Weismann's *panmixia,* Mr. Kidd proclaims that only by rivalry and the selection and accumulation of desirable congenital variations can the human race continue to progress or even escape retrogression. He forthwith proceeds to identify economic competition with the struggle for existence, success with the survival of the fittest, the poverty and suffering of the masses with the elimination of the unfit. The power that drives this selective apparatus is assumed to be the pressure of population upon subsistence. But Kidd goes on to state that the rivalry of life which conditions race progress is nowhere so strenuous and severe as with the progressive peoples. How this can be, in view of the fact that it is just these peoples that have learned to multiply at a human rather than an animal rate of speed, he does not explain.

If it is the food quest that "makes the world go round," the "rivalry of life" ought to be more stressful in Java or India than in France or the United States; but plainly it is not. The lupine theory of progress, therefore, breaks down. The secret of this undeniable keying up of competition among the peoples most exempt from over-population and hunger will never be supplied by biological thinkers like Kidd. It must be sought of social psychologists like Tarde and Dumont, Veblen and Gurewitsch, who have formulated the laws that govern the expansion of human wants, and have shown how, in societies of a certain type, all classes are inflamed with new desires from the example of the classes above them,

and are spurred by social ambition to put forth their utmost efforts.

With Kidd's opinion of the modern tendency to equalize opportunities, it is instructive to compare that of Haycraft. Kidd hails it as a perfecting of the selective process, whereby the members of the "disinherited" classes are admitted to the rivalry of life on equal terms with the rest. Haycraft grants him that the democratic régime of equal chances for all is a success from the standpoint of social efficiency. Universal competition does, in fact, get the round peg into the round hole, the best man into the best post, the second-best man into the second-best post, and so on. But the race loses. The "social capillarity" that smooths the way upward for the capables lessens their fecundity. They spend more of their lives in preparing for their work and in winning a foothold. They marry later and their brides are three or four years older than the brides of miners or operatives. Even if they rear the same number of children, the interval between the generations is longer, and there will be fewer generations in a given period. The "aristocracy of achievement" that elbows out the old hereditary aristocracy tends, therefore, to extinction. Those who rise are less prolific than those left behind. Under the modern conditions of success it would seem that the lower classes, ever more thoroughly drained of their fittest individuals, must eventually swamp the upper classes, composed of successful combatants in the battle of life. The broad, fecund, self-perpetuating

layer of the population will become impoverished, like a worn-out tobacco field or a fish pond too closely seined.

Under the influence of the Darwinists, Seeck, the latest historian of the Lower Empire, undertakes to account for the world-historic decadence of ancient society by social mis-selection. The decay of ancient Greece, marked by a lamentable lowering of ability in every department of culture, he connects with the ferocious party struggles between aristocrats and democrats. In these struggles, at each turn of fortune's wheel all persons of distinction belonging to the defeated party were banished or slaughtered. Thus, we read of seven hundred families being exiled at one time from Athens, one thousand leading citizens executed at Mitylene, four thousand at Gela. In generations of such savage work the contending factions contrived to drain Greece of her best blood, and left to her insignificant and mediocre families an inglorious and decadent future.

In like manner Seeck connects the decline of ability among the Romans, and especially the notable decline in their courage and force of character, with the wholesale massacres of the Social Wars. Marius and Cinna murder the aristocrats and their personal enemies by thousands, Sulla extirpates the democrats with equal ferocity, and the remaining noble blood is spilled under the proscriptions of the triumvirs. All the bold were slain; only cowards remained alive, and from their progeny issued the

timid, characterless generations of the Lower Empire, that bewailed the passing of the old greatness and idly let the barbarians smash in upon them.

The most comprehensive and thorough examination of social selections thus far made is the work of Lapouge, who has not only surveyed the results of his predecessors, but has added many contributions of his own. All the alterations of the human breed that arise from social causes he groups under the six heads of military, political, religious, moral, legal, and economic selection.

Once war selected well, and on the whole assured the survival of the bravest, strongest, and most adroit. In civilized populations, however, war takes the pick, and leaves the unfit to stay at home and propagate. The poor quality of the recruits that presented themselves in France in 1891 and in Germany in 1892 is due largely to the fact that they were begotten during the Franco-Prussian war, when the *élite* were in the field. In these days of machine guns, moreover, the battle no longer spares prowess, as it did in the days of spear or sword war, but mows men down indiscriminately.

Political selection is exemplified in the Revolutionary struggles, where the great men of France guillotined one another in turn, and only mediocrity throve. In hardly any epoch has political contest been free from the shedding of blood; and even today the victors, while they respect the lives, do not spare the livelihoods, of their office-holding opponents.

An example of moral selection is our exacting standard of decency, which by insisting on the complete covering up of the body reduces cutaneous respiration, and results either in a slow asphyxiation or in throwing more work upon the lungs. In Oceania, says Lapouge, tuberculosis and evangelization have advanced hand in hand. As the missionary imposes clothes on his converts, they begin to fall a prey to consumption, so that, as an English statesman declared in Parliament, the most rapid and effective means of clearing a Pacific island for colonization is not the demijohn or the rifle, but the gospel!

The cult of charity has worked regressively, keeping alive the unfit, assisting them to rear large families of their ilk, and even forming monstrous varieties of our species, such as the horrible *crétins* of the Alpine valleys.

Legal selection is instanced by punishment, which has been a selective agent of no mean order when we remember that the little England of Elizabeth hung eight hundred malefactors a year. Indeed, some have attributed the unusually low criminality of the British population to this ferocious purging. To-day, however, punishment is so little eliminative that many advocate the sterilization of all congenital criminals as the only means of thinning out the bad breeds.

The most decisive influence of law is, however, in the matter of marriage. The institution of polygamy is a means of favorable selection, because

it abstracts women from the inferior, and multiplies the descendants of the successful and well-to-do, who are able to support an establishment of several wives. In its natural form it handicaps the scrubs in favor of the thoroughbreds. In the approaching competition of Occidentals and Orientals, says Lapouge, the former, who limit the superior man to one wife, will carry a heavy handicap.

In viewing the selective workings of economic institutions, Lapouge shows himself as radical as Ammon is conservative. The struggle for wealth does not bring to the top the intellectual aristocracy. The emulative standards of plutocratic expenditure infect all classes save the poor, and cut down the size of the family. Inherited wealth shields its possessors from selective stress, and permits retrogression. The plutocracy of to-day is far, very far, he thinks, from favoring the multiplication of the best.

It would take long to name the faces that have turned towards this fascinating question of social selections. We have Dugdale and McCulloch and Warner, with their studies of maleficent charity; Reid, who argues that the intemperate peoples are the ones that have not undergone alcoholic selection; Ripley, who has amassed the facts bearing on climatic selection, and has shown the influence of "consciousness of kind" in controlling matrimonial choice; Pearson, who assesses the selective value of economic competition; and Jordan, who has eloquently compared war and peace in their effect on the quality of the race

The future, no doubt, belongs to the doctrine of selection. But, if the selectionists are to make headway, there must be a fuller recognition of social factors. The master error of the social Darwinists is to see in the economic struggle a twin to the "struggle for existence" that plays so fateful a part in the modification of species. The fact is, the scramble for money or place, though it be as desperate as the fight of clawed beasts, has ceased to be a clear case of life or death. Only on the bottom steps of the social staircase do men compete from hunger. Above them men work themselves into the madhouse or the grave, not for bread, but for jam on the bread. Starvation takes ever thinner shavings from the under side of society, while overfeeding is beginning to plane down the upper side. Beyond six hundred dollars a year, it is doubtful if pecuniary success has much influence on survival. The well-to-do, with all their high-priced doctors and trips to Florida, diminish very little their natural mortality rate.

What a difference between the gaining or losing a rung in the climb for comfort, and the situation Darwin found among animals and plants, where "a grain in the balance will determine which individual shall live and which die"! With animal life, where "of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born but a small number can survive," compare a modern society where half of the males that are born finish their forty-seventh year, and where those who work themselves to death to get the

vanities of life probably outnumber those who perish from lack of its necessaries.

If economic gradation does not register itself clearly in death-rates, still less can we read it in the birth-rates. The "rivalry of life," if it is not a mere struggle to survive, is certainly not a struggle to leave offspring. The victors could multiply, but they choose to take out their success in upholstery rather than in more babies. The slums, on the other hand, are alive with infants, because the factory demand for child labor makes children an asset rather than a burden. Hence the well-to-do increase less rapidly than the poor. The professional, mercantile, and higher artisan classes have smaller families than the workingmen; and the fact that they rear a larger percentage of their children to maturity does not always compensate for their lower marriage-rate and birth-rate. Moreover, this saving of infants by better care amounts, in many cases, to keeping alive the less fit.

The fact is, in the higher societies the "battle of life" is now of the Red Cross kind, and is little selective. It is hardly a struggle to exist, still less a struggle to reproduce, but chiefly a struggle to rise; and the winners are liable to be out-multiplied by the losers, and displaced by their progeny. At best, the net result of it all is not "the survival of the fittest," but *the promotion of the capable.* At worst, the outcome is a partial suspension of natural selection among the hereditarily rich.

For all the naturalists may say, the food quest,

prime agent of selection among the beasts, is no longer the chief winnower of men. Clothes, stoves, cookery, firearms, and medicaments have, moreover, withdrawn us from some of the stresses that sifted the cave-men. But still Nature finds ways of getting her flawed pots to the shard-heap. Climate, that screens immigrants so mercilessly, continues to drop through the mesh a serious fraction of each generation. Microbes lay low the non-resistant stocks. The arrows of many diseases—though not all—fly selectively, striking down the inferior in physique. The accidents of life and the hazards of occupations snatch away the reckless and thoughtless. Drink and vice purge from the ranks those fierce of appetite and weak of will. Diet, regimen, personal habits, are so many means of casting out the stupid and imprudent.

The social selections are by no means of a stripe with these natural selections. Nature eliminates the unfit; society eliminates the misfit. Nature rejects the defective; society preserves them, but burns the heretic and hangs the criminal. For the most part, though, the social selections do not eliminate anybody. They determine not who shall live, but who shall propagate the next generation. They select not survivors, but parents. Most institutions and policies that sift human beings do so by influencing one or more of the following factors: (*a*) the inclination to marriage; (*b*) the amount of marriage, —polygamy, monogamy, etc.; (*c*) the age of marriage; (*d*) the will to have children; (*e*) the ability

to rear children to maturity. Social selections thus discriminate between men on the basis of their volitions, whereas Nature discriminates for the most part on the basis of their bodily traits or their instincts.

The theory of social selections will doubtless throw fresh light on the causes of the decadence of nations. Under the spell of the social organism analogy, the idea long prevailed that a society, like a human being, has its youth, maturity, old age, and death. But on further reflection it was seen that the hereditary necessity that impels the individual along the fatal path to dissolution arises from a special cause. Weismann showed that death strikes only multicellular organisms, and that the normal term of life for each species is fixed by natural selection operating upon innumerable generations. Societies, however, are not organisms, and do not lie under the sceptre of heredity. The size and term of life of each society depend upon present circumstances, not upon the conditions to which ancestral societies were exposed. It may perish under the heel of invading barbarians or in the throes of civil strife; but its end is a catastrophe, never a natural death.

Now, however, with the recognition of social selections, the theory of national afternoons has been exhumed and set on its feet. Dimly we begin to discern why the career of a people is a parabola, why "every stone thrown must fall." As a society mounts to greatness, a growing civil, military, and

ecclesiastical organization concentrates talent and creates brilliant centres of energy, attracting the capable, as lighthouses fatally attract birds. In camps, courts, cloisters, universities, and capitals the *élite* become incandescent, take fire, and feed the flame of civilization.

But meanwhile certain searching primitive tests of manhood have been done away with, survival and reproduction have been turned askew by artificial arrangements, and motives have been unloosed which blunt the race-preserving instincts of the fittest. The flower of the race is wasted in war, or trampled under in civil contests, or drawn to centres of intense civilization, where, a prey to wants and ambitions that interfere with breeding, it becomes glorious, but sterile, fecund in deeds, ideas, and graces, but not in children. When in time the eugenic capital is used up, we have a people no longer capable of matching the achievements of their sires. The very institutions that make a people great and happy may bring in at last a race decadence which presently announces itself in social decline.

There is a way pointed out by Dumont by which the historic triumphs of vigorous races are undone. As the fertile parts of a country like France are stricken with sterility under the fever of social ambition, currents of migration set up from the poor environments, the uplands and mountains. But these are inhabited by the beaten people driven aforetime from desirable areas by the invaders. The overflow from these poverty-stricken but fecund regions

silently fills the gaps in the lowlands left by the extinction of the superior stocks. In this way the conquered avenge themselves, the progressive element is swamped, and the nation runs down like a clock with no one to wind it.

Perhaps the classic picture of over-ripe nations dropping to pieces from sheer rottenness is fanciful. Perhaps every Golden Age does not need to be paid for with a Silver Age. But the selectionists are beginning to divine how such *might* be the case. The possibility of accounting in this fashion for the passing of nations certainly lends a new interest to the records of the past and a fresh zeal to the philosophic historian.

It is likely that mere qualitative reasoning on selection has reached its zenith. Ingenious and fertile minds have gotten out of the idea about all there is in it as an easy solvent of hard problems. The next pressing task is not to hunt for new selective agencies, but to measure the relative importance of those already recognized,—to determine which are momentous and which trivial. The hour has struck to make variation and selection a branch of quantitative science, to put mathematico-statistical logic in place of the prevailing loose qualitative reasoning. We need significant facts,—above all the counting of numerous similar facts,—in order to advance further in the appraisal of social institutions. There is coming a new Darwin, who will spend half a lifetime in patiently collecting all facts that throw light on the siftings and screenings of human beings by social

agencies. He will ransack history, engulf dictionaries of biography, cross-examine medical men, pry into family life, and digest the vital statistics of the globe in order to establish his facts. Then he will isolate and test one after another every policy and institution, every type of family, inheritance, property, religion, morals, charity, warfare, education, and social organization. And his calm *exposé* of its bearing on the relative increase of breeds and stocks will constitute either its supreme vindication or its final damnation, its acquittal or its sentence in the court of last resort.

In the course of two centuries, men have passed from standard to standard in judging an institution. Is it ordained of God? Does it strengthen the State? Does it accord with human rights? Does it promote the increase of wealth? Does it conduce to the social welfare? To these successive standards, theological, political, ethical, economic, sociological, is added now the biological query, Does it favor the best breeds? This, as it heeds all the consequences of an institution, even the remotest, will constitute the final standard.

This mete-wand, by enabling us to compare the chief features of our own development with the corresponding features of other societies and times, affords a new and decisive test of the worth of social conditions and stages of culture. It yields a fresh appraisal of the cityward movement, of machine industry, of the emancipation of women, of the ascendency of mode imitation over custom imitation. The

formation of a leisure class, the growth of luxury, the spread of a feverish ambition into ever wider circles, the multiplication in the middle class of wants that interfere with the multiplication of human beings, the sterilizing of the intellectual *élite* by exacting standards of expenditure, the accenting of pecuniary considerations in matrimonial choice, the delaying of marriage among working-class girls by the opportunities of factory labor, the undermining of the family ideal by individualism,—all these phenomena that our double-quick social progress draws in its wake call for the yard stick of the selectionist.

Still more momentous is his revaluing of all social measures, policies, and arrangements. In this court of final appeal every ordinance, from the law of succession to the regulation of the liquor traffic; every institution, from slavery to primogeniture; every custom, from the marriage portion to coeducation; every social practice, from child marriage to the higher education of women; every tribunal from the Inquisition to the Hague Conference; every historical movement from the Crusades to the expulsion of the Moors,—must stand or fall by the breed of human being it favors.

When you know what kind of people multiply most under it, you know whether it is good or bad; for back of social questions lies the human question. With strong, wise, good men, any type of institution will do, because all are superfluous. Whereas a population of knaves, fools, and weaklings will turn heaven itself into an Inferno. Any practice or ar-

rangement that sifts badly, keeping the chaff instead of the grain, catching the silt and rejecting the particles of gold, must be given up, be it never so hallowed.

On this coming day of judgment the granite of authority will melt like snow, the mortar of logic will turn to dust, "eternal" principles will vanish like the morning mist. For, if society englobes generations yet to be, no institution can come off scathless that hinders the well-endowed from outbreeding the ill-constituted and filling the earth.

This test may do much to end debate and unify opinion on social questions. Into the profitless discussion of measures from the standpoint of particular interests the sociologist has thrown the question, "Is it best for society as a whole?" But society is a vague entity, and each disputant deems his own class the backbone of society. The selectionist in turn seeks to lift the plane of discussion with the question, "Will it tend to the preponderance of the fittest?" For cases where it can be applied, perhaps his touchstone will be adopted sooner than that of the sociologist. Most of us are hazy as to the social welfare; but every one knows and prefers the hale to the sickly, the wise to the foolish, the noble to the base.

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X

THE CAUSES OF RACE SUPERIORITY[1]

The superiorities that, at a given time, one people may display over other peoples, are not necessarily racial. Physical inferiorities that disappear as the peoples are equalized in diet and dwelling; mental inferiorities that disappear when the peoples are levelled up in respect to culture and means of education, are due not to race but to condition, not to blood but to surroundings. In accounting for disparities among peoples there are, in fact, two opposite errors into which we may fall. There is the equality fallacy inherited from the earlier thought of the last century, which belittles race differences and has a robust faith in the power of intercourse and school instruction to lift up a backward folk to the level of the best. Then there is the counter fallacy, grown up since Darwin, which exaggerates the race factor and regards the actual differences of peoples as hereditary and fixed.

Just now the latter error is, perhaps, the more besetting. At a time when race is the watchword of the vulgar and when sciolists are pinning their faith to breed, we of all men ought to beware of it.

[1] The Annual Address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, April 12, 1901.

We Americans who have so often seen the children of underfed, stunted, scrub immigrants match the native American in brain and brawn, in wit and grit, ought to realize how much the superior effectiveness of the latter is due to social conditions. Keleti, from his investigations in Hungary, has come to the conclusion that in most of the communes there the people have less to eat than is necessary to live and work, the result being alcoholism, weakness, disease and early death. Atwater, on the other hand, has found that the average wage-worker in New England consumes more food than health requires. What a host of consequences issue from this one primary contrast!

A generation ago, in the first enthusiasm over the marvels of heredity, we were taught that one race is monotheistic, another has an affinity for polytheism. One race is temperamentally aristocratic, while another is by instinct democratic. One race is innovating and radical, another is by nature conservative. But it is impossible to characterize races in respect to such large complex traits. A keener analysis connects these great historical contrasts with a number of slight specific differences in body or temperament. For example, four diverse traits of the greatest social importance, namely, progressiveness, the spirit of adventure, migrancy and the disposition to flock to cities, can be traced to a courageous confidence in the unknown coupled with the high physical tone that calls for action. Similarly, if we may be-

lieve Signor Ferrero,[1] of two equally gifted races the one that is the less sensual will be inferior in æsthetic output, less apt to cross with lower types, more loyal to the idea of duty, better adapted to monotonous factory labor, and more inclined to the Protestant form of religion. It is only by establishing fixed, specific differences of this kind that we can hope to explain those grand race contrasts that enchant the historian.[2]

[1] "L'Europa Giovane."

[2] The author ventured a later word on this subject in an address delivered at the International Congress of Arts and Sciences, St. Louis, 1904.

"The broad moral contrasts between German, Turk and Gipsy must be due to Race or to Environment, physical and social. Now, how much weight ought we to assign to the race-factor? For my own part, I doubt if ideas ever get into the blood or feelings and dispositions that depend on particular ideas. The Chinaman is not born a conservative, the Turk a fatalist, the Hindoo a pessimist, the Semite a monotheist. Notions and beliefs do not become fixed race-characters, nor do the emotions and conduct connected with them become congenital. Yet, considering how differently the peoples have been winnowed and selected by their respective environments, occupations, and histories, I see no reason why there should not arise between them differences in motor and emotional response to stimulus.

Even now in the same stock, nay, even in the same family, we find congenital differences in the strength of the sex-appetite, in the taste for liquor, in the craving for excitement, in migratoriness, in jealousy, in self-control, in capacity for regular labor, in the spirit of enterprise, in the power to postpone gratification—differences which defy eradication by example or instruction. If such diversities declare themselves within a people, why not between peoples? Will not a destructive environment select the sensual, a bountiful environment the temperate, a niggardly environment the laborious, a capricious environment the fore-looking? Will not the restless survive under nomadism, the bold under militancy, the supple under slavery, the calculating in an era of commerce, the thrifty in an epoch of capitalism? Since intellectual gains

The first cause of race superiority to which I invite your attention is a physiological trait, namely, *climatic adaptability.* Just now it is a grave question whether the flourishing and teeming peoples of the North Temperate zone can provide outlets for their surplus population in the rich but undeveloped lands of the tropics. Their superiority, economic and military, over the peoples under the vertical sun is beyond cavil. But can they assert and profit by this superiority save by imposing on the natives of

are indefinitely communicable, men do not survive according to their predisposition to have or not to have a certain advantageous idea or belief. But modes of response to stimulus are not so generalized by imitation. Men change their thoughts but not their elementary reactions, and, since according to these reactions they survive or perish, it is possible for motor and emotional differences to arise between peoples one in blood, but unlike in social history.

Let the social psychologist account for the cultural differences between peoples and for the moral differences that hinge on some cultural element. Only the simple undecomposable reactions involving no conceptual element would fall to the race-psychologist. Of course, it is not easy to tell which characteristics are elementary. Once we thought the laziness of the anæmic Georgia cracker came from a wrong ideal of life. Now we charge it to the hook-worm and administer thymol instead of the proverbs of Poor Richard. The negro is not simply a black Anglo-Saxon deficient in schooling, but a being who in strength of appetites and in power to control them differs considerably from the white man. Many of the alleged differences between Chinese and Occidentals will be wiped out when East and West come to share in a common civilization. But it will be found perhaps that the Occidental's love of excitement, speculation, sport, and fighting flows from his greater restlessness due to a thousand years less of schooling in industrialism than the Chinese have had. Again, those who imagine that by imparting to Hindoos or Cinghalese our theology the missionary endows them with our virtues and capacities, certainly fail to appreciate how much these depend on certain elementary motor reactions."

the tropics the odious and demoralizing servile relation? Can the white man work and multiply in the tropics, or will his rôle be limited to commercial and industrial exploitation at a safe distance by means of a changing, male contingent of soldiers, officials, business agents, planters and overseers?

The answer is not yet sure, but the facts bearing on acclimatization are not comforting to our race. Immunity from the fevers that waste men in hot, humid climates seems to be in inverse ratio to energy. The French are more successful in tropical settlement than the Germans or the English. The Spanish, Portuguese and Italians surpass the French in almost equal measure. When it comes to *settling* Africa, instead of merely exploring or subduing it, the peoples may unexpectedly change their rôles. With all their energy and their numbers the Anglo-Saxons appear to be physiologically inelastic, and incapable of making of Guiana or the Philippines a home such as they have made in New Zealand or Minnesota. In the tropics their very virtues—their push, their uncompromising standards, their aversion to intermarriage with the natives — are their destruction.

Ominous, on the other hand, is the extraordinary power of accommodation enjoyed by the Mongolians. Says Professor Ripley: "The Chinese succeed in Guiana where the white man cannot live; and they thrive from Siberia where the mean temperature is below freezing, to Singapore on the

equator."[1] There are even some who believe that the Chinaman is destined to dispossess the Malay in southwestern Asia and the islands of the Pacific, and the Indian in the tropical parts of South America.[2]

There is, indeed, such a thing as acclimatization; but this is virtually the creation at a frightful cost of a new race variety by climatic selection. We may therefore regard his lack of adaptability as a handicap which the white man must ever bear in competing with black, yellow, or brown men. His sciences and his inventions give him only a temporary advantage, for, as the facilities for diffusion increase, they must pass to all. Even his educational and political institutions will spread wherever they are suitable. All precedence founded on the possession of magazine rifles, or steam, or the press, or the Christian religion, must end as these elements merge into one all-embracing, everywhere diffused, cosmopolitan culture. Even the advantage conferred upon a race by closer political cohesion, or earlier development of the state, cannot last. Could we run the coming centuries through a kinetoscope, we should see all these things as mere *clothes*. For, in the last analysis, it is solely on its persistent physiological and psychological qualities that the ultimate destinies of a race depend.

The next truth to which I invite your attention is, that one race may surpass another in *energy*. The

[1] "The Races of Europe," p. 565.
[2] Pearson, "National Life and Character," ch. I.

average of individual energy is not a fixed race attribute, for new varieties are constantly being created by migration. The voluntary, unassisted migration of individuals to lands of opportunity tends always to the upbuilding of highly energetic communities and peoples. To the wilderness go, not the brainiest or noblest or highest bred, but certainly the strongest and the most enterprising. The weakling and the sluggard stay at home, or, if they are launched into the new conditions, they soon go under. The Boers are reputed to be of finer physique than their Dutch congeners. In America, before the days of exaggerated immigration, the immigrants were physically taller than the people from which they sprang, the difference amounting in some instances to an average of more than an inch. By measurements taken during the Civil War the Scotch in America were found to exceed their countrymen by two inches. Moreover, the recruits hailing from other states than those in which they had been born were generally taller than those who had not changed their residence. The Kentuckians and the Texans have become proverbial for stature, while the surprising tallness of the ladies who will be found shopping, of an afternoon, on Kearney street in San Francisco, testifies to the bigness of the "forty-niners." Comparative weights tell the same tale. Of the recruits in our Civil War, the New Englanders weighed 140 pounds, the Middle State men 141 pounds, the Ohians and Indianans 145 pounds, and

the Kentuckians 150.[1] Conversely, where, as in Sardinia, the population is the leavings of continued emigration, the stature is extraordinarily low.

This principle that repeated migrations tend to the creation of energetic races of men, opens up enchanting vistas of explanation in the jungle of history. Successive waves of conquest breaking over a land like Sicily or India may signify that a race, once keyed up to a high pitch of energy by gradual migration from its ancient seats, tends to run down as soon as such beneficent selections are interrupted by success, and settlement in a new home. Cankered by a long quiet it falls a prey in a few centuries to some other people that has likewise been keyed up by migration.

Again, this principle may account for the fact that those branches of a race achieve the most brilliant success which have wandered the farthest from their ancestral home. Of the Mongols that borrowed the old Babylonian culture, those who pushed across Asia to the Yellow Sea, have risen the highest. The Arabs and Moors that skirted Africa and won a home in far-away Spain, developed the most brilliant of the Saracenic civilizations. Hebrews, Dorians, Quirites, Rajputs, Hovas were far invaders. No communities in classic times flourished like the cities in Asia created by the overflow from Greece. Nowhere under the Czar are there such vigorous, progressive communities as in Siberia.

[1] Shalers, "The United States of America," vol. II, p. 454, note.

By the middle of this century, perhaps, the Russian on the Yenesei or the Amur will be known for his "push" and "hustle" as is to-day the American on Lake Michigan or Puget Sound. It is perhaps on this principle that the men who made their way to the British Isles have shown themselves the most masterful and achieving of the Germanic race; while their offshoots in America and Australia, in spite of some mixture, show the highest level of individual efficiency found in any people of the Anglo-Saxon breed. Even in America there is a difference between the East and the West. The listlessness and social decay noticeable in many of the rural communities and old historic towns on the Atlantic slope, are due, no doubt, to the loss of their more energetic members to the rising cities and to the virile West.

There is no doubt that the form of society which a race adopts is potent to paralyze or to release its energy. In this respect Americans are especially fortunate, for their energies are stimulated to the utmost by democracy. I refer not to popular government, but to the fact that with us social status depends little on birth and much on personal success. I will not deny that money, not merit, is frequently the test of social standing, and that Titania is often found kissing "the fair long ears" of some Bottom; but the commercial spirit, even if it cannot lend society nobility or worth, certainly encourages men to strive.

Where there is no rank or title or monarch to con-

secrate the hereditary principle, the capillarity of society is great, and ambition is whetted to its keenest edge. For it is hope not need that animates men. Set ladders before them and they will climb until their heart-strings snap.

Without a social ladder, without infection from a leisure class that keys up its standard of comfort, a body of yeomen settling in a new and fertile land will be content with simplicity and rude plenty. A certain sluggishness prevails now among the Boers, as it prevailed among the first settlers beyond the Alleghanies. If, on the other hand, there is a social ladder, but it is occupied by those of a military or hereditary position, as in the Spanish communities of the southwest, there is likewise no stimulus to energy. But if vigorous men form new communities in close enough touch with rich and old communities to accept their exacting standards of comfort, without at the same time accepting their social ranking, each man has the greatest possible incentive to improve his condition. Such has been the relation of America to England, and of the West to the East.

This is why America spells Opportunity. Inspired by hope and ambition the last two generations of Americans have amazed the world by the breathless speed with which they have subdued the western half of the continent, and filled the wilderness with homes and cities. Never has the world seen such prodigies of labor, such miracles of enterprise, as the creation within a single lifetime of a vast or-

dered, civilized life between the Mississippi and the Pacific. Witnessing such lavish expenditures of human force, can we wonder at American "rush," American nervousness and heart failure, at gray hairs in the thirties and old age in the fifties, at our proverb "Time is money!" and at the ubiquitous American rocking chair or hammock which enables a tired man to rest very quickly!

Closely related to energy is the virtue of *self-reliance.* There is a boldness which rises at the elbow touch of one's fellows, and there is a stoutheartedness which inspires a man when he is alone. There is a courage which confronts resolutely a known danger, and a courage which faces perils unknown or vague. Now, it is this latter quality—self-reliance—which characterizes those who have migrated the oftenest and have migrated as individuals. On our frontier has always been found the Daniel Boone type, who cared little for the support of his kind and loved danger and adventure for its own sake. The American's faith in himself and confidence in the friendliness of the unknown may be due to his enlightenment, but it is more likely the unapprehensiveness that runs in the blood of a pioneering breed. Sometimes, as in the successive trekkings of the Boers from Cape Town to the Limpopo, the trait most intensified is independence and self-reliance. Sometimes, as in the settling of the Trans-Mississippi region, the premium is put on energy and push. But in any case voluntary migration demands *men.*

Even in an old country, that element of the population is destined to riches and power which excels in self-reliance and enterprise. Cities are now the places of opportunity and of prosperity, and it has been shown conclusively that, in the urban up-building now going on in Central Europe, where long-skull Teutons and broad-skull Celto-Slavs are mingled, the cities are more Teutonic than the rural districts from which their population is recruited. The city is a magnet for the more venturesome, and it draws to it more of the long-skulled race than of the broad-skulled race. In spite of the fact that he has no greater wit and capacity than the Celt, the Teuton's superior migrancy takes him to the foci of prosperity, and procures him a higher reward and a superior social status.

Wherever there is pioneering or settlement to do, self-reliance is a supreme advantage. The expansion of the English-speaking peoples in the nineteenth century—the English in building their Empire, the Americans in subduing the West—seems to be due to this trait. Self-reliance is, in fact, a sovereign virtue in times of ferment or displacement. In static times, however, other qualities outweigh it, and the victory may fall to those who are patient, obedient, and quick-witted, rather than to the independent in spirit. If this be so, then the great question of the hour, What is to be the near destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race? involves the question whether we stand on the threshold of a dynamic, or a static epoch. If the former, well for the

Anglo-Saxon; if the latter, it may be the Latins who, renewing their faith in themselves, will forge ahead.

I think there can be no doubt that we are entering a tumultuously dynamic epoch. Science, machinery and steam—our heritage from the past century—together constitute a new economic civilization which is destined to work in the world a transformation such as the plow works among nomads. Two centuries ago Europe had little to offer Asia in an industrial way. Now, in western Europe and in America, there exists an industrial technique which alters the face of society wherever it goes. The exploitation of nature and man by steam and machinery directed by technical knowledge, has the strongest of human forces behind it, and nothing can check its triumphant expansion over the planet. The Arab spreads the religion of Mahomet with the Koran in one hand and the sword in the other. The white man of to-day spreads his economic gospel, one hand on a Gatling, the other on a locomotive.

It will take at least two or three generations to level up the industrial methods of continents like South America or Africa or Asia, as a Jamaica, a Martinique, or a Hawaii have been levelled up; and all this time that race which excels in energy, self-reliance and education will have the advantage. When this furiously dynamic epoch closes, when the world becomes more static, and uniformism recurs, self-reliance will be at a discount, and the conditions will again favor the race that is patient, laborious,

frugal, intelligent and apt in consolidation. Then, perhaps, the Celtic and Mediterranean races will score against the Anglo-Saxon.

For economic greatness perhaps no quality is more important than *foresight*. To live from hand to mouth taking no thought of the morrow, is the trait of primitive man generally, and especially of the races in the tropical lands where nature is bounteous, and the strenuous races have not yet made their competition felt. From the Rio Grande to the Rio de la Plata, the laboring masses, largely of Indian breed, are without a compelling vision of the future.[1] The Mexicans, our consuls write us, are "occupied in obtaining food and amusement for the passing hour without either hope or desire for a better future." They are always in debt, and the workman hired for a job asks something in advance to buy materials or to get something to eat. "Slaves of local attachments" they will not migrate in order to get higher wages. In Ecuador the laborer lets tomorrow take care of itself and makes no effort to accumulate. In Guiana, where Hindoos, Chinese, Portuguese, and Creoles labor side by side, the latter squander their earnings while the immigrants from the old economic civilizations all lay by in order to return home and enjoy. In Colombia the natives will not save, nor will they work in order to supply themselves with comforts. In British Honduras the natives are happy-go-lucky negroes who rarely save

[1] Consular Reports, "Labor in Foreign Countries," 1884, vol. III.

and who spend their earnings on festivals and extravagances, rather than on comforts and decencies. In Venezuela the laborers live for to-day and all their week's earnings are gone by Monday morning. The Brazilians work as little as they can and live, and save no money; are satisfied so long as they have a place to sleep and enough to eat.

Since, under modern conditions, abundant production is bound up, not so much with patient toil, as with the possession of ample capital, it is evident that, in the economic rivalry of races, the palm goes to the race that discounts the future least and is willing to exchange present pleasures for future gratifications most nearly at par. The power to do this depends partly on a lively imagination of remote experiences to come, partly on the self-control that can deny present cravings, or resist temptation in favor of the thrifty course recommended by reason. We may, in fact, distinguish two types of men, the sensori-motor moved by sense-impressions and by sensory images, and the ideo-motor moved by ideas. For it is probable that the provident races do not accumulate simply from the liveliness of their anticipation of future wants or gratifications, but from the domination of certain ideas. The tenant who is saving to build a cottage of his own is not animated simply by a picture of coming satisfactions. All his teaching, all his contact with his fellows, conspire to make "home" the goal of his hopes, to fill his horizon with that one radiant idea. So in the renter who is scrimping in order to get himself a farm as

in the immigrant who is laying by to go back and "be somebody" in the old country, the attraction of a thousand vaguely imagined pleasures is concentrated in one irresistible idea. The race that can make *ideas* the lodestars of life is certain to supplant a race of impulsivists absorbed in sensations, and recollections or anticipations of sensations.

It is certain that races differ in their attitude toward past and future. M. Lapie[1] has drawn a contrast between the Arab and the Jew. The Arab *remembers;* he is mindful of past favors and past injuries. He harbors his vengeance and cherishes his gratitude. He accepts everything on the authority of tradition, loves the ways of his ancestors, forms strong local attachments, and migrates little. The Jew, on the other hand, turns his face toward the future. He is thrifty and always ready for a good stroke of business, will, indeed, join with his worst enemy if it pays. He is calculating, enterprising, migrant and ambitious.

An economic quality quite distinct from foresight is *the value sense.* By this I mean that facility of abstraction and calculation which enables a man to fix his interest on the value in goods rather than on the goods themselves. The mere husbandman is a utility perceiver. He knows the power of objects to keep human beings alive and happy, and has no difficulty in recognizing what is good and what is not. But the trader is a value perceiver. Not what a thing is good for, but what it will fetch, engages

[1] "Les races tunisiens."

his attention. Generic utilities are relatively stable, for wine and oil and cloth are always and everywhere fit to meet human wants; but value is a chameleon-like thing, varying greatly from time to time and place to place and person to person. The successful trader dares form no fixed ideas with regard to his wares. He must pursue the elusive value that hovers now here and now there, and be ready at any moment to readjust his notions. He must be a calculator. He must train himself to recognize the abstract in the concrete and to distill the abstract out of the concrete. Economically, then, the trader is to the husbandman what the husbandman is to the hunter. The appearance of cities, money, and commerce puts a premium on the man who can perceive value. He accumulates property and founds a house, while his less skillful rival sinks and is devoured by war and by labor.

All through that ancient world which produced the Phœnecian, the Jew, the Greek and the Roman, the acquisition of property made a difference in survival we can hardly understand to-day. Our *per capita* production is probably three or four times as great as theirs was, and hence the grain-handlers of Buffalo are vastly more able to maintain a family than were the grain-handlers of old Carthage or Alexandria. All around the Mediterranean, trade prospered the value perceivers, and that type tended to multiply and tinge more and more the psychology and ideals of the classic world. In ancient society the difference in death rates and in family-support-

ing power of the various industrial grades exceeded anything we are familiar with, and hence those who were steady and thrifty in labor or shrewd and prudent in trade vastly improved their chances of survival. Thus the economic man multiplied, and commercial, money-making Byzantium rose on the ruins of the old races. "Long before the seat of empire was moved to Constantinople," says Mr. Freeman, "the name of Roman had ceased to imply even a presumption of descent from the old patricians and plebeians." "The Julius, the Claudius, the Cornelius of those days was for the most part no Roman by lineal descent, but a Greek, a Gaul, a Spaniard or an Illyrian."

Between the economic type and the military type there is abrupt contrast, and the social situation cannot well favor them both at the same time. The warrior shows passionate courage and the sway of impulse and imagination. The trader is calculating, counts the cost, and prizes a whole skin. From the second century B. C. the substitution of this type for the old, heroic, Cincinnatus type went on so rapidly that a recent writer finds congenital cowardice to be the mark of the Roman Senate and nobility during the empire. We all know the brilliant picture that Mr. Brooks Adams, in his "Law of Civilization and Decay," has given of the replacement of the military by the economic type in western Europe since the Crusades.

If this hypothesis be sound, the value perceiving sense is to be looked for in old races that have long

known cities, money and trade. The Jew came under these influences at least twelve centuries earlier than did our Teutonic ancestors and has therefore had about forty or fifty generations the start of us in becoming economic. Equal or even greater is the lead of the Chinaman. It is, then, no wonder that the Jews and the Chinese are the two most formidable mercantile races in the world to-day, just as, in the Middle Ages, the Greeks and the Italians were the most redoubtable traffickers and money-makers in Europe. The Scotchman, the Fleming, and the Yankee, minor and later economic varieties developed in the West, can, indeed, exist alongside the Jew. The less mercantile German, however, fails to hold his own, and vents his wrath in Anti-Semitism. The Slav, unsophisticated and rural, loses invariably in his dealings with the Jew, and so harshly drives him out in vast numbers.

May we not, then, conveniently recognize two stages in the development away from the barbarian? Hindoos, Japanese, North Africans and Europeans, in their capacity for steady labor, their foresight, and their power to save, constitute what I will call *the domesticated races.* But the Jews, the Chinese, the Parsees, the Armenians, and in general the peoples about the Mediterranean constitute *the economic races.* The expurgated and deleted Teuton of the West, on the other hand, is more recently from the woods, and remains something of the barbarian after all. We see it in his migratoriness, his spirit of adventure, his love of dangerous sports, his gambling

propensities, his craving for strong drink, his living up to his standard of comfort whether he can afford it or not. In quest of excitement he betakes himself to the Far West or the Klondike, whereas the Jew betakes himself to the Board of Trade or the Bourse. In direct competition with the more economic type the Anglo-Saxon is handicapped by lack of patience and financial acumen, but still his virtues insure him a rich portion. His energy and self-reliance locate him in cities and in the spacious, thriving parts of the earth where the economic reward is highest. Born pioneer, he prospects the wilderness, preëmpting the richest deposits of the precious metals and skimming the cream from the resources of nature. Strong in war and in government, he jealously guards his own from the economic races, and meets finesse with force; so that despite his less developed value sense, more and more the choice lands and the riches of the earth come into his possession and support his brilliant yet solid civilization.

It is through no inadvertence that I have not brought forward *the martial traits* as a cause of race superiority. I do not believe that the martial traits apart from economic prowess are likely in the future to procure success to any race. When men kill one another by arms of precision instead of by stabbing and hacking, the knell is sounded for purely war-like races like the Vandals, the Huns and the Turks. Invention has so completely transformed warfare that it has become virtually an extra hazardous branch of engineering. The factory system receives

its latest and supreme application in the killing of men. Against an intelligent force equipped with the modern specialized appliances of slaughter no amount of mere warlike manhood can prevail. The fate of the Dervishes is typical of what must more and more often occur when *men* are pitted against properly operated lethal *machinery*.

Now, the war factory is as expensive as it is effective. None but the economic races, up to their eyes in capital and expert in managing machinery, can keep it running long. Warfare is becoming a costly form of competition in which the belligerents shed each other's treasure rather than each other's blood. A nation loses, not when it is denuded of men, but when it is at the end of its financial resources. War is, in fact, coming to be the supreme, economic touchstone, testing systems of cultivation and transportation and banking, as well as personal courage and military organization.

At the same time that war is growing more expensive it is becoming less profitable. The fruits of victory are often mere apples of Sodom. A decent respect for the opinion of mankind debars a civilized people from massacring the conquered in order to plant its own colonists on their land, from enslaving them, from bleeding them with heavy and perpetual tribute. Fortunate, indeed, is the victor if he can extort enough to indemnify him for his outlay. Therefore, at the very moment that the cost of war increases, the declining profits of war stamp it as an industry of decreasing returns. Wealth is a

means of procuring victory, but victory is no longer a means of procuring wealth. A non-martial race may easily become victorious by means of its prosperity, but it will be harder and harder for a non-economic race to become prosperous by means of its victories. Even now the Turks in Europe are declining in numbers, and in spite of Armenian massacres the industrial races of the empire are growing up through the top-dressing of oppressors. It would seem safe to say that the purely warlike traits no longer insure race survival and expansion, and that in the competitions of the future the traits which enhance economic efficiency are likely to be the most decisive.

In the dim past when cultures were sporadic, each developing apart in some island or river delta or valley closet, no race could progress unless it bore its crop of inventive genius. A high average of capacity was not so important as a few Gutenbergs and Faradays in each generation to make lasting additions to the national culture. If fruitful initiatives were forthcoming, imitation and education could be trusted to make them soon the the common possession of all.

But when culture becomes cosmopolitan, as it is to-day, the success of a race turns much more on the efficiency of its average units than on the inventions and discoveries of its geniuses. The heaven-sent man who invents the locomotive, or the dynamo, or the germ theory, confers thereby no exclusive advantage on his people or his race. So perfect is in-

tellectual commerce, so complete is the organization of science, that almost at once the whole civilized world knows and profits by his achievements. Nowadays the pioneering genius belongs to mankind, and however patriotic he may be he aids most the race that is most prompt and able to exploit his invention. Parasitism of this kind, therefore, tends to annul genius as a factor in race survival. During the century just closed the French intellect has stood supreme in its contributions to civilization; yet France has derived no exclusive advantage from her men of genius. It is differences in the qualities of the common men of the rival peoples that explain why France has not doubled its population in a century, while the English stock in the meantime has peopled some of the choicest parts of the world and more than quadrupled its numbers.

Henceforth this principle of cosmopolitanism must be reckoned with. Even if the Chinese have not yet vanquished the armies of the West with Mauser rifles supplied from Belgium, there is no reason why that mediocre and intellectually sterile race may not yet defeat us industrially by the aid of machines and processes conceived in the fertile brains of our Edisons and Marconis. Organizing talent, of course,—industrial, administrative, military,—each race must, in the long run, produce from its own loins; but in the industrial Armageddon to come it may be that the laurels will be won by a mediocre type of humanity, equipped with the science and the appliances of the more brilliant and brain-fertile peoples. Not

preponderance of genius will be decisive, but more and more the energy, self-reliance, fecundity, and acquired skill of the average man; and the nation will do most for itself that knows how best to foster these winning qualities by means of education and wise social institutions.

How far does moral excellence profit a race? Those who hold that "History is the world's Court of Justice" tell us that the weal or woe of nations depends upon morals. Indeed, every flourishing people lays its prosperity first to its religion, and then to its moral code. Climatic adaptation or economic capacity is the last thing to be thought of as a cause of superiority.

The chief moral trait of a winning race is *stability of character.* Primitive peoples are usually over-emotional and poised unstably between smiles and tears. They act quickly if at all, and according to the impulse of the moment. The Abyssinian, for example, is fickle, fleeting and perjured, the Kirghiz "fickle and uncertain," the Bedouin "loves and honors violent acts." The courage of the Mongol is "a sudden blaze of pugnacity" rather than a cool intrepidity. We recall Carlyle's comparing Gallic fire which is "as the crackling of dry thorns under a pot," with the Teutonic fire which rises slowly but will smelt iron. In private endeavor perseverance, in the social economy the keeping of promises, and in the state steadfastness—these are the requisites of success, and they all depend on stability of character. Reliability in business engagements and settled

reverence for law are indispensable in higher social development. The great economic characteristics of this age are the tendency to association, the growth of exchange, the increasing use of capital and the greater elaborateness of organization. They all imply the spreading of business over more persons, more space, and more time, and the increasing dependence of every enterprise upon what certain persons have been appointed to do or have engaged to do. Unreliable persons who fail to do their duty or keep their promises are quickly extruded from the economic organization. Industrial evolution, therefore, places a rising premium on reflection and self-control, the foundations of character. More and more it penalizes the childishness or frivolousness of the cheaply-gotten-up, *mañana* races.

As regards the altruistic virtues, they are too common to confer a special advantage. Honesty, docility, faithfulness and other virtues that lessen social friction abound at every stage of culture and in almost every breed. The economic virtues are a function of *race;* but the moral virtues seem rather to be a function of *association.* They do not make society; society makes them. Just as the joint secretes the lubricating synovial fluid so every settled community, if undisturbed, secretes in time the standards, ideals and imperatives which are needed to lessen friction. Good order is, in fact, so little a monopoly of the higher races that the attainment of it is more difficult among Americans at Dutch Flat or Skagway than it is among Eskimos or Indians.

Sociability and sympathy are, indeed, serviceable in promoting cohesion among natural men; but they are of little account in the higher social architecture. The great races have been stern and grasping, with a strong property sense. More and more the purposive triumphs over the spontaneous association; so that the great historic social edifices are built on concurrence of aims, on custom or religion or law, never on mere brotherly feeling.

Indeed, the primary social sentiments are at variance with that sturdy self-reliance which, as we have seen, enables a race to overrun the earth. It was observed even in the California gold diggings that the French miners stayed together, while the solitary American or Briton serenely roamed the wilderness with his outfit on a burro, and made the richest "strikes." To-day a French railway builder in Tonkin says of the young French engineers in his employ: "They sicken, morally and physically, these fellows. They need papa and mamma! I had good results from bringing them together once or twice a week, keeping them laughing, making them amuse themselves and each other, in spite of lack of amusement. Then all would go well." It is perhaps this cruel homesickness which induces the French to restrict their numbers rather than expatriate themselves to over-sea colonies. Latin sociability is the fountain of many of the graces that make life worth living, but it is certainly a handicap in just this critical epoch, when the apportionment of the earth among the races depends so much on a readiness to

fight, trade, prospect or colonize thousands of miles from home.

The superority of a race cannot be preserved without *pride of blood* and an uncompromising attitude toward the lower races. In Spanish America the easygoing and unfastidious Spaniard peopled the continent with half-breeds and met the natives half way in respect to religious and political institutions. In East Africa and Brazil the Portuguese showed toward the natives even less of that race aversion which is so characteristic of the Dutch and the English. In North America, on the other hand, the white men have rarely mingled their blood with that of the Indian or toned down their civilization to meet his capacities. The Spaniard absorbed the Indians, the English exterminated them by fair means or foul. Whatever may be thought of the latter policy, the net result is that North America from the Behring Sea to the Rio Grande is dedicated to the highest type of civilization; while for centuries the rest of our hemisphere will drag the ball and chain of hybridism.

Since the higher culture should be kept pure as well as the higher blood, that race is stronger which, down to the cultivator or the artisan, has *a strong sense of its superiority.* When peoples and races meet there is a silent struggle to determine which shall do the assimilating. The issue of this grapple turns not wholly on the relative excellence of their civilizations, but partly on the degree of faith each has in itself and its ideals. The Greeks assimilated

to themselves all the peoples about the Mediterranean save the Jew, partly because the humblest wandering Greek despised "the barbarians," and looked upon himself as a missionary to the heathen. The absorbent energy of the United States surpasses that of any mere colony probably because of the stimulus given us by an independent national existence. America is a psychic maelstrom that has sucked in and swallowed up hosts of aliens. Five millions of Germans, for instance, have joined us, and yet how little has our institutional development been deflected by them! I dare say the few thousand university-trained Germans, and Americans educated in Heidelberg or Göttingen, have injected more German culture into our veins than all the immigrants that ever passed through Castle Garden. There is no doubt that the triumph of Americanism over these heterogeneous elements, far more decisive now than eighty years ago, has been hastened by the vast contempt that even the native farm-hand or mechanic feels for the unassimilated immigrant. Had he been less sure of himself, had he felt less pride in American ideals and institutions, the tale might have been different.

One question remains. Is the Superior Race as we have portrayed it, able to survive all competitions and expand under all circumstances? There is, I am convinced, one respect in which the very foresight and will power that mark the higher race dig a pit beneath its feet.

In the presence of the plenty produced by its triumphant energy the superior race forms what the

economists call "a Standard of Comfort," and refuses to multiply save upon this plane. With his native ambition stimulated by the opportunity to rise and his natural foresight reinforced by education, the American, for example, overrules his strongest instincts and refrains from marrying or from increasing his family until he can realize his subjective standard of comfort or decency. The power to form and cling to such a standard is not only one of the noblest triumphs of reason over passion, but is, in sooth, the only sure hope for the elevation of the mass of men from the abyss of want and struggle. The progress of invention held out such a hope but it has proven a mockery. Steam and machinery, it is true, ease for a little the strain of population on resources; but if the birth-rate starts forward and the slack is soon taken up by the increase of mouths, the final result is simply more people living on the old plane. The rosy glow thrown upon the future by progress in the industrial arts proves but a false dawn unless the common people acquire new wants and raise the plane upon which they multiply.

Now, this rising standard, which alone can pilot us toward the Golden Age, is a fatal weakness when a race comes to compete industrially with a capable race that multiplies on a lower plane. Suppose, for example, Asiatics flock to this country and, enjoying equal opportunities under our laws, learn our methods and compete actively with Americans. They may be able to produce and therefore earn in the ordinary occupations, say three-fourths as much as

Americans; but if their standard of life is only half as high, the Asiatic will marry before the American feels able to marry. The Asiatic will rear two children while his competitor feels able to rear but one. The Asiatic will increase his children to six under conditions that will not encourage the American to raise more than four. Both, perhaps, are forward-looking and influenced by the worldly prospects of their children; but where the Oriental is satisfied with the outlook the American, who expects to school his children longer and place them better, shakes his head.

Now, to such a competition there are three possible results. First, the American, becoming discouraged, may relinquish his exacting standard of decency and begin to multiply as freely as the Asiatic. This, however, is likely to occur only among the more reckless and worthless elements of our population. Second, the Asiatic may catch up our wants as well as our arts, and acquire the higher standard and lower rate of increase of the American. This is just what contact and education are doing for the French Canadians in New England, for the immigrants in the West, and for the negro in some parts of the South; but the members of a great culture race like the Chinese show no disposition, even when scattered sparsely among us, to assimilate to us or to adopt our standards. Not until their self-complacency has been undermined at home and an extensive intellectual ferment has taken place in China itself will the Chinese become assimilable ele-

ments. Thirdly, the standards may remain distinct, the rates of increase unequal, and the silent replacement of Americans by Asiatics go on unopposed until the latter monopolize all industrial occupations, and the Americans shrink to a superior caste able perhaps by virtue of its genius, its organization, and its vantage of position to retain for a while its hold on government, education, finance, and the direction of industry, but hopelessly beaten and displaced as a race. In other words, the American farm hand, mechanic and operative might wither away before the heavy influx of a prolific race from the Orient, just as in classic times the Latin husbandman vanished before the endless stream of slaves poured into Italy by her triumphant generals.

For a case like this I can find no words so apt as "race suicide."[1] There is no bloodshed, no violence, no assault of the race that waxes upon the race that wanes. The higher race quietly and unmurmuringly eliminates itself rather than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off from itself by collective action. The working classes gradually delay marriage and restrict the size of the family as the opportunities hitherto reserved for their children are eagerly snapped up by the numerous progeny of the foreigner. The prudent, self-respecting natives first cease to expand, and then, as the struggle for existence grows sterner and the outlook for their children darker, they fail even to

[1] This, so far as the writer knows, is the first use of a term which later was given wide currency by President Roosevelt.

recruit their own numbers. It is probably the visible narrowing of the circle of opportunity through the infiltration of Irish and French Canadians that has brought so low the native birth-rate in New England.

However this may be, it is certain that if we venture to apply to the American people of to-day the series of tests of superiority I have set forth to you at such length, the result is most gratifying to our pride. It is true that our average of energy and character is lowered by the presence in the South of several millions of an inferior race. It is true that the last twenty years have diluted us with masses of fecund but beaten humanity from the hovels of far Lombardy and Galicia. It is true that our free land is gone and our opportunities will henceforth attract immigrants chiefly from the humbler strata of East European peoples. Yet, while there are here problems that only high statesmanship can solve, I believe there is at the present moment no people in the world that is, man for man, equal to the Americans in capacity and efficiency. We stand now at the moment when the gradual westward migration has done its work. The tonic selections of the frontier have brought us as far as they can bring us. The testing individualizing struggle with the wilderness has developed in us what it could of body, brain and character.

Moreover, free institutions and universal education have keyed to the highest tension the ambitions of the American. He has been chiefly farmer and

is only beginning to expose himself to the deteriorating influences of city and factory. He is now probably at the climax of his energy and everything promises that in the centuries to come he is destined to play a brilliant and leading rôle on the stage of history.

XI

THE VALUE RANK OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE[1]

How much is the present enviable position of America due to the qualities of her people, how much to the rich land they have occupied and to the beneficent institutions they have inherited? While not belittling the favor of environment and institutions, we have ground for thinking that if in 1800 or 1850 this country had contained instead of its then population an equal number of average English or French or Germans its progress would have been less rapid than it actually was. The anthropologist thinks he can perceive a distinct American type, the formation of which he would attribute not to climate or crossing of strains, but to the same process that creates improved varieties of domestic plants or animals—*viz., selection.*

The American strain originated in the spontaneous influx of Europeans. Before the days of assisted or artfully stimulated immigration the tearing up of the roots in the Old World home required unusual hardihood and enterprise. It implied not only self-reliance and faith in the unknown, but great readiness to take risk. To the wilderness

[1] From *The Independent*, Nov. 10, 1904.

to cope with nature and the savage go not always the brainiest or noblest or best bred, but certainly the strongest and most energetic. The weakling and the sluggard stay at home, or, if they are launched into the frontier conditions, they soon go under. The tests to which pioneers are subjected are much more searching than those of an old society, and the death-rate is higher. A differentiated society shelters and carries along many ill-adapted that cannot stand the rude buffets of life as isolated farmers clearing the forest and planting crops among the stumps. The hardships of pioneer life pitilessly screened out the weak and debilitated, leaving only the hardy and vigorous.

To-day the lure of America is chiefly economic. But the early comers panted for something else than easy bread-winning. They sought escape from the confinement of crusted-over societies. Too independent in spirit to crouch and fawn and prosper, they preferred the hardships of this untamed land to the dictation of priest and squire and drill seggeant and employer. The clingers abided at home, but the stalwarts came for freedom's sake, and when, even here, society began to close about them and to crystallize they pushed farther into the wilderness. To-day among the *vortrekkers* of population in the valleys of the Rocky Mountains you find eagle-faced men who remind you of Vikings, men like the "terrible and self-reliant warriors of the Scandinavian sagas, like Ragnor, Lodbrog or Egil, son of Skallagrim, who did not regard even the

gods, but trusted to their own might and main." In the last and westernmost decanting of our people this impatience of restraint becomes almost a malady. In accounting for the dislike of Arizonans for the United States soldiers, Owen Wister says:

"The unthinking sons of the sage brush ill tolerate a thing which stands for discipline, good order and obedience; and the man who lets another command him they despise. I can think of no threat more evil for our democracy, for it is a fine thing, diseased and perverted—namely, independence gone drunk."

The energy and spirit of the original European element have been intensified by the innumerable internal migrations that have carried the white race entirely across the Continent. It is the more ambitious and spirited that have "gone West," and since the younger and more flourishing communities have had the higher rate of natural increase a large part of the American element in our population are descended from men who had the mettle and pluck to become pioneers.

What now are the salient traits of the type thus formed?

The natural physique of the American breed is superior to that of European. Even in the sixties, after the average physique of the nation had suffered through the infusion of great numbers of low-grade immigrants, the measurements showed the native-born volunteers to be an inch or an inch and a half taller than the foreign-born. The foreign-

born, in turn, appeared to be taller than the people from which they sprang.

A report on the volunteer soldiers of the war says:

"The physical qualities which fit the American for military service consist not so much in muscular development and height as in the toughness of his muscular fibre and the freedom of his tissues from interstitial fat, whereby active and prolonged movements are much facilitated."

Our people, moreover, are singularly free from blood taints. One cannot live in Central Europe without observing that the signs of rachitis, scrofula and syphilis are much more numerous there than they are here.

As regards American character, there is no question that its salient trait is energy of will. We see it in the saurian ferocity of business competition, in the whirl of activity that leaves neurasthenia, heart failure and Bright's disease in its wake, in the reluctance to "retire" betimes, in the killing pace of our workingmen, in the swift conquest of the wilderness, in our faith in efficiency as the only goal of education. No people pardons more to the successful man or holds the persistently poor in such pitying contempt as weaklings that cannot get into the game. In the American action prevails over imagination and reflection. He is the true anti-Buddhist, the Occidental raised to the n^{th} power. Hence the American rocking-chair, solace of the overtired. Hence "Time is money," "Boil it down," "Twenty minutes for dinner," etc. The magazine article is

read instead of the book, the paragraph instead of the editorial, the scare-head instead of the dispatch. To the women are relegated religion, literature, art, social elegancies — whatever, in short, demands repose.

The strong will heeds nothing but the goal. The high voltage American of the pioneering breed contemns hardship and risk, braves alike White Pass and Death Valley. In sport or in battle no one will stand more punishment than he. Body, appetites, inclinations—all are gripped in the iron vise of his will. Unsparing of himself, he is reckless in sacrificing others. His impulses are kindly, but woe to those whose rights or lives block his way!

The enjoying of things requires the passive attitude—letting things work on you. The reign of the active spirit therefore makes ours a producers' society rather than a consumers' society. We neglect no trifle that will lower cost, but overlook little things that add to comfort. In London there are hotels where the morning paper is warmed before it is handed to you. In Berlin there are restaurants where they give you an electric stirrer with thermometer inserted to bring your beer to just the right temperature. The New World for making money, the Old World for spending it. Hence the active come to us, the idle rich desert us. We do not learn to dawdle gracefully. An American crowd never effervesces with gayety like the holiday throng in Europe.

In this "hustle" civilization preoccupation and

hard work damp lust, that canker of the pleasure civilization. The centers of infection are fewer, and the germs of lubricity can hardly live in this eager forenoon air. The sex life is not prominent in our manners and literature, the family is pure, and there is an Arcadian frankness between our young men and young women.

Guile is the resource of the feeble, the weapon of the downtrodden. The born American, on the other hand, feels able to win without stooping. Conscious of strength, he prefers to speak the truth and play fair, not as something due to others, but as something due to himself. But for all that he owes it to himself to succeed. Where business or political competition becomes fierce this native morality is, therefore, compromised by the determination to succeed at any cost. Hence a queer, ring-straked conscience that does not stick at corruption, fraud and grand larceny, yet keeps faith with foes and warns before striking.

In point of intellect Americans are not clearly differentiated from the mother stocks. Although free from the ox-like "man-with-the-hoe" — that sort finding here no chance to survive or mate—we must not impute to ourselves unusual mental capacity. The change a few years of our electrifying ozone works in the dull, fat-witted immigrant suggests that our proverbial alertness, cleverness and lucidity betoken stimulus rather than brain power. It is, after all, the high peaks that count, and no one is so rash as to assert that our crop of geniuses per

million is heavier than that of Scotland or Switzerland. It is only by counting in our inventors—mostly mechanical—and our captains of industry that we can offset our deficit of eminent men in literature, art and science.

Albeit we travel on a rising curve of civilization, anthropologically we are at our zenith, for the westward shifting of people has slackened, and the bracing selections of the frontier have well-nigh ceased. Indeed, it is quite possible that in 1860, before the Great Killing and the Great Dilution, the human stuff here was some carats finer than it is to-day.

The Civil War cost half a million men well above the average in physique and spirit. The South lost her flower. In the North the impulsive were decimated, while the calculating stayed at home and multiplied. Had this splendid half million lived the Old World would not have peopled the trans-Mississippi region, and the nomenclature of many a Western town would be different to-day. The blood of the nation was lastingly impoverished by that awful hemorrhage. The cheap stucco manikins from Southeastern Europe do not really take the place of the unbegotten sons of the granite men who fell at Gettysburg and Cold Harbor. Had this sterling humanity not been squandered would the South be so hysterical or the North so graft-rotted as is the case to-day?

Then came the Great Dilution to pull down the average.

The flood of immigration now flows from differ-

ent sources, and taps lower human levels than the earlier tide. Over-persuaded, from Croatia and Dalmatia and Sicily and Armenia, they throng to us, the beaten members of beaten breeds, often the more aboriginal men that have been elbowed aside or left behind in the swayings of the mightier European races. Do these Slovaks and Syrians add as much to the strength of the human piers that support our civilization as Scotch-Irish or Scandinavians? As undersized in spirit, no doubt, as they are in body, the later comers lack the ancestral foundations of American character, and even if they catch step with us they and their children will, nevertheless, impede our progress.

The inrush from the lesser breeds has not stayed the march of industry or commerce or science or education, for these are in the capable hands of picked men. But the newcomer counts one at the polls, and hence it is in our politics that the sag is most evident. The higher types of men are prompted to act together, because they believe in the same principle or love the same ideal. The inferior pull togther from clannishness or allegiance to a leader. The growing disposition to rally about persons and the rising value of the saloonkeeper, the ex-pugilist and the boss in controlling city voters would indicate that the electorate has been debased by the too free admission of political incapables.

The strife between labor and capital has been aggravated by ethnic difference. The employer has been more haughty, the employee more turbulent,

than if they had stood on one race plane. Caste widens the gulf between them and the Edenic reasonableness of the Antipodes is hardly for us to hope.

Dilution, however, need not spell decline. The psychology of the superior third of a people creates the spirit which ultimately comes to dominate the rest. It gives rise to ideals, which, under the pressure of divers social atmospheres, penetrate to the soul's marrow and become a second nature. This is why, despite the swelling influx of the inferior, that emanation of the pioneering breed, the American spirit, is still clear, strong and triumphant. Never has the psychic whirlwind here had more power to seize and bear aloft lowly men than it has to-day. The social body quivers throughout under our forced-draft pace.

Free land is gone, however, and the fact that nowadays the hegira of the ambitious is all to the man-stifled town instead of to the spacious, prolific frontier may be fateful for the American element in our population. The great glittering cities attract the brightest youths from the farms and tempt them to strain for the prizes of success. But what with shortened lives, bachelorhood, late or childless marriages, and small families, the cities constitute so many blast furnaces where the talented rise and become incandescent, to be sure, but for all that are incinerated without due replacement. Thus may run down a race keyed up by the migrations of more than two centuries. War lowered the

standard of admission to the French army three and one-third inches between Louis XIV and the Third Republic, but in the meantime siren Paris lowered still more the spirit of initiative of the French. Unless our successful ones hearken betimes to the gospel of the simple life the afternoon spirit is sure to creep upon us at last.

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